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Abstract
The thesis aims to evaluate the critical potential of a foucaultian approach to Politics and 
International Relations by looking at the main rationalities o f government in the last 45 
years in the United States. In order to investigate the practical and ideational elements 
that shape the formation o f subjectivity in contemporary America, I explore the possible 
combinations between the various forms of power that Foucault talks about, most 
notably govemmentality, discipline and sovereign power. By addressing the existing 
attempts to combine the above forms of power in IR and sociological literature, I intend 
to qualify the scope and applicability of govemmentality. The thesis therefore works on 
two levels. First, it attends to the theoretical expositions and problematizations o f 
govemmentality. Second, it concentrates on the technical and intellectual transformations 
that have taken place across domestic and foreign policy domains in contemporary 
America. In spite of the need to qualify the use of govemmentality, I argue that the 
foucaultian understanding of the transformation of subjectivity through the reproduction 
o f social, cultural and economic criteria and practices, offers the best possible 
perspective to engage with present-day political forms.
Throughout the history o f American rationalities of rule, a reliance on the development 
o f individual qualities and the ongoing suggestion o f civic responsibilities have battled 
out to constitute governmental arrangements at any given time. In the transformation 
from a welfare oriented rationale to a neoliberal governance through community, two of 
the most important political rationalities, neoconservatism and neoliberalism, have 
produced compelling versions o f social behaviour as well as discourses which have 
influenced foreign and domestic policy courses. A look at the governmental shifts in 
recent American history shows that the understandings o f both freedom and 
responsibility have become increasingly narrow and specific. Disciplinary measures on 
welfare recipients and developing countries receiving American assistance have 
intensified, and security imperatives have periodically upset the normal operation of 
govemmentality.
Acknowledgments
I am deeply thankful to my supervisor Kimberly Hutchings for encouraging me 
throughout this long and occasionally difficult journey. Her critical input has been 
invaluable and I couldn’t have wished for a more thorough, attentive and 
considerate supervisor.
I would like to thank my LSE colleagues Simona, Simon and Roberto for their 
friendship and good humour, particularly in the last six months. A special mention 
goes to my colleague and friend in Oxford Jean Francois Drolet who took the time 
to comment on several chapters.
I would like to thank my friends, in particular Jean-Francois, Nicola, Dominic and 
Kate, for putting up with me in the last four years.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents for all their support.
Table of Contents
Introduction............................................................................................................. 1
Chapter One: Foucault, Govemmentality and International Relations 12
1. Foucault’s Earlier Work and the Idea of Critique................................................. 14
1.1 Power and Knowledge............................................................................................18
1.2 Govemmentality..................................................................................................... 22
2. Post structural IR and Govemmentality...................................................................30
2.1 The Critique of Neorealism...................................................................................30
2.2 Discourse analysis and Identity Formation......................................................... 33
2.3 Govemmentality and International Relations..................................................... 37
Chapter Two: Biopolitics and Sovereignty...........................................................42
1. Government and Violence......................................................................................... 42
1.1 Foucault and Sovereign Power............................................................................... 44
1.2 ‘Society Must be Defended’....................................................................................45
1.3 Population, Security and the Exception........................  49
2. The Sovereigntv/Biopower nexus in International Politics.................................. 52
3. Law. Security and Government.................................................................................57
Chapter Three: The 1960’s; The Welfare State versus Individualism 64
1. American Govemmentality....................................................................................... 65
1.1 Freedom and Responsibility in pre-1960’s America...........................................66
1.2 Beginnings o f a Conservative Backlash................................................................71
2. The AFDC and the Great Society.............................................................................74
3. AID Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Era......................................................... 80
4. The Vietnam War and US foreign policy................................................................85
4.1 The Vietnam War; Extending the American Model by Force........................... 87
Chapter Four: The 1970’s; The Welfare Model Under Pressure.................... 93
1. Welfare and Work in the 1970’s...............................................................................95
2. The American Family................................................................................................ 101
3. New Directions for American Aid (1973)...............................................................104
3.1 The Distribution o f Responsibility.........................................................................107
v
4. Leadership. Order and Morality................................................................................. 110
5. The Counter-Culture and its Offsprings.................................................................... 115
C hapter Five: Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism in the Reaganite E ra ......... 119
1. Moral and Economic Discipline at Home................................................................. 121
1.1 Intellectuals and Social Policy.................................................................................. 123
1.2 Reagan’s Welfare Reforms........................................................................................127
2. Moral and Economic Discipline Abroad.................................................................... 131
2.1 USAID in the 1980’s .................................................................................................. 133
2.2 Conditionality.............................................................................................................. 136
3. The Restoration of American Grandeur Under Reagan............................................139
C hapter Six: The 1990’s; Community and Global Governance.............................146
1. Neoliberalism with an Ethical Twist............................................................................148
2. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWOR)... 
...............................................................................................................................................152
3. The dawn of Global Governance.................................................................................. 155
4. USAID Reforms in the 1990’s .......................................................................................160
5. The Gulf War and International Governance............................................................... 164
C hapter Seven: Security and Government after 9/11...................................................170
1. Law. Security and Surveillance: the USAPATRIOT ACT........................................ 171
2. Governance through community after 9/11..................................................................177
3. Discourse after 9/11.........................................................................................................181
4. American Foreign Policy after 9/11 and the Iraq W ar................................................ 184
4.1 Second Generation Neoconservatives and US Foreign Policy................................ 185
4.2 American Govemmentality in Iraq..............................................................................189
Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 194
Bibliography........................................................................................................................202
Introduction
The primary purpose of this study is to evaluate the critical potential o f a foucaultian 
approach to politics and International Relations. Although I refer to Foucault’s oeuvre as a 
coherent set o f interrelated concerns, the thesis will mainly explore the potentialities and 
critical functions of one of his later analytical projects; govemmentality. To do this, I 
survey the practices, calculations, techniques and ideas within the political rationalities of 
the last 45 years in the United States. I identify these rationalities through looking at 
particular policy papers, secondary sources and ideological formulations surrounding 
welfare, foreign assistance and security programs. While traditional International Relations 
see domestic and foreign policy as governed by different conditions and exigencies, a look 
at those sources seems to confirm that the general critiques which have guided reforms and 
governmental experiments in both realms appear to be very similar.
I will argue that Foucault’s account of governmental rationalities provides the best possible 
assessment of contemporary material and ideational transformations in the United States as 
it details the processes through which contemporary American subjects are constituted. In 
contrast with traditional historical and social scientific approaches, govemmentality gets at 
the heart of the intrinsic requirements and expectations that bear upon individual subjects. 
The thesis then attempts to excavate some of the technical and intellectual processes 
through which contemporary American subjects are made and hopes to provide the 
beginnings o f a critical reflection on the main rationalities that are internalized and 
reproduced by individuals. While I engage with existing theoretical work on the content 
and scope of govemmentality throughout the thesis, the policies and practices surrounding 
welfare and foreign assistance are taken as the primary material to chart important shifts in 
ways to think about the place and strategic roles o f state institutions, individuals, the 
community and other governmental actors.1
In order to tease out the analytical potentialities o f govemmentality, I engage with and 
organize some of the existing insights about govemmentality. My use of Foucault calls 
upon several different, seemingly paradoxical aspects of his work. Although he does not
1 Throughout the thesis, I look at various sources such as administrative reports, program summaries and 
policy reform plans. I also look at a variety of presidential speeches and at writings and quotes of influential 
policy advisers.
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offer a theoretical system which can be applied indiscriminately, most o f Foucault’s 
insights may be used in concert. I contend that studies on govemmentality benefit from the 
integration of disciplinary and sovereign forms of power in its analytical remit. Although I 
do not derive a systematic model from the above combinations, I try to provide some initial 
theoretical pointers as to how sovereign power and biopower may intersect. With the help 
o f a slightly revised foucaultian framework, I move on to interrogate the governmental 
developments in recent American history. More specifically, I look at the history of one of 
the United States’ main social programs; the AFDC (Assistance to Families with 
Dependent Children) and at the history of the US’ main foreign assistance program; the 
Agency for International development (AID). The use of Foucault’s analytics to study the 
above programs constitutes one o f the thesis’ original contributions. To illustrate the 
persistence o f sovereign power throughout the deployment o f govemmentality in recent 
US history, I discuss the major wars (Vietnam, Iraq 1991 and 2003) and a selection of 
presidential orders and tactics which exemplify specific relationships between decisional 
moments and biopolitical strategies. Since my main intention is to provide empirical 
manifestations o f the above theoretical relationship, the examples I use are necessarily 
selective. I do not mean to offer an extensive account o f recent American foreign policy 
ventures. The study then mainly attempts to identify the rationalities at work in particular 
programs and to illustrate the production, organization and circulation o f moral and 
governmental conceptions at the domestic and foreign policy levels. That is to say, the 
thesis hopes to draw out the main practices of government, most of which revolve around 
efficiency, individual responsibility, freedom and security, by examining a series of 
specific policies found in both primary and secondary sources. The administrative reports, 
policy recommendations and official decisions that have to do with specific areas of 
government such as welfare and foreign policy contain the seed of more general practices, 
that is a conflation of techniques and intellectual constructs that contribute to shape the 
specific roles and responsibilities o f individuals and institutions. I argue that the recent 
understandings of the later practices in domestic and foreign policy programs have 
gradually incorporated uncompromising moral certainties and enabled stricter disciplinary 
measures.
Foucault’s own critical enterprise emerged from a particular intellectual context. In the 
midst of Marxism’s progressive demise as a critical and political project from the 1960’s 
onwards, the very foundations o f the great humanisms were put in doubt. The unity of 
thought purported by the Enlightenment and its progressive variants was dismissed as
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another guise of the modem will to power. Spurred on by Nietzsche’s critique of Western 
moral philosophy and Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistical inquiries, a handful o f theorists, 
most of them French, endeavoured to collapse what they saw as questionable truths and 
dichotomies. As opposed to referring to fixed points of origin from which to anchor claims 
to truth, morality and reason, thinkers like Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Beaudrillard, 
Deleuze and Guattari were interested in investigating the discontinuities, silences and 
contradictions inherent to Western philosophy’s foundational precepts and in undoing the 
entrenched distinctions between object and subject, rationality and irrationality, identity 
and otherness. Rather than posing Man as the source of cognition and history, they 
presented subjectivity as a fragmented and shifting amalgam which could not be wholly 
assimilated into rigid categories o f representation. For them, language no longer mirrored 
the physical world, it was an open-ended field of signification, which constantly (re) 
defined itself in relation to what it could not know or represent (Derrida, 1978). What’s 
more, history was for them no longer considered, after Hegel and Marx, as leading to the 
attainment o f Spirit or Communism. Rather, history did no more or no less than setting the 
conditions of possibility for meaningful claims and particular subjectivities. For so-called 
postmodernists, the way we understand ourselves depends upon immediate and local 
determinations. We cannot transcend the linguistic, cultural and political data which 
surrounds and traverses us at any given time. The above thinkers expressed their suspicion 
and incredulity towards metanarratives as they no longer believed in their ability to contain 
the contradictions o f lived experience and the fragmentation o f consciousness and identity 
in contemporary times (Lyotard, 1984). Enlightenment’s trust in the ability of science and 
reason to grasp the totality of human experience was giving way to radical uncertainty.
Most of these intellectuals wrestled with the expressions of Marxism in the political arena 
of their time. Although many harboured sympathies for the Marxian analysis, at least in the 
initial part o f their careers, they were uncomfortable with its totalizing design and with its 
narrow focus on economics as the ultimate source of social and intellectual production. 
Thinkers who have somewhat prefigured the preoccupations o f postmodern thinkers, in 
particular Theodor Adorno, reflected on the modem quest for instrumental and 
organizational control. In Dialectic o f  the Enlightenment (2002), Adomo and Horkheimer 
argue that Enlightenment’s promise to liberate humanity from fear and superstition through 
the power of reason turned into its opposite; reason was appropriated and directed towards 
purely instrumental ends which greatly enabled the perpetuation o f capitalist exploitation. 
They insisted that the bureaucratic state and the ever more sophisticated modes of
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communication and cultural production combined to impress false desires and 
representations in the minds o f social subjects, so much so that they were no longer aware 
o f their own subjection. Importantly, they argue that Enlightenment has imposed its own 
truth, namely its particular kind o f unreflexive rationalization and its self-legitimating 
maintenance o f capitalist relations, by violently discarding alternative conceptions o f the 
purposes of technical progress. This concern with the modem will to tmth and with how 
powerful metanarratives were reproduced and disseminated through the organization of 
knowledge and discourse was also shared by Foucault. However, instead o f seeing the 
death of man and individuality as a result of the ‘capitalist economy, its culture industries, 
bureaucracies, and modes o f social control,’ as critical theorists do, Foucault saw it as a 
‘discursive event occurring within the emergence of new sciences and discourses, and the 
sociological fate of individuals in a normalizing, disciplinary society’ (Kellner 1991:218). 
Beyond the critique of metanarratives, then, Foucault was interested in reconstituting the 
modalities of major epistemological shifts through the inventory of specific discourses and 
practices. As opposed to attributing humanity’s acceptance of its own servitude to a 
departure from an uncontaminated kind of reason, Foucault observes that a series of 
rationalities emerge in the various processes of subjugation initiated through particular 
institutional and administrative necessities.
In contrast with people like Derrida and Lyotard who are primarily interested in language, 
Foucault focuses on the interplay of discursive and non-discursive elements, and it is 
precisely the attention he accords to practice and materiality which makes his work all the 
more cogent and compelling. Although he did not subscribe to critical theory’s diagnostic 
o f the death o f individuality, Foucault tried to retrace the precise means through which 
liberal capitalism maintained and perpetuated itself with such success. Again, it is not so 
much the surreptitious imposition o f falsehoods that makes us who we are, it is our 
reproduction o f what is presented to us as making sense. Foucault’s brand o f critical theory 
is novel in that it attempts to describe the establishment o f dominant forms of knowledge, 
categorization and administration from the inside, that is, through the silent struggles that 
inform the adoption of a particular understanding and the unseen relays of institutional and 
discursive practices. Instead of proceeding from the unseen universal to the particular, 
Foucault reconstitutes the grand schemes of rationality which organize human life through 
the observation of seemingly unimportant details. The critical purchase of his approach 
mainly consists in the attentive observation and patient reconstruction of the dominant 
discourses that guide our behaviour.
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Foucault defines govemmentality as ‘the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle 
form o f knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of 
security’ (in Burchell, 1991: 102). Clearly, this understanding differs from the traditional 
definition of government as the institutional structure through which a political body 
functions and exercises authority. At any given time, govemmentality consists in the 
intellectual constmcts and techniques which aim to best induce the productivity and 
happiness o f a national population. At the end of the 18th century, in and amongst the 
political transformations which led to the progressive displacement o f royal authority, the 
‘population’ emerged as an object to observe, manage and secure. As a result of these 
developments, ‘Western man was gradually learning what it meant to... have a body, 
conditions o f existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces 
that could be modified, and a space in which they could be distributed in an optimal 
manner. For the first time in history... biological existence was reflected in political 
existence’ (1978:142). Efforts towards ensuring the population’s well-being required the 
expansion o f specific domains o f knowledge and of methods o f compilation and 
categorization. A flurry o f human sciences developed in correspondence with the increased 
need to control and discipline particular elements o f the population. The establishment of 
thresholds of normality meant that individuals were selected according to their ability to 
participate in social life and, ultimately, to contribute the population’s ongoing 
productivity and contentment. The particular kind of power which ‘brought life and its 
mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of 
transformations o f human life’ is what Foucault terms biopower (1978: 143). Biopower 
therefore encrypts life by rendering it into a calculable, modifiable matter. Biopolitics, 
another analytical term used throughout the thesis, is then the mode of government which 
regulates life through biopower.
In his lectures on govemmentality (Foucault, 2004a, 2004b), Foucault identified the main 
paradigmatic shifts in the history of the West’s political rationalities. This thesis is 
concerned with the most recent shift from a welfare-oriented rationality of government to a 
neoliberal one. Before applying govemmentality to specific practices, however, I attempt 
to rehabilitate and extend some of Foucault’s reflections on a form of power which is 
seemingly absent from the self-perpetuating motions of biopolitics, that is, sovereign 
power. Indeed, the direct violence that continues to be deployed in contemporary liberal
5
democracies, from the death penalty in the United States to the invasion o f Iraq in 2003, 
begs to reconsider the apparent occlusion of the state’s continuing ability to decide who 
lives or dies in govemmentalized societies. However, determining the part of sovereign 
power within a foucaultian framework, both theoretically and empirically, remains an 
uncertain and difficult task. The suggestions I offer in the thesis as to how government 
relates to power-as-imposition are still very tentative. I contend that the decisions made by 
certain powerful agents may change or orient the content o f govemmentality. As I show 
with the example of American govemmentality, other rationales such as neoconservatism 
are more explicit about their will to wage state power and impose truths through discursive 
injunctions. Fluctuations in rationalities of government are therefore not solely organic; 
economic and political authorities may occasionally reverse or interrupt existing processes 
in the name of necessity. As Foucault argued in a series of lectures entitled Society Must be 
Defended (2003), once the role of the state changes from the preservation o f its own 
authority to the facilitation and safeguard of the lives of citizens towards the end of the 18th 
century, the state continues to distinguish between those forms of life that are necessary to 
the perpetuation of the biopolitical whole and those that are not. Biopower can therefore 
‘make live’ and ‘let die’ (Rose and Rabinow, 2006: 203). In a foreign policy context, that 
is, in the handling of risks that come from outside the boundaries of the state, sovereign 
authorities are charged with estimating what constitute acceptable and unacceptable threats 
to a national population, and with deciding upon the appropriate measures to avert those 
threats.
The exclusion of certain forms of life from the biopolitical whole in a domestic context and 
the estimation of threats to a national population from other countries, invariably involve 
discursive instantiations that legitimize the measures adopted to deal with security 
problematiques. Agencies of authority in the US such as the presidential office are 
absolutely central in the diffusion and perpetuation o f these discursive distinctions. 
Presidential speeches and a myriad of other cultural and social agencies then contribute to 
the formation of responsive cultural subjectivities in parallel to the objectifying work of 
governmental rationalities. The constitution of national identity, particularly in the US, 
relies on the continual assertion of American distinctiveness and its connections with 
particular values and principles. The American predilection to equate its national character 
with universally shared values is partly a function of its intensive repetition in public 
addresses. The role o f political and public agencies to inspire moral uprightness in a partly 
liberalized culture is again greatly emphasized by neoconservatives.
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In the lecture series and published works that followed Society Must be Defended, Foucault 
left behind his schematic but promising insights on violence and sovereignty to focus 
almost entirely on govemmentality, that is, on the self-sustaining productions of biopower. 
Although I agree with Foucault that direct orders bearing upon the lives o f subjects in 
advanced liberal societies have become fewer, I argue that executive estimates as to the 
nature of internal and external threats and decisions to use or suspend law in the name of 
securing the biopolitical whole, still speak o f the permanence of sovereign power. Again, I 
agree with Foucault that the traditional philosophical and political justifications 
surrounding the appropriate position o f rights-endowed individuals versus the duties and 
authority of the state are of little help to understand the constitution o f subjectivity in 
contemporary times. The processes of subjectification intrinsic to advanced liberalism have 
more to do with a myriad of norms and requirements that are impressed in our minds 
whilst we go about our daily lives, that is, when we are working, entertaining ourselves, 
soliciting services, etc. In spite of this, we must pay attention to the ongoing expressions of 
violence within contemporary government, how they come about and are legitimated. The 
realm o f international relations also brings the problematique o f sovereign power to the 
fore simply by outlining the evident durability of the struggles among states, which often 
involve bmte force and influence. At a basic level, it is also clear that the very existence 
and maintenance of biopolitical processes requires a bounded territory, on which a central 
authority has claimed jurisdiction. The application o f a foucaultian framework to 
International Relations must therefore take account of these particularities.
As he developed it, Foucault’s study of rationalities o f government focused almost entirely 
on Western states, in particular France, Great Britain and the United States. The 
application of govemmentality outside of a domestic context is a recent occurrence. At this 
stage, it is important not to overstate the existence of a fiilly-fledged govemmentality on a 
global scale. Even if the dissemination of ethical norms and performance standards through 
the ever more present and numerous agencies of international development suggests that a 
transnational form of govemmentality is beginning to emerge, the effectiveness of 
advanced liberal norms depends on pre-existing dispositions to internalize specific 
requirements.
Studies on govemmentality initiated by Foucault but pursued by many other commentators 
usually present neoliberalism, understood here as a technology of government rather than 
an ideology, as a general mode of doing things which applies across a variety of national
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contexts in the Western world. However, I think the ideological inflections of American 
neoliberalism need to be outlined. For one, the special importance allocated to individual 
liberty and the belief that the market constitutes an exemplary logic for all social relations 
means that contemporary American govemmentality presents itself as an intensified form 
of neoliberalism. What’s more, in an American context, any contest taking place between 
the state and the individual refers back to individual rights. As Simon comments; ‘when 
sovereignty is fragmented... the key problem becomes the reconcilability of individual 
liberty with social order and cohesion’ (Simons, 1995: 52). Skeptical about the 
overextension of the rights and creative energies of individuals, several political groupings 
concerned themselves with bringing about greater social order and cohesion. One o f these 
political forces, loosely labelled as neoconservatism, has been a particularly effective 
governmental corrective to the presumed shortcomings o f neoliberalism. Through their 
remarkable intellectual output, organizational skills and tireless lobbying efforts, 
neoconservatives have had considerable success in impressing the need to curtail some of 
the cultural and political expressions allowed to have their course within a neoliberal 
rationality of government. They argue that it is the central state’s responsibility to issue the 
moral commands that will bring about social order and cohesion. This particular feature of 
neoconservatism indicates that it cannot wholly be seen as a rationality of government. As 
it seeks to further patriotic sentiments, self-restraint and moral uprightness, 
neoconservatism attempts to modify neoliberalism through inducements and suggestions at 
the same as it tries to impose the kind of moral authority which beckons the return of 
antiquated forms of rule.
Throughout chapters three to seven, I argue that the ideological features o f both 
neoliberalism and neoconservatism feed into the constitution of political narratives in the 
US and contribute to the formation of contemporary American subjectivity. This of course 
departs from Foucault’s version of ideology, which, as he contends, wrongly refers to an 
elemental truth hidden by an extraneous apparatus o f power. Rather, I understand ideology 
as a more or less unified discourse which combines a certain number o f ideas on how to 
best organize political and social agencies. As I see it, the fight for the soul of individual 
Americans is divided among the representations o f appropriate forms of citizenship 
suggested by a variety o f ideological strands as much as the requirement o f liberal 
technologies of government. My emphasis on power as part intentionality and decision, 
which somewhat relates to my use of ideology, also departs from Foucault’s understanding 
of sovereign power. With Foucault, biopolitical exigencies generate exclusion in and of
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themselves by insuring the security of particular life processes and ignoring others. Seen in 
this way, violence is inherently necessary and justifiable. In contrast with Foucault, I 
suggest that the exclusion of particular social elements is, to an extent, wilfully 
orchestrated by individuals familiar with the discursive and technical modalities of 
governmental power.
The thesis is organized in seven chapters.2 The first chapter elaborates on the progression 
o f Foucault’s thought and attempts to incorporate some o f his earlier concerns about 
epistemology and discourse to the govemmentality framework. I move on to explore the 
various rationalities o f government Foucault talks about from the pastoral state to 
neoliberalism. In the second part o f the chapter, I survey and critically engage with the 
uses of Foucault in International Relations theory. By the same token, I try to situate the 
current work within the interpretations and applications o f Foucault in International 
Relations.
Chapter 2 seeks to interrogate the apparent absence of violence and coercion in the self- 
perpetuating motions of govemmentality. By looking at Foucault’s own account of 
sovereignty in Society Must be Defended (2003) and that of others interested in the play of 
sovereignty as force rather than as legitimate institutional framework, I suggest potential 
ways in which the relationship between sovereign power and biopower may be understood. 
Secondly, departing from a foucaultian version of sovereign power, I attempt to clarify the 
conceptual links between law, security and government and look at the possible role of 
official instances in deciding upon the appropriate means to deal with security 
problematiques. In the second part of the chapter, I critically engage with existing 
reflexions on the above combinations in international relations.
After having presented existing work on govemmentality and sovereign power in the two 
first chapters, chapter three begins to look at specifically American ideational,
2 Although it could be argued that they are important referents in American popular consciousness, the 
division of the thesis in decades is largely artificial. The continuities, discontinuities, combinations, struggles, 
and conquests in the constitution of welfare rationales invariably straddle over strict temporal delineations. In 
keeping with a foucaultian reading of history, terminologies such as ‘the 1960’s’ or ‘the 18th century’ do not 
refer to self-contained signifying units. Periodization will always be arbitrary and history may not ‘be 
articulated into great units_ stages or phases_ which contain themselves their own principle of cohesion’ 
(Foucault, 1969: 9-10). The division in decades is largely made for the sake of clarity. The core elements of 
American govemmentality like freedom, self-help and responsibility interweave in different ways across 
temporal delimitations. The roles, combinations and strategic locations of the above notions are modified 
through governmental transformations that are historically specific; they do not progress towards a more 
perfect conceptual articulation.
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governmental and practical configurations. The chapter’s main objective is then to 
contextualize the discussion of contemporary American governance by defining some of 
the main rationalities (liberal art o f governing, welfare rationale, neoliberalism and 
neoconservatism) which have come to feature throughout its history. It also situates 
govemmentality’s peculiar way of writing history and o f understanding the role o f ideas 
among alternative interpretations. In addition, I explore some of the overlaps between 
ideology and govemmentality in the US context, an analytical claim that I pursue in the 
following chapters. To represent the governmental diagram of 1960’s America, which I 
take to be a peculiar combination of welfare and neoliberal rationales, I look at two 
specific programs; the AFDC on the domestic front and USAID on the foreign policy one. 
Secondly, I give an account of the interaction of sovereign and biopolitical forms of power 
in the conduct o f the war effort in Vietnam.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the progressive permeation of efficiency standards into 
existing governmental arrangements. Throughout the 1970’s, the focus o f governmental 
strategies is beginning to shift from the collective determinations of the welfare model to 
the development of individual energies. A look at some o f the AFDC and USAID’s policy 
papers o f the time shows the growing importance of autonomy and responsibilization in 
the administrative plans orchestrated through public and private agencies. Domestically, 
work becomes a particularly crucial instance of regulation and incentives to move welfare 
recipients unto the labour become more forceful. At the foreign policy level, the 
responsibility for development appears to be progressively devolved to countries receiving 
assistance. Following the Vietnam War, however, displays o f military force abroad are 
rather limited.
Chapter 5 looks at the ideas and practical transformations which participated in furthering 
neoliberal governance in the 1980’s. It also points to the disciplinary content o f welfare 
and foreign aid reforms, conveyed by the increasingly narrow definition o f freedom and 
responsibility. I argue that the disciplinary turn o f the Reagan era partly results in the 
conflation o f neoconservative exhortations to self-restraint and neoliberal incitements to 
efficiency and self-regulation. Ever more focused on the person o f the poor, governmental 
schemes sought to lift the destitute out of poverty by impressing the psychological 
dispositions for successful living and by being more severe with those fail to internalize 
those requirements. Sovereign power therefore manifests itself through the punishment or 
neglect of subjects deemed to have failed to integrate standards of self-regulation. In the
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last part of the chapter, I attempt to trace the ideas that presided to Reagan’s aggressive 
foreign policy stance. Although Reagan did not engage in all out war, his rhetorical 
addresses insisted on the inherent benevolence o f American power, a tendency which 
partly mirrored the neoconservative belief in the moral and existential necessity of 
American leadership in the world.
Chapter 6 charts the emergence of governmental correctives which sought to manage 
neoliberal subjects through their specific ethical identifications. While exhortations to 
performance and autonomy continued to be central axes of government in the 1990’s, 
strands of thought like communitarianism and neoconservatism proposed to temper the 
cultural effects of the self-interested rationality of neoliberalism with a series o f ethical 
provisions. Welfare as much as foreign aid reforms continued to be informed by standards 
o f administrative efficiency, but more and more political and normative conditions were 
attached to state assistance. In both the domestic and foreign policy spheres, the array of 
regulative agencies with only minimal ties to the state was rapidly expanding. 
Domestically, private agencies, community organizations and neighbourhood groups began 
to assume normalizing functions. Similarly, moral and administrative responsibilities 
surrounding international development continued to be displaced and organized among a 
variety of actors, including multilateral institutions, non-governmental organizations, 
global firms and recipients o f foreign assistance themselves. Ultimately, although the 
1990’s marked a timely discussion of the bounds and sources o f ethical commitments, I 
argue that the definition of morality which is actual through many o f the discursive and 
legislative injunctions of the time is rather inflexible.
As the thesis intends to analyse various domains of activity to demonstrate the extension of 
both biopolitical and sovereign forms of power, Chapter 7 departs from the exploration of 
welfare and foreign aid to focus on the security practices that followed 9/11. The chapter 
aims to show how the dispositions described in the previous chapter are integrated within 
an emerging discourse of threat. To do so, it looks at new legislation and security measures 
and at the ways in which they are used and combined with existing governmental 
arrangements. On the foreign policy front, I discuss the conscious extension of armed and 
biopolitical strategies in Iraq from 2003. Faced with an uncertain threat, the US executive 
has enacted a wide ranging strategy o f pre-emption which includes greater powers to 
surveil and prosecute at home, and the extension of its own governmental standards 
abroad. The operation of decisional instances was greatly enabled by a sustained discursive
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campaign. Freedom, celebrated in public discourse without being given a substantive 
definition, was said to be in great danger. The enactment of univocal interpretations and 
hurried decisions pointed to the reestablishment o f central authority in the US. The 
unfolding narrative of security, fuelled by the constant production of immaterial threats, 
legitimized the extensive control of individual activities and spawned potentially 
dangerous foreign policy doctrines.
By using a revised version of govemmentality, the thesis hopes to uncover the hidden 
requirements and the direct commands that participate in the formation o f subjectivity in 
contemporary America. The work of rationalities of government can be detected in many 
areas o f individual existence as well as in many policy domains. I content that their 
investigation is the first step in a realistic assessment of who we are and of the modes of 
knowledge that organize human life.
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Chapter One:
Foucault, Govemmentality and International Relations.
Introduction
This chapter aims to present and contextualize Foucault’s studies on government. Starting 
from his earlier work, I trace the trajectory of his thought and highlight some of the 
theoretical premises of govemmentality. In the first subsection, I explore the ontological 
and epistemological bases o f Foucaultian analysis and move on to discuss the combination 
of the practical, discursive and philosophical elements which informs govemmentality. 
Secondly, I define some of primary terms of Foucault’s critical enterprise, more 
particularly his representation of power and knowledge and the ways in which they are 
connected. Third, I look at govemmentality itself and present the various political 
rationalities that Foucault and his followers have talked about. In the second part of the 
chapter, I appraise the interpretations and uses of Foucault in International Relations. 
While many IR scholars have adhered to Foucault’s work on epistemology, discourse and 
discipline, others have begun to apply govemmentality to transnational processes. The 
chapter’s main task is then to establish some of the theoretical arguments that will inform 
the rest o f the thesis.
Foucault’s thought is more often than not used sparingly, as a kind of ‘toolkit’ to study 
particular discourses or institutions. Over the last decade or so, Foucault’s studies on 
government in particular have served as an inspiration to scholars across a wide range of 
disciplines, including International Relations. Given the partial and experimental character 
of Foucault’s lectures and few writings on the matter, its success has been remarkable. 
Govemmentality is primarily concerned with demonstrating how the activity of 
government is understood by the participants in relation to their own selves, as well as in 
relation to impersonal constraints and social institutions (Gordon, 1991: 2). It is at once 
centred on the subject’s internalization of social standards and on the encompassing 
rationalities behind the distribution of political authority. This does not mean, however, 
that it replicates political theory’s concern for sovereignty, in other words for the question 
of who governs and of what are the limits of authority. Rather, it considers signifiers such 
as legitimacy, freedom, responsibility and security as abstract spaces, which are defined, 
calculated and combined according to momentary exigencies. Govemmentality’s critical
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purpose is to command awareness about the ways in which individuals are objectified in 
their every day lives through their participation in social, cultural and political exchanges. 
But while govemmentality effectively synthesises and integrates a variety of Foucault’s 
insights, it is necessary to examine and in a sense preserve some o f his earlier concerns. 
Foucault’s historicism, critique of modem knowledge constructions and interest in the 
discursive formation of subjectivity are all crucial elements to the understanding of 
govemmentality. One of the tasks of this chapter will then be to integrate Foucault’s 
primary axes of critique to a governmental framework in a more explicit fashion. The 
objective here is not to take his work as a watertight philosophical system but as a fairly 
coherent set of interrelated concerns. This approach allows for the presentation of a more 
extensive array o f contemporary forms of power and the ways in which they combine and 
interact.
The same tortuous, yet coherent path of critique applies to the work Foucault has inspired 
in International Relations. Even if it is fair to say that he did not pay much attention to the 
international, govemmentality and discourse analysis are now widely used in the field. 
Generally speaking, poststructural scholars of International Relations have all endeavoured 
to expose the arbitrary nature of the theoretical division between the domestic and the 
international, the first being traditionally presented as the only realm in which individuals 
may enjoy a reasonably ordered and safe existence, the second as a realm of perpetual 
disorder and insecurity. This would suggest that some o f Foucault’s earlier work on the 
constitution of modem discourses along differentiated modes of exclusion is indeed 
relevant to the study o f International Relations. While this is certainly the case, the 
application of govemmentality is more problematic. Initially conceived to study the 
rationalities of government in developed western countries, and to survey the range of 
sophisticated incitements to subjective transformations throughout the recent stages of 
liberalism, it is difficult to see how it may be relevant to poor, institutionally weak 
countries. However, it can also be said that the recent extension of economic, 
developmental and political programs through an increasing array of private and 
governmental actors, presents us with the beginnings of a transnational form of 
govemmentality.
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1. Foucault’s Earlier Work and the Idea of Critique
Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an extensive presentation of 
Foucault’s work prior to his more pragmatically inclined studies on the individual body 
and government, a brief account of the philosophical critique and method he develops in 
the Order o f  Things (1970) and the Archaeology o f  Knowledge (1969) is necessary to 
introduce some of the assumptions that lie behind govemmentality. Foucault’s critique of 
the modem quest for unambiguous and linear accounts of the history of ideas has inspired 
many contemporary theorists in IR and elsewhere. Equally, his focus on the exclusionary 
modalities o f a variety o f socio-scientific discourses has been influential on a number of 
research domains, not least on critical IR studies looking into the constitution o f national 
identities. This section is then concerned with situating Foucault’s critique within larger 
philosophical problems and with exploring the evolution and transformation of his thought 
towards the combination o f philosophical, discursive and practical elements which has 
punctuated his studies on discipline and government.
Foucault’s first publication, Madness and Civilization (1965) prefigures some o f the 
defining concerns o f his later work. Although still tending to present historical materialism 
as one of the defining causes of social organization, Foucault’s analysis includes the 
cultural changes inherent to the internment of a whole category of people, namely the poor, 
the mad and the criminal (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 5). His depiction o f the 
categorization of otherness through a series of new institutional and administrative 
procedures, how such processes translate at a local level and how individual behaviour 
begins to be isolated and observed, sets the scene for later important work like Discipline 
and Punish (1977). Furthermore, Madness and Civilization (1965) already hints at a more 
fundamental kind of Otherness; the lurking existence o f a realm contrary and external to 
modem reason. Manifestations of unreason, impossible to discover or articulate, represent 
the elusive point o f reference against which secure ontological foundations must guard us. 
Foucault’s historical studies of madness and medical practices therefore still hinted at some 
fundamental experience o f unreason found standing at the outer edge or outside of modem 
discourse. He will later abandon this enterprise to eventually define objects of knowledge 
as almost entirely constituted by the discourse that designates and specifies them.
In the Order o f  Things (1970), Foucault goes back to the fundamental task o f rediscovering 
‘on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what space o f order
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knowledge was constituted; on the basis o f what historical a priori. .. ideas could appear, 
sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, 
only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards’ (Foucault, 1970: xxi, xxii). He 
begins by exposing the basic conditions of possibility of knowledge and representation in 
the classical age. From the 17th century up to perhaps the end of the 18th century, all of 
which presents itself to human perception, the observable natural world and the existence 
o f Man itself, is already included in a perfectly ordered cosmological plan. The sum of 
representations is laid out on a plane surface o f ordered relations, and man is but another 
empirical being within it. His task is limited to specifying the pre-established logic of the 
universe and its component parts. He can reconstitute the order of the world through the 
faculty o f reason, an innate force which progressively reveals itself in the activity of 
representing. Within such an epistemic space, man is but the ‘locus of clarification’ 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 20); he is not the self-conscious origin and object of 
representation. Accordingly, language, the main instrument available to Man to survey or 
clarify the workings of the external world, is taken to be equivalent to the thing it 
designates. Towards the end of the 18th century, however, Foucault insists that a crucial 
epistemic change is taking place; Man is suddenly thought of as ‘the difficult object and 
sovereign subject of all possible knowledge’ (1970: 310). As the interested source and 
object o f representation, Man can no longer rely on the pre-established web of ordered 
relations characteristic of the classical episteme. He is left alone to confront the limitations 
of his knowledge about himself and the world. The physical world and the language that 
replicates it are no longer transparent; the precise historical origin of language is unknown 
and the exact properties o f nature remain largely un-chartered. Kant, fully conscious o f the 
inherently problematic character of representation, attempts to ground and legitimize 
claims to knowledge. By doing this, he initiates what Foucault describes as the typically 
modem propensity to ‘affirm man’s finitude and at the same time completely deny it’ 
(Rabinow and Dreyfus 1982: 31).
What Foucault calls the modem ‘analytic of finitude’ takes three different but equally self- 
defeating forms. The first one is the conception o f Man as an empirical/transcendental 
doublet (1970: 319). Kant attempts to establish Man as both an empirical being, subject to 
historical and intellectual contingency, and as a transcendental entity which would allow 
for a an ‘account of man as a self-producing source of perception, culture, and history’ 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 33). Foucault argues that the tension between the two poles 
will never be fully resolved until we let go of our anthropological discourse. The second,
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somewhat related doublet, is that between the cogito and the unthought. Man’s 
consciousness o f his own limitations supposes the need to think the unthought in order to 
‘reconcile him with his own essence,’ to reappropriate the acknowledged conditions that 
make thought possible (Foucault, 1970: 35). Foucault sees this to be a futile attempt as the 
almost infinite inventory of the background practices that render thought and action 
possible will always depend upon yet another background. Thirdly, as exemplified in the 
philosophies of Nietzsche and Heidegger, is the hesitation between the retreat and return of 
the origin. As Foucault puts it; ‘man is cut off from the origin that would make him 
contemporaneous with his own existence: amid all the things that are bom in time and no 
doubt die in time, he, cut off from all origin, is already there’ (1970: 332). However, 
Foucault argues that in Heidegger, the ever elusive origins of thought and the limitation of 
man through his essential historicity become the transcendental source of that very history.
Through his critique of the often convoluted modem attempts to locate transcendental 
sources o f meaning, Foucault claims to have discovered a space which is not reducible to 
either a-historical Man or to the interpretation of human action against the background of 
shared practices. He develops this new avenue in Archeology o f  Knowledge (1969), and 
begins by presenting an element central to this unexplored analytical direction; the 
statement. He defines the latter not as a proposition, an utterance or a speech act, but as the 
network o f mles that makes such things as propositions, utterances or speech acts 
meaningful. A statement’s meaning then depends entirely on ‘the field o f use in which it is 
placed’ (Foucault, 1969: 104). It may be placed in a variety discursive formations, 
themselves constituted through the aggregation of a great variety o f statements. These 
create relatively autonomous logical spaces in which the individual parts (the statements) 
are defined through their position in a system (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 49). Such a 
theoretical formulation presents striking similarities with structuralism. However, Foucault 
maintains that the archaeologist ‘only claims to be able to find the local, changing mles 
which at a given period in a particular discursive formation define what counts as an 
identical meaningful statement’ while ‘the structuralist claims to find cross-cultural, 
ahistorical, abstract laws defining the total space o f possible permutations o f meaningless 
elements’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 55). As much as he does not want to uncover an 
extensive field of possibilities and permutations, Foucault is not interested in trying to 
uncover a hidden meaning or a deeper signification in the movement of history. Rather, he 
claims do no more than to describe how the statement appears in all its materiality.
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In the Archeology o f  Knowledge, however, Foucault does not seem to be able to shake off 
his association with structuralism. He does not fully specify whether the description of 
historical transformations in discursive formations may be informed by atemporal systemic 
rules or not. There are many other issues with Foucault’s often difficult and meandering 
theses in the Archeology, but some of the more valid criticisms have to do with the status 
that the rules of discursive formations have in the minds o f those who use them; the 
speakers or writers. Here the rules not only describe how discursive formations come 
together in a coherent whole, they are also prescriptive, meaning that they require o f the 
speaker to use certain formulations as opposed to others in order to make sense (Dreyfus 
and Rabinow, 1982: 90). Furthermore, the very condition of possibility of discourse as it 
appears to the eyes o f the archaeologist depends on that same individual’s standing inside 
and outside of the discourse he or she observes. Simply put, ‘the system works so long as 
everyone does not share the enlightened position o f the archaeologist,’ thus the 
archaeologist, refusing to see himself or herself as the source of historical consciousness, is 
nonetheless in an imprecise location between history and a sort of transcendental void 
which allows for the possibility of an archaeology of discourse. Foucault somehow 
replicates the modem doublets he is at pains to criticize as he ‘seems to both affirm and 
deny his finitude’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 95-96). Moreover, the idea of ‘making 
sense’ cannot be limited to the replication of discursive mles, it also has to do with a series 
o f institutional validations, that is non-discursive elements. Here, Foucault maintains that 
non-discursive elements such as economic institutions, techniques, systems of norms and 
modes o f classification, do indeed have a role to play but that they only acquire full 
signification insofar as they are included in discursive formations. In later work, he will 
lend more importance to non-discursive elements and insist on the involvement o f the 
genealogist in the historical practices he or she is describing. Although it does not come up 
with a satisfactory theory of discourse or with a position totally emancipated from the 
problems Foucault detects in modem philosophy, the archaeology nonetheless provides a 
‘tool for attaining a relative degree o f detachment from the practices and theories o f the 
human sciences’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:103) and offers a cogent critique of modem 
narratives’ pretension to truth.
After several years o f pondering, and assessing the criticisms directed at his work, 
Foucault turned his attention to social practices as opposed to formal rule-based systems. 
He becomes more interested in the way social practices inform the constitution of 
knowledge about Man. In his revised framework, theory becomes at once subordinated to
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practice and implicated in the constitution of the larger organizational practices 
underwritten by notions like biopower. In so doing, Foucault uses a new method; 
genealogy. Partly inspired by Nietzsche, the latter records the history of the interpretations, 
and the incumbent material and technical dispositions they have inspired, that have 
successively established themselves in modernity. As opposed to identifying a linear 
progression in a variety of study areas, as is commonly done by the majority of social 
scientists, Foucault’s genealogies show that the interpretations that have currency in a 
particular time in fact result from the arbitrarily imposed resolution of a great many 
unspoken struggles. In order to explain how particular modes o f understanding and 
technical arrangements come to prevail at a specific time, Foucault introduces a revised 
notion o f power.
1.1 Power and Knowledge
Equipped with a revamped method which straddles unorthodox forms of structuralism and 
hermeneutics, Foucault begins to explore the possibility of defining subjects, knowledge 
categories and techniques of government through the actual historical practices in which 
they are involved. In order to account for the possibility of subjective and epistemological 
transformations within historical practices, Foucault suggests a new understanding of 
power, which he will develop in Discipline and Punish (1977) and The History o f  Sexuality 
(1978). In the former, he maintains that the establishment of disciplinary regimes in the 
later part of 18th century France and England is not so much the result o f an imposition by 
a sovereign authority as it is a particular configuration of subjects o f knowledge and 
institutional spaces. No one person or group of persons is responsible for shifts in 
disciplinary technologies, they emerge through ‘dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, 
techniques, functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in 
tension, in activity’ (1977: 26). For Foucault, power is not only defined by an external 
imposition allowing or disallowing for particular kinds of behaviour and practices but is 
inherent to the constitution of knowledge and its objects. He suggests that it be understood 
as;
‘the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and 
which constitute their own organization: as the process which, through ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them: as the support 
which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or 
on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one 
another: and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or
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institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of 
possibility, in the various social hegemonies’ (Foucault, 1978: 92-93).
Foucault’s power, which can be at once local, mobile, purposeful and non-intentional, is 
not without its complexities and ambiguities. Firstly, it can be inferred that the individual is 
not passive with regards to the various modes of objectification to which it is subjected; he 
or she internalises and reproduces various criteria of behaviour in order to be able to live, 
work and communicate. In the form of technical knowledge and expertise especially, 
power can also be appropriated strategically by political and economic elites. Within the 
increasing variety of domains of enquiry, particularly since the emergence o f the 
normalizing sciences in the 1800’s, power is beginning to inform more clearly the 
struggles, inclusions and exclusions implicit to the establishment o f what counts as true 
knowledge about man. However, despite the fact it can be used strategically by specific 
actors or is at work in the formation of knowledge systems, it cannot be crystallized in a 
definite form as it is in a state o f constant flux dictated by local and immediate necessities. 
As soon as a stable knowledge-configuration or rationality seems to establish itself, it is 
likely to be challenged, transformed, reaffirmed or discarded. Active in the most minute 
designs o f daily life and in the most general strategies o f government, it can neither be 
possessed or exercised by a single entity. It is a creative and productive force that 
‘traverses and produces things, induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse’ 
(Foucault, 1980:119). Its effectiveness does not lie in placing a mere limit on desire but in 
constituting social rites and instruments of domination that are both tolerable and efficient 
(1980: 86). Again, power mechanisms can be used ideologically, but they are first and 
foremost directed at producing ‘effective instruments for the formation and accumulation 
of knowledge_ methods of observation, techniques o f registration, procedures for 
investigation and research, apparatuses of control’ (1980: 102). In whatever domain of 
knowledge, the organizational capacities of power are continually reviewed and refined.
By defining power in this way, Foucault clearly opposes its understanding in more 
traditional forms of political theory. He is decidedly not interested in trying to locate the 
nucleus o f legitimate political authority and associates the will to do so with political 
philosophy’s ongoing preoccupation with the person of the King, in other words with the 
perpetuation of a ‘juridico-discursive’ paradigm (1978:82-85). Again, he contends that the 
analysis ‘should be concerned with power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, 
with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms
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and institutions’ (1980: 96) rather than with characterizing various forms of vertical 
domination. Accordingly, rather than being defined negatively through the prohibitive 
decrees o f external authorities, the formation of subjectivity has to do with assimilating and 
perpetuating the local requirements of power. In both Discipline and Punish and The 
History o f  Sexuality, Foucault insists on the importance of the body as a nexus for the 
operation of power. What he is mainly concerned with is the interstitial space between 
larger institutional strategies and the body as a discrete object of study and intervention. 
The prison and the confessional are here seen as locations where the manipulation o f the 
biological body and the individual soul conflate with general schemes o f rule. These 
encounters constitute what Foucault calls a ‘political technology of the body’ (1977: 26). 
Again, punitive measures are not solely explained and justified by the fact that a crime has 
been committed and that it must be punished. They are not ‘simply ‘negative’ mechanisms 
that make it possible to repress, to prevent, to exclude, to eliminate; but they are linked to a 
whole series of positive effects which it is their task to support’ (1977: 24). Similarly, the 
ongoing valorization of the confession o f sexual desires in modem history is not the story 
o f a progressive liberation or o f a triumph over repressive cultural forms. Rather, through 
the extensive development of confessional modes, sex ‘becomes an issue; a whole web of 
discourses, special knowledges, analyses, and injunctions settled upon it’ (1978: 26). 
Importantly, punitive modes and sex are both implicated a larger economy of power, which 
ties in to the security, health and prosperity of the population as a whole. The 
democraticization of right transpiring in the constitutional experiments of the end o f the 
18th and 19th centuries in the Western world, also contributed to the fact that life and modes 
of behaviour became inscribed and administered through self-produced norms rather than 
left at the discretion of an all-powerful sovereign.
As Foucault’s general project consists in making apparent the claims to knowledge that 
have been displaced or discarded by the dominant paradigms in each discursive formation, 
he specifies how the general, yet strategically specific logic o f ‘truth’ directs relations of 
power. Truth, Foucault says, ‘is to be understood as a system o f ordered procedures for the 
production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements... (and) is 
linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to 
effects of power which it induces and which extend it’ (1980: 133). There are rules as to 
what constitutes a valid statement in linguistic constmctions, clinical psychology or 
economic sciences. The consolidation of paradigms of knowledge, especially when it 
comes to non-exact sciences, is a consequence o f a series o f power effects that in turn
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reinforce and perpetuate certain criteria o f validity. It follows that individuals who have a 
greater command o f those criteria are more able and authorized to ‘speak the truth.’ The 
power effects that culminate in truth tend to present the history o f particular social sciences 
as a linear progression towards an ever more perfected form of knowledge. But Foucault 
intends to demonstrate that these coherent and evolutionary histories conceal the struggles 
inherent to the establishment o f truth and his genealogies are precisely an effort to render 
those omissions and struggles more visible. Through painstaking documentary research, 
they aim to ‘rediscover the ruptural effects o f conflict and struggle that the order imposed 
by functionalist or systematising thought is designed to mask’ (1980: 82). A genealogy of 
rationalities o f government, discipline or sex therefore entails a willingness to look beyond 
humanistic, coherent and progressive histories in order to reinstate the claims to knowledge 
that have been subjugated and forgotten. Equally, a genealogical perspective suggests that 
foundational notions of Western political theory such as freedom, legitimacy and morality 
have been constituted through a mixture o f coercions, struggles and strategic incitements 
that have taken different forms according to historical context. Foucault then subverts the 
traditional requirement o f philosophy to discover the essence of being human, free or 
moral to assert that truths and essences are in fact ‘things of this world’ (1980:131), borne 
out of ever changing conditions of intelligibility and strategic necessities.
For Foucault, it is truth itself, truth as ‘already power,’ which is the political problem 
(1980: 133). He invites us to ‘detach the power of truth from the social, economic and 
cultural forms of hegemony’ (1980:133). Again, Foucault is not entirely clear about what 
this means in concrete terms. It may be taken to mean that the present requirements to be 
successful, happy, effective and free must not be accepted as self-evident and inescapable 
but it may also be interpreted as the validation o f an indiscriminate suspicion o f the 
primary rules that make social life possible. Either way, what is most important with 
regards to this questioning o f truth is that it should be not be considered as an external 
standard by which current hegemonic forms can be judged but an already present 
configuration of power. Possibilities of resistance are therefore conditional to local and 
immediate modes of subjectification as opposed to general strategies orchestrated by a 
willing, knowing external power with its own vision of true freedom and humanity. As 
soon as one relates truth to a perpetually contested, unstable and reversible thing in the 
present, it becomes possible to assess the degree o f domination involved in the 
establishment of a particular truth. As an example of the practical application o f such a line 
of critique, Foucault’s enquiry into rationalities o f government consisted more in
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determining what had made liberal capitalism so enduring and effective than suggesting 
standards from which it could be justified, improved or invalidated.
1.2 Governmentality
Foucault’s (1977) work on the administration of surveillance, discipline and punishment in 
the 19th century was criticized by many on the left for its failure to represent the more 
general relations between state and society (Gordon, 1991:4). Somewhat receptive to this 
objection, but without continuing the long tradition of political theory attached to the 
person of the sovereign, Foucault extended the method he had perfected in the examination 
of how individuals were ‘separated, studied, aggregated and scrutinized’ according to new 
institutional and organizational grids, to regularities than could be observed within the 
population as a whole (Foucault, 1977:139). In a certain sense, governmentality points to a 
more general design relating the ideational and material structures o f governmental power 
with the regulation of individual behaviour. Biopower is incidentally found at the 
intersection of the techniques and systems of thought that apply to the social and to the 
individual body as an object o f manipulation and classification (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
1982: 134). For example, the distribution of state benefits encompasses personalized 
techniques for work incentive as much as overarching intellectual constructions 
determining the place of market, state and individual within a rationality o f government. 
Throughout the 19th century and beyond, discipline and the associated sciences of 
normalization (sociology, psychology, etc) become important domains of activity as the 
security of socio-economic processes ultimately depends on their effective functioning. 
Clearly, the kind of power at work in disciplinary and governmental processes seems to 
have little to do with a direct, prohibitive form of authority. Even if sovereignty, on 
Foucault’s own admission3 never entirely disappears, he does not consider it as an overly 
important element in modem day governance. I will therefore give a succinct account of 
governmentality as Foucault and many o f his followers understand it before attempting to 
incorporate sovereign power to the analysis.
The emergence of governmentality somewhat depends on the successful establishment of a 
central political authority over a bounded territory and population. Around the end of the 
18th century, it is reasonable to say that government, particularly in France and England, is 
less concerned with the preservation of the sovereign’s right to command obedience from 
its subjects through coercive methods than it is with the means by which the population
3 See Michel Foucault (2003) Society Must be Defended
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can be kept relatively happy, organized and productive. As Colin Gordon puts it, 
government consists in the ‘conduct of conduct’; ‘that is to say, a form of activity aiming 
to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some persons or persons’ (Gordon, 1991: 2). This 
form of activity generates an ever-widening range of administrative necessities that in turn 
require new ways of obtaining and compiling information about the population. The 
pervasive mode o f knowledge in this survey of personal habits and statistical generalities 
o f society is political economy. Individuals come to be defined as subjects of interest 
responding to the economic logic of loss and benefit. As Graham Burchell writes; ‘the 
prototype o f ‘economic man’ becomes ‘the correlate and instrument of a new art of 
government’ (1991: 127). Several responsibilities are transferred to the citizen from then 
on deemed capable of looking after their own well-being. Individuals must familiarize 
themselves with an expanding array of political institutions, domestic measures (hygiene, 
health etc) and commercial regulations if they are to function adequately. Governmental 
mechanisms must simultaneously integrate novel subjective aspirations and encourage the 
division of tasks in smaller social units that are not directly linked to state institutions. The 
integration o f subjective aspirations into schemes of governance is closely related to the 
transformation o f sovereignty into right. As the main preoccupation of the nascent liberal 
art o f government is to obtain a satisfactory ratio of contentment and productivity, it 
functions by producing political and economic freedoms (Foucault, 2004a: 65).4 More 
precisely, the liberal state’s purpose is to provide the conditions under which the freedom 
not just o f individuals, but of the processes borne out their interaction, may thrive. Clearly 
the kind of liberty being alluded to has more to do with an abstract space in which the 
relations and limits between governors and governed are calculated than a primary essence 
that is translated in constitutional forms. However, the production of political and 
economic freedoms is counterbalanced by mechanisms of security. Government must also 
have the inbuilt ability to determine the moment at which practices of liberty become 
prejudicial to the ensemble of society. This interplay between security and liberty is 
precisely what animates the economy of power of liberalism in the centuries to follow 
(Foucault, 2004a: 67).
As several philosophers of the Enlightenment attest, the market and its potentially 
unlimited extension, is an important point o f reference for both normative arguments and 
the limitation of political authority. At the time economic activity, like many other 
domains of knowledge, was mainly conceptualised through the lens of nature. Kant’s
4 All references drawn from Foucault (2004a, 2004b) are my translations.
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Perpetual Peace, as Foucault tells us, is not so much premised on the political institutions 
that men have wilfully constructed but on nature itself (2004a: 59). Apart from its 
association with universal notions of justice and fairness that go beyond race, religion or 
nationality, the extension of commerce throughout the world is a sign o f the irresistible 
march toward a more perfect correspondence o f human activity with nature and ultimately 
reason. Economic exchange may eventually lead to cosmopolitan right over and above the 
juridical independence o f states (2004a: 59). Exchange is therefore reason’s means to 
extend the moral and juridical obligations impressed on Man beyond national borders. In 
the Wealth o f  Nations (1776), Adam Smith describes the natural equilibrium that emerges 
out of the expression of individual interests in the economic sphere. The hidden hand of the 
market is likened to a force of nature which cannot be fully grasped or calculated but 
which nonetheless regulates forms of interaction that are outside of the juridical relation 
between state and individual. Smith incidentally points to the state’s incapacity, as a form 
of detached abstraction, to know and control the consequences of economic exchange. To a 
great extent, The Wealth o f  Nations is an advice to statesmen on how to secure the 
perpetuation of ‘natural’ economic processes.5 A more intimate knowledge o f how these 
processes function should lead the state both to a cautious disengagement from the 
economy and a keener ability to determine when intervention is necessary. Despite the 
problematization of authority in 18th century philosophy, Foucault argues that thinkers like 
Kant and Smith see more benefits in the cautious management of natural processes than the 
universal extension of juridical rights to individuals. As has been said above, liberalism is 
primarily defined by the recognition of the market as a model o f nature, as a standard for 
the limitation o f political authority and as a boundless potentiality to profit for European 
powers (Foucault, 2004a: 62). Understood in this way, liberalism is more a ‘manner of 
doing things’ and an ‘ethos of governing’ than a political philosophy or ideology (Foucault 
in Dean, 1999: 58). Again, governance in the 18th century is no longer a question of 
prohibiting gestures disrespectful to the sovereign’s authority but one o f determining 
whether government is intervening too much or too little in the safeguard of partially 
autonomous spheres o f activity (Rose, 1999: 70). In other words, what becomes 
objectionable is an excess of government, not of sovereignty (Foucault, 2004a: 15). To a 
great extent, liberalism’s success at managing society depends on its flexibility; on a 
capacity to accept its own inadequacies and correct them through increasingly refined 
techniques and thought constructions. As Mitchell Dean notes, the liberal mode of
5 On this particular point, see McNamara (1998) Political Economy and Statesmanship.
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governance ‘is a polymorphous and permanent instrument of critique which can be turned 
against the previous forms of government’ (1999: 190).
The workings of commercial exchange, so central to the new mode o f government in the 
18th century, is related to a protean association mentioned in the writings o f the Scottish 
Enlightenment; the polymorphous sphere o f civil society, in which self-interested 
individuals engage in social and economic relations. Although unrelated to the state, it 
provides government with markers as to how ‘economic men’ may be placed in order to be 
adequately managed (Gordon, 1991: 23). If self-interest is generally thought to be the 
principal socializing force in civil society, there are other qualities like ‘sympathy’ and 
‘disinterested interest’ at work in human communities, as several treaties (e.g Hume’s An 
Enquiry Concerning The Principles o f  Morals (1751), Smith’s Theory o f  Moral Sentiments 
(1759) and Ferguson’s^/? Essay on the History o f  Civil Society (1767)) on the sources and 
modalities of individual morality attest. For Ferguson, Hume and Smith, the above 
qualities have not developed out of a certifiable conception o f the good or o f a human 
nature, but through a long history o f social interaction. Those thinkers are already more 
concerned with the sociological incentive o f knowing ‘how beliefs come to be held and 
work’ (Hampsher-Monk, 1992: 126) than grounding ontological truths. Aside from their 
historicist outlook, dissertations on the unwritten norms of social interaction also explicitly 
encouraged the cultivation of civility and restraint to balance the pursuit o f self-interest. In 
fact, there was a sustained interest in a renewed version of civic republicanism in 18th 
century thought which perhaps disproves or at least unsettles the association o f thinkers 
like Adam Smith with a purely liberal creed. Reflexions on the nature and boundaries of 
individual morality are also inevitably associated with rules beneficial to the ensemble of 
society. Theorizations about civil society are in a sense preparing the emergence of 
disciplinary institutions through the conscious observation and isolation o f individual 
behaviour and of ‘society’ as an object of government. As an abstract designation, civil 
society is the site where a great variety o f governmental requirements are contested and 
negotiated but it also serves as a reference point for rule. This simultaneous tendency of 
government to ‘totalize’ and ‘individualize,’ or to discipline and govemmentalize, has 
endured to our day (Gordon, 1991: 3).
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The Welfare State:
Throughout the 19th century, the individualizing rationality o f early liberalism comes to be 
problematized in terms o f the state’s disengagement from the welfare of the population. 
Problems and discrepancies occasioned by the extraordinary advances of capitalism are the 
source of much discontent, as the growing communist movements across Europe attest. 
Increasingly aware that economic and technological developments carry certain risks, 
liberal government is attempting to make those risks more ‘calculable’ and to tame 
‘insecurity with solidarity and the laws o f large numbers.’ (Rose, 1999: 81). The main unit 
o f analysis shifts from the ‘individual’ to identifiable social groups or associations that 
may be familial, professional, political or religious (Gordon, 1991: 33). Importantly, 
previously established distinctions between civil society and government are dissolved in 
favour of a more organic link between the state and the ‘people.’ Government’s role has no 
longer to do with ensuring the perpetuation of natural processes from a distance but to 
actively manipulate the main socio-economic variables behind the realization of collective 
welfare. The state becomes absolutely central in this process and there is an unprecedented 
proliferation of its administrative agencies throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Concurrently to those general shifts, the individual subject o f government is no longer 
conceived as autonomous and self-interested but through its fundamental appurtenance to 
the various institutions to which he or she is obliged. As Nikolas Rose tells us, ‘the subject 
o f welfare was a subject of needs, attitudes and relationships, a subject who was embraced 
within, and governed though, a nexus of collective solidarities and dependencies’ (Rose, 
1996:40). Individual aspirations are now irrevocably tied to collective notions o f freedom 
and happiness.
In the codification of these new modes o f subjectivity and government, the state furnishes 
its ranks with an expertly trained bureaucracy and becomes an increasingly complex and 
imposing structure. The relationships identified in society are also documented through a 
much more extensive and sophisticated form of knowledge. Disciplinary institutions and 
the associated sciences of normalization are transformed both by the refinements of 
technique and the specification of ‘normality’ within the wider domain o f the social. 
Personal habits enter into the calculations of generalized standards of behaviour, and the 
terms for inclusions, exclusions and distinctions are set according to the requirements for 
collective welfare. The transitional form of governmentality between classic and welfare 
liberalism is a peculiar combination of disciplinary and philanthropic practices. The
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expression o f the moral responsibility of private citizens is accompanied by an 
intensification of the control of individual behaviour. The institutions created by the 
combined forces of the state and philanthropic organizations are at once expressions of 
Christian charity and of rigorous programs of social integration. As Rose advances along 
similar lines; ‘the conduct o f individual members of the population became the object of 
philanthropic, medical, architectural and hygienic programmes, and the moral domain 
became traversed by innumerable interventions from industrial schools to sewers, from 
police force to lady missionaries, from friendly societies to model housing schemes’ (1999: 
106). The increasing array of institutional forms preoccupied with individual habits, are 
progressively subsumed under the more general object o f society.
In itself, the designation o f the state as guarantor of social progress and collective 
happiness denotes a Christian sentiment. Foucault actually begins his history of 
government with a discussion of ‘pastoral power,’ (Foucault, 2004a: 168) which 
essentially consists in guiding both individual and community toward salvation. 
Transported by Christian notions o f sacrifice and obligation, pastoral power is 
characterized by an emotional form of solidarity, a sense o f empathy and connectedness. 
To some extent, measures adopted by the social state mark the surge of a tendency that has 
never been entirely repressed. However, for all the coherent and integrated aims o f the 
welfare rationality, the latter is the site o f a lasting struggle between government through 
individual liberty and government through the representation of collective aspirations in 
institutions which beg obedience (Dean, 1999: 82).
Neo-liberalism and Governance Through Community:
The idea that the well-being of the individual is best ensured by the wider community, 
whose needs are represented in state institutions, is criticized from several perspectives. 
The most important and effective of these critiques is ‘neo-liberalism,’ as understood by 
Foucault and his followers. Neo-liberalism’s final end is to extend the logic o f the market 
to state institutions and individual behaviour. Some of the criticisms which informed the 
transformation of the welfare state are exposed most clearly in the work of Friedrich Hayek 
(1944). Wary of the ongoing bureaucratisation and militarization of the state in the early 
20th century, he argues for a limitation of the state’s functions to a preservation of 
historically determined cultural and social processes. Economic rationality, in conjunction 
with the fundamental capacity of the individual to exercise his or her autonomy within a
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reasonably advanced mode of social interaction, is a model for the exercise of political 
power and individual choice. However, and this is the crucial difference with ‘classical’ 
liberalism, processes like concurrence are not natural; they are produced by certain 
circumstances and facilitated through active intervention (Foucault, 2004a: 123-124). 
Notions of moral identity are also displaced from a collective determination to a private 
one in order to allow citizens to exercise their freedom and rationality in the marketplace. 
Choice becomes the comer stone o f the emerging rationality o f government. The act of 
choosing among the increasing variety of goods and services simultaneously expresses 
social identity, rationality and autonomy (Rose, 1999: 85).
In contrast with both classical and welfare liberalism, neo-liberal subjects are governed 
through the ‘communities’ they have freely chosen to belong to and are categorized 
according to their lifestyles, sexual orientation or consuming habits (Rose, 1996:40-41). In 
late modernity, individuality becomes a layered and complex reference point for the 
calculations of governmental power. Neoliberal government is at once keenly aware of the 
subjective transformations at work in post war consumerism and of the need to shape 
subjectivity through more discrete and sophisticated means. In other words, while it 
assumes the individual’s inclination to reasonable judgement and autonomy, it must 
produce those same qualities through a variety o f institutional incitements. As Rose points 
out, neoliberal means of government intend to persuade, educate and seduce rather than to 
prescribe (Rose, 1996: 50). Concurrently to those subjective transformations, the provision 
of social services is becoming the responsibility of private bodies contracted by the state. 
Government’s involvement in the delivery of services is increasingly limited to ‘setting 
targets, promulgating standards, monitoring outputs, allocating budgets, undertaking 
audits’ (Rose, 1999:146). Emerging modes o f administration are once again based on the 
logic of the market. Private bodies compete for funding and strive to attain performance 
targets set by the state. Private citizens are considered as consumers of either ‘health 
services, education, training, transport’ who must in turn ‘enterprise themselves’ in order 
to maximize their quality o f life’ (Rose, 1998: 8). This double bind of autonomization and 
responsibilization is what drives the perpetuation of neoliberal standards and it applies 
equally to administrative institutions and individual behaviour.
As Rose (1998) reminds us, the role o f psychology in the ongoing transformation o f 
subjectivity is important. In effect, neo-liberalism operates through a combination of 
behavioural psychology and economic rationality (Gordon, 1991: 43). The exercise o f
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liberty being bound to an economic logic, self-actualization, personal happiness and wealth 
all depend on the ability to make the right decisions in a competitive environment. The 
proliferation o f techniques of self-regulation like meditation, talk therapy, self-help books 
etc, indicates a fairly widespread desire to do away with impediments to success. Success, 
performance, hard work and tenacity are becoming self-evident regulators of social life and 
potentialities to which individuals aspire to in their quest for self-actualization. Throughout 
the 1970’s and 1980’s, enterprises are hiring personnel to survey their workers’ 
preferences and devise motivational programs in order to create a happier, more productive 
workforce (Foucault, 2004b: 229-2).
Governmental programs applied in the 1980’s, particularly in their more drastic forms in 
the US and Great Britain, were widely interpreted as overemphasizing the economic, self- 
interested aspects of liberty. Along with the perceived erosion of moral norms following 
three decades of hedonistic individualism, citizens and state agencies began to assess the 
cultural consequences of neoliberal governance on society. While maintaining most of the 
criteria instated by a neoliberal rationality, government is starting to integrate a multiplicity 
of ethical initiatives led by ‘third sector’ organizations (Rose, 1999:176). Schemes such as 
community policing, voluntary work, local and international development projects are 
becoming part and parcel o f the re-organization of governance along particular moral 
identifications. The state’s role within these emerging networks o f solidarity and 
allegiances is to act as a kind o f ‘enabler’ and to incite self-management. Individuals are 
therefore no longer solely responsible for their own well-being, they are held responsible 
for the social consequences o f their actions. Governance through community is based on 
the ongoing internalization o f a double-edged responsibility; ‘a responsibility to oneself 
and one’s obligations to others’ impressed upon the individual through his or her 
membership in local and international networks of association (1999: 88).
The above version of governmentality is quite clearly confined to the spatial and temporal 
limits of the state. It can argued that governmentality, presented and understood in this 
way, has little to tell us about international relations. But even if there are several 
difficulties in applying the approach to contemporary international politics, recent 
historical developments and research projects prove that it is both possible and fruitful to 
do so. The next section will proceed much in the same way as the first part of the chapter. 
It will first briefly present the International Relations studies which partly drew on 
Foucault’s view of modernity, particular brand of anti-foundationalism and enquiries into
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the constitution of ‘identity.’ Secondly, it will present some o f the more notable 
applications o f governmentality to International Relations.
2. Post structural IR and Governmentality
Although many of the critically inclined studies in International Relations display some 
Foucaultian influence, scholars loosely grouped under the banner of poststructuralism are 
inspired by a wealth of other sources. Most of them also draw from French 
deconstructionists and literary theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva and Roland 
Barthes. However, this section is mainly concerned with expounding Michel Foucault’s 
legacy within the discipline. For this purpose, I will limit my discussion to a few o f the 
more significant contributions to the strands o f critique bearing a foucaultian influence. 
The first one can be traced in the critique of ‘scientific’ and rationalist approaches to 
International Relations, the second in accounts of the discursive strategies that delimitate 
cultural and national identity and the last one in the application o f governmentality to 
international institutional developments. Although I argue that governmentality represents 
an advance over the applications of Foucault’s earlier work to international relations, these 
three ‘stages’ of critique are essentially interrelated and complementary. In general terms, 
postructuralism’s objective is to destabilize the narratives upon which traditional studies of 
international relations are based and to open up analytical possibilities.
2.1 The Critique of Neorealism
The main target o f early critical theory in international relations was the dominant 
paradigm of realism/neorealism. One of the first texts to question the neorealist orthodoxy 
from a poststructuralist perspective is Richard K. Ashley’s The Poverty o f  Neorealism 
(1984). In his lengthy article, Ashley indicts neorealism as ‘a self-enclosed, self-affirming 
joining o f statist, utilitarian, positivist and structuralist commitments’ (1984: 228). He 
presents neorealism’s brand of structuralism as theoretically flawed and as a conscious 
attempt to neutralize the complexities inherent to the study o f international relations. 
Firstly, the ‘deep structure’ identified by a structuralist analysis is intended to have an 
‘autonomous existence independent of, prior to, and constitutive of the elements’ (1984: 
254). However, Waltz (1979) maintains that the anarchical system emerges as a result of 
the ‘external joining of states-as-actors,’ a conclusion which obscures the primordial role 
o f the meaning-giving structure in shaping the subjective relations and characteristics of
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states (1984:255). Neorealism’s coherence as atheory is therefore based on the conception 
o f the sovereign state as a self-evident, stable unit of analysis. The refusal to recognize that 
the internal coherence o f the state may be at least disputable is a manoeuvre without which 
the structural determinant of anarchy, based on the differentiation of capabilities among 
functionally similar units, could not hold. Other possible factors in the explanation of state 
behaviour, such as cultural and economic variables, are not considered relevant to the 
fundamental workings o f world politics and are altogether excluded from the analysis. 
What’s more, if  structural realism claims to do nothing more than provide a scientific 
explanation for international relations, in other words a detached representation o f ‘reality,’ 
it implicitly aims to produce certain institutional outcomes. An immediate example would 
be the pressing necessity of great powers to maintain or enhance their military capabilities 
in a perpetually dangerous environment. It could also be argued that influential groups or 
classes have an interest in upholding the military and bureaucratic structures that a constant 
state o f alertness requires.
However, poststructuralism is generally more interested in interrogating the fundamental 
assumptions upon which mainstream IR approaches (such as Liberalism, Marxism, 
Realism and Neorealism) are based than it is in exposing their unavowed interests or 
ideological tendencies. In subsequent works, Ashley (1988,1989) argues that neorealism’s 
pretension to objectivity relies on unacknowledged assumptions about ‘Rational Man’ and 
‘Sovereignty.’ Looking for stable beginnings upon which to ground the knowledge of man 
as an independent being or in social relationships, Enlightenment thinkers attempted to 
discover primary ‘truths,’ which would contribute to organize and unify representation, 
and offer the promise o f a more complete understanding of technological as much as 
human processes. The more positivistic tendencies o f the Enlightenment, recognizable in 
approaches like neorealism, sought to bring human cognition and social activity ever more 
amenable to prediction and instrumental control. However, throughout the relationship 
between knowledge and the observable world, and in this case the explanation of the latter 
through structural factors, Ashley argues that the unity of the modem phenomenological 
subject is preserved. He maintains that state sovereignty, as one of the fundamental modem 
constructs, is consciously defined as a valid ontological term by critical reason. In his 
words, sovereignty ‘invokes a figure of man who recognizes some specific limitations on 
his doing and knowing, not as external constraints, but as a virtually constitutive of his 
autonomous being as the necessary centre of historical narrative’ (Ashley, 1989: 266). As 
the rational centre o f reflexion, man imposes boundaries as to the conditions of possibility
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for an ordered and peaceful life within the international realm. Neorealists therefore insist 
on the dichotomy between sovereignty and anarchy, between coherent pacified units, and 
an external environment which remains unchecked by a central authority (Ashley, 1988: 
238). The absoluteness of the state as a mode of organizing political and social beings 
implies an abstract ideal of internal order preserved from the vicissitudes of the outside. 
What lies outside of state boundaries is to be suspected as a potentially ill-intentioned 
‘Other.’ Postructuralist writers associate this strategic exclusion with the broader modem 
tendency to segregate between what is amenable to knowledge and what is best left to the 
external realm of indecision and disorder.
While modem investigations in political philosophy have long hinted at reason’s inability 
to encompass every aspect of human understanding, International Relations has remained 
characteristically steeped in absolute distinctions for epistemological purposes (Ashley, 
1988:131 and Walker, 1993:10). In itself, the variety, uncertainty and volatility implied in 
the term ‘international’ seems to require the strategic closure o f nearly infinite analytical 
possibilities. State sovereignty therefore provides a secure ontological ground for the 
interpretation of world politics. Concurrently, it assigns particular conceptual, spatial and 
temporal limits to identity. As Walker asserts; ‘it is this proliferation, affirmed by accounts 
of the modem state as ... container of all cultural meaning, and the site o f sovereign 
jurisdiction over territory, property and abstract space, and consequently over history, 
possibility and abstract time, that still shapes our capacity to affirm both particular and 
collective identities’ (1993: 162). According to accounts like Walker’s and Ashley’s, the 
continuing insistence on state sovereignty as the basis for international relations theory 
participates in the creation o f mutually exclusive identities bound to oppose each other in 
an anarchical environment.
On other counts, the voluntary epistemological closure operated by neorealism may seem 
difficult to reconcile with the contemporary movement in the international sphere towards 
an increased fluidity of goods, people and technological advances. Sovereignty no longer 
appears to be able to contain the lived experience of hybrid identities, temporal 
acceleration and spatial extension (Walker, 1993). However, in the face o f these criticisms 
and potential difficulties, neorealism actually asserts and perpetuates its criteria as to what 
constitutes a truthful explanation of international relations. Partly inspired by foucaultian 
genealogy, some commentators have sought to expose the various strategies through which
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international politics has been constructed as a ‘regime of truth,’ and, in so doing, to make 
silenced discourses and alternative interpretations re-emerge.6
Through their assessment o f the more fundamental assumptions upon which scientifically 
inclined theories of political reality rest, poststructuralists scholars o f international 
relations aim to ‘denaturalize’ commonly accepted distinctions between theory and 
practice, object and subject as well as domestic and international. Subsequently to the 
openings brought about by the critique of metanarratives at work in the neorealist 
conception, a portion of postmodern or postructuralist scholars turn their attention to the 
analysis o f discourse and more specifically to the ways in which discursive power- 
strategies constitute national identities. By doing that, they move to more historically and 
practically oriented research programs.
2.2 Discourse analysis and Identity Formation
Within international relations, much of the work inspired by foucaultian genealogy in 
particular, has given way to the study o f the discursive modalities o f identity formation. 
O f course, identity is not taken here to mean the manifestation of individuality or freedom, 
but takes shape according to a highly developed array o f purposeful and hierarchical 
discursive strategies. For genealogists, subjectivity and identity are constituted through 
historically specific configurations of power. They are the result o f regularly repeated 
gestures and narratives that either perpetuate a positive definition of a particular identity or 
a more negative one based on ongoing processes o f differentiation. In general, the source 
material of these studies consists in either bureaucratic reports, journalistic pieces, 
academic texts or official speeches and the focus is more often than not put on the 
contrasting games of identity formation. The critical purpose o f these studies is to expose 
the arbitrary nature o f the distinctions purported by traditional accounts of world politics, 
with a particular emphasis on deconstructing the notion of fixed cultural and national 
identities.
In Writing Security (1998), David Campbell describes the historical and discursive 
processes by which American identity has been constituted. He argues that in the historical
6 See in particular chapter 2 on Machiavelli in Walker (1993) Inside/Outside; Williams (2005) ‘What is 
the National Interest?’ and James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (Eds.) (1989) 
International/Intertextual Relations.
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becoming of the United States up to the present times, the consolidation of American 
identity has been informed by a series of localized and generalized differentiations. The 
inherent instability of the United States’ identity, composed almost exclusively of 
immigrants, requires the constant use of powerful symbols and unifying historical 
narratives ‘so that which is contingent and subject to flux is rendered more permanent’ 
(Campbell, 1998: 31). Campbell argues that American identity itself partly overcomes its 
own internal contradictions by externalising them in a highly charged differentiation with 
ethnic, cultural or ideological opponents. He draws the history of the internal constitution 
o f the U.S. through a succession of stark exclusions, starting with the English settlers’ 
brutal encounter with Amerindian tribes. Convinced that their mission was to materialize 
God’s kingdom on earth, Puritans identified the untamed wilderness o f North America and 
its original inhabitants as obstacles to their religious and cultural project. The settlers’ own 
attributes of purity, industriousness and civilization were articulated and enhanced through 
the characterization of Amerindians as licentious, stupid and barbaric. The advancing 
colonization of the West, depicted in most textbooks on American history as a 
manifestation of the ‘frontier spirit,’ symbol o f courage and perseverance, is also one of 
bloody encounters with the Other. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the mounting 
number o f immigrants from continental Europe and Ireland and of black slaves transported 
from Africa, contributed to the delimitation o f a superior identity; characteristically white,
thAnglo-Saxon and Protestant. Throughout the 20 century, however, American 
‘nationhood’ endeavoured to overcome or sideline its own internal contradictions by 
externalizing them in a highly charged differentiation with ideological and, more recently, 
cultural opponents (both at home and abroad), all the while re-asserting the universality of 
its founding principles. The discursive constructions that follow 9/11 essentially draw on
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the same historically constituted modalities of exclusion.
As against the assumptions of mainstream international relations theory, Campbell insists 
that ‘the state’s reality holds, not to a pre-determined conception of being, but to the 
combination o f regularly repeated acts’ (Campbell, 1998: 10). He makes clear that the 
constitution of American identity within a bounded territorial space depends on the 
continual performance of rituals of exclusions and positive characterizations. The general 
lines of American nationhood and subjectivity emerge out of their integration and 
perpetuation of dominant discourses, themselves bound to struggles, reversals, novel
7 On this see David Campbell (2002) ‘Time is Broken: The Return of the Past in the Response to 
September 11.’
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combinations and historical transformations. If Campbell offers a powerful genealogical 
account of American identity; o f the forgotten historico-political discourses beneath the 
surface of unitary interpretations, his characterization of otherness is often set in radically 
oppositional terms, which results in the occlusion of the degrees o f differentiation (Hansen, 
2006: 51). In Security as Practice, Lene Hansen proposes to specify how the ‘Selves’ and 
the ‘Others’ referred to in Campbell’s book are constituted and to determine the degrees of 
difference between seemingly opposite poles. What’s more, she suggests to examine how 
‘difference is constituted through the articulation of spatial, temporal and ethical identities’ 
(2006: 51). Hansen’ analysis of identity-formation then proceeds around the necessary 
construction of a delimitated space (spatial), in which certain cultural and intellectual 
standards prevail (temporal), and where there are particular views as to the moral 
(non)responsibility towards other nations (ethical) (2006: 51). All o f these aspects tend to 
vary significantly according to cultural, geographic and historical contexts.
Others like Henrik Larsen, using Foucault’s understanding of discourse, set out to offer an 
alternative approach to the ‘traditional’ foreign policy analysis, which he associates with 
people like Rosenau and Holsti. Starting from Foucault’s analysis in Archaeology o f  
Knowledge, he asserts that meaning and language are situational, self-referential and not 
exterior for the analyst to untangle; they are both part of the manner in which the 
researcher will emit hypotheses. If ideas are considered at all in the analysis o f foreign 
policy decisions, they are so as static ‘variables’ in an array of other variables (1997: 7). 
Larsen takes the case o f ‘Europe’ as a discursive formation and shows how France and 
Britain each undergo modifications in their conceptual relations with ‘Europe’ at the close 
o f the 1980’s. With Foucault’s help, he shows the dynamic integration of sub-discourses to 
the more general statements on Europe and surveys the changes of outlook as regards to 
the idea of Europe in both countries at the institutional and discursive levels.
In her study of the U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines, Roxanne Lynn Doty’s 
(1993) examines how the subjectivity o f both Filipinos and Americans is constituted 
through language. She argues that the discursive positioning of both protagonists involves 
a hierarchy of identities; Americans are associated with benevolence, efficiency and moral 
responsibility while Filipinos are seen as precisely the opposite. The formation o f identity 
here works in an oppositional logic that can be traced in the linguistic construction of the 
‘Other’. In contrast to traditional approaches of foreign policy analysis and international 
relations, discourse analysis assumes that ‘words, language and discourse have a force
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which is not reducible to either structures or cognitive attributes of social actors’ (1993: 
301). As with Larsen, language possesses its own rules of constitution without being an 
unchanging object that can be invariably appropriated by individuals for their own 
motivations. Individuals are not ‘the loci of meaning’ (1993: 302), their subjectivity is 
constructed through linguistic and conceptual categories that are assigned specific 
positions within larger discursive formations. Specific political interventions are made 
possible through the conceptual association of needs, characteristics and aspirations to 
groups and subjects.
In an effort to systematize the study of discourse in critical international relations at the 
end of the 1990’s, Jennifer Milliken (1999) reviews the various ‘theoretical commitments’ 
o f post-structuralism. Typically, ‘discourses are understood to work to define and to 
enable, and also to silence and to exclude, for example, by limiting and restricting 
authorities and experts to some groups, but not others, endorsing a certain common sense, 
but making other modes o f categorizing and judging meaningless, impracticable, 
inadequate or otherwise disqualified’ (1999: 229). Following Milliken’s argument, 
political practices are permeated by dominant discourses that define subjectivity and 
meaningful objects. This understanding of discourse draws heavily on Foucault’s 
conception of power and truth. Throughout a discontinuous series of historical struggles, 
particular forms o f knowing and studying social reality assert themselves over others. 
Identities or knowledges that do not correspond to these momentary ‘regimes of truth’ are 
resisted and discarded. ‘Difference’ is subject to linguistic categorization and the 
constitution of identity is once again established in oppositional terms. The study of 
International Relations according to this model would involve looking at the linguistic 
constitution of the ‘enemy’ and at the formal authority of experts and policy makers to 
speak correspondingly to their mastery o f dominant paradigms (1999: 229). For all the 
discontinuities and breaks that Foucault identifies in the study o f discursive formations, 
however, Milliken is struck by how ‘dominant discourses have been largely continuous' ; 
frameworks of binary opposition seem to repeat themselves steadily (1999: 246). She 
insists on the ability of post-structural discourse analysis to identify continuity and propose 
coherent research programs in contrast to other more static treatments of discourse. Along 
similar lines, Ole Waever (2002) argues that post-structural advances in the analysis of 
discourse should provide a more systematic study o f language and identity in foreign 
policy. He suggests a notion of discursively produced identity that is ‘both structured and 
more unstable’ (2002:22). The discontinuities found in discursive formations, just as much
37
as political practices, can be understood according to a set o f basic concepts and codes that 
prevail in a political culture (2002: 30). According to Waever, the explanation of change 
and continuity must rely on a series o f identifiable and lasting concepts in order to escape 
the Foucaultian juxtaposition of disjointed histories.
Even though the play o f material structures is invoked in many discursive analyses, they 
are rarely integrated in a systematic fashion. Consequently, discourse analysis in 
International Relations often remains at the level o f language and text. In doing so, it is 
likely to be preoccupied with identifying the elements of official discourses that assert and 
perpetuate distinctions based on standard oppositions between inclusion/exclusion, 
national and foreign, normal and deviant, good and evil, etc. While the use of those 
discursive strategies by political elites has proven to be pervasive in the justification of 
wars, as well as domestic and foreign policies, an analysis of the formation of identity must 
go beyond the reassertion of oppositional terms, however moderated by more precise 
differentiations. This is not to say that this form of analysis has nothing to offer, but that it 
needs to be supplemented with an examination of the role material and institutional factors 
in the constitution of subjectivity. As Waever points out; ‘identities are often involved in 
contrasting games, (but) it definitely does not follow from a post-structuralist starting 
point, that antagonisms should be the main source o f meaning. Quite the contrary, pure 
dichotomies are not very information rich’ (Waever, 1996: 3).
2.3 Governmentality and International Relations
The two first stages of critique inspired by Foucault opened the way to an alternative 
understanding of International Relations by questioning the distinctions between domestic 
and international, sovereignty and anarchy as well as Rational Man versus Irrational Man. 
Discourse analysis has endeavoured to identify the textual and verbal instantiations of the 
above distinctions. Both of these critical enterprises remain valid in their own rights, but if 
we are to provide a more complete, more complex picture o f contemporary subjectivity in 
an intra-national context, several elements must be integrated to the analysis. By following 
the development of Foucault’s thought, more particularly his redefinition of power in 
Discipline and Punish and History o f  Sexuality, we can begin to associate the rules of 
formation of discursive spheres with tactics surrounding the actual disposition of subjects 
and governmental institutions. Again, the relatively few commentators who have applied 
governmentality to International Relations have uncovered the unspoken requirements in
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transnational strategies of governance from a patient inspection of reports and policy 
papers as well as interviews with development agents and local civil society activists. They 
have done so in order to reconstitute the ‘practices, programmes, techniques and 
strategies,’ that guide state intervention and subjective choices in particular contexts 
(Lamer and Williams, 2004:4). However, in spite of the analytical possibilities offered by 
such an application, several problematic elements also need to addressed.
Certainly, with the liberal democratic protocols (good governance, transparency, free trade, 
human rights, local democracy, governmental accountability, etc) applied in post- 
communist states and third world countries, post war reconstruction projects (Bosnia, 
Afghanistan, Iraq and so on) and the innumerable incentives to build active civil societies 
throughout the world, it is clear that a particular model o f governance and its associated 
institutional channels are beginning to take hold across national boundaries. Following 
Foucault’s conception of power, Jacob Sending and Ivar Neumann point out that ‘the 
ascendance of non-state actors in shaping and carrying out global govemance-functions is 
not an instance o f transfer of power from the state to non-state actors.. .(but is rather an) 
expression o f a change in governmentality by which civil society is redefined from a 
passive object of governance to be acted upon and into an entity that is both an object and 
a subject o f government’ (2006: 658). Governmentality sees the recent re-orientation o f 
world governance not as a straightforward transfer o f authority from sovereign states to 
civil society institutions, but as a strategic displacement of managerial techniques and 
functions. The role o f the state and of multinational corporations in international 
development schemes is increasingly taking the form of supervision and partnership. Far 
from arguing that recognizable sources of economic and political power acting upon the 
subjectivity o f recipient countries and individuals have disappeared, it can nonetheless be 
said that performance criteria and normative expectations are being carried through a 
greater multiplicity of intermediary, more surreptitious agencies. The form of power 
inherent to emerging patterns of global governance is at once more dispersed, decentred 
and far-reaching.
Ronnie Lispchutz argues that international institutions and NGO’s are formulating 
particular methods o f governance, standards and norms that are beginning to shape state 
action. He defines ‘global governance’ as an ‘arrangement of actors and institutions, of 
rules and rule, through which the architecture of the global articulation of states and 
capitalism is maintained’ (Lispchutz, 2005:237). Most of those who use governmentality
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to talk about global governance, although they differ in their emphasis on the kind of 
power at work in the process, aim to unwrap the global liberal strategies implied in the 
institutional promotion of rights, obligations and values to the readers’ attention. More 
specifically, they aim to bring forth the political, economic and legal criteria which 
individual subjects are invited to comply with if they are to become successful participants 
in the expanding network of global norms and institutions. As Michael Merlingen attests, 
‘IGO’s (International Governmental Organization) discursively constitute phenomena as 
problems whose solution requires international interventions’ (2003, 368). Agents of 
international development therefore constitute institutionally weak and economically 
deprived countries as spaces of intervention. In so doing, they objectify and assess them 
according to specific performance criteria and of knowledge practices. Statistical and 
formal reports as to indexes of prosperity, rates of participation in civil society projects, the 
relative success or shortcomings of democracy workshops in faraway towns and villages, 
construct a multitude of micro standards that regulate the activities of individual subjects 
directly involved in development projects. International governmental and non­
governmental organizations monitor the behaviour of recipient countries as much as local 
participants and coordinators, and if the latter fail to comply with some of the more basic 
standards set in program guidelines, a set o f disciplinary measures are put in place 
(Merlingen, 2003: 369). Typically, within a neoliberal rationality, these measures involve a 
mixture o f normalizing, positive incitements and more strictly punitive gestures. As we 
will see in chapter five, conditionality exemplifies this double-edged means of 
intervention.
Although governmentality can tell us quite a lot about the developing modes of 
intervention into the lives of citizens in third world countries, there are several problems as 
to its application to International Relations. Even without mentioning it explicitly, 
Foucault’s study o f the various historical combinations pertaining to the liberal rationality 
of government presuppose the nation-state as the delimited space within which 
governmental relations can take place. As will be emphasized in the next chapter, 
governmentality rests on the more fundamental assertion o f a delimitative and coercive 
power inherent in the territorialization of states. What’s more, Foucault is clearly focused 
on technologically advanced Western countries, and, to a large extent, the effectiveness of 
advanced liberal norms depends on the existing capacity of subjects to internalize a great 
array o f subtle normalizing practices. Governmentality would then seem to be at pains to 
show the subjective transformations involved in the integration o f extraneous standards of
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development in non-Western countries (Mosse and Lewis, 2005: 14). The risk is that 
accounts of standardized systems of international governance remain at the level of 
describing procedural-institutional norms and requirements as opposed to how the latter 
are integrated, forced upon, ignored or rejected by the actual subjects of governmental 
intervention; individuals in third world countries. This points to a problem regarding the 
definition o f the object and scale of a governmental analysis o f international relations. 
States and international organizations, as subjects of governmental objectification and 
intervention, cannot be said to internalize norms and requirements in the same way 
individuals do.
Conclusion
Apart from clarifying the logical progression of Foucault’s thought, the purpose of 
presenting his move from a critique of modem knowledge paradigms strained between 
radical hermeneutics and holistic structuralism (Rabinow and Dreyfus, 1982) to a 
reconstitution of power/knowledge assemblages which objectify both individual subjects 
and the population as a whole, is to identify and preserve some o f the insights that 
supplement a governmental perspective. Governmentality’s main strength consists in 
making explicit the often-unacknowledged requirements for a successful adaptation, both 
institutionally and subjectively, to specific technical, cultural and economic standards. 
However, its analytical remit must also explicitly include the discursive instantiations and 
disciplinary institutional spaces through which modem identities are constructed.
In the context of the critical redefinition and opening of International Relations theory, 
Foucault’s influence, either with regards to his enemies or his supporters, has been 
considerable. The foucaultian-inspired critique o f dominant, supposedly scientific 
theoretical strands like neorealism has opened to a number of interesting research projects 
starting from studies on the discursive constitution of national identities to accounts on 
global governmentality. Although Foucault’s thought offers several promising avenues for 
future analysis, we have seen that the application of his ideas to International Relations is 
not without its difficulties. International Relations, as a discipline which justifiably takes 
states as its main object of study, actually problematizes the kind of power emphasized in 
disciplinary and governmental modes of social control. Indeed, it is difficult to sustain that 
the definition of threats to national security and of the measures required to address them, 
do not emanate from a centralized political authority at some point or the other. This 
problematique has recently been the subject of much discussion. The next chapter will
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present the attempts to re-evaluate the governmentality framework according to the 
persistence of sovereign power and suggest some of the ways in which the two seemingly 
heterogeneous forms of power may combine and interact.
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Chapter Two:
Biopolitics and Sovereignty
Introduction
If we adhere strictly to a governmental account, the thesis that sovereign power is 
increasingly irrelevant to analyze the perpetuation of governmental power holds good. 
However, Foucault himself never stopped hesitating between various forms and 
combinations of power, even if at first impression, the elements of domination present in 
his earlier work seem to have receded in favour o f the more surreptitious and subtle form 
of power characteristic o f governmentality. This chapter aims to present some of the work 
in which Foucault considers the relationship between discipline, government and sovereign 
power more closely, most particularly in a series of published lectures entitled Society 
Must be Defended (2003). Following on from Foucault’s own account and that of others 
interested in the play o f sovereignty as force rather than as legitimate institutional 
framework, I will suggest potential ways in which the relationship between the above 
forms o f power may be understood. Further on, I will draw the consequences o f such 
combinations for the study of International Relations. The main task o f this chapter is to 
extend the analytical reach of governmentality and to critically engage with some o f its 
premises. My account of sovereign power breaks away from a strictly foucaultian 
understanding by incorporating decision, intentionality and ideological features to a 
governmentality framework.
1. Government and Violence
It is legitimate to ask why Foucault did not dwell on the sometimes violent and 
authoritarian means by which liberal states have maintained themselves (Dean, 2007). 
There are glaring examples of direct and indirect forms of violence deployed within penal 
systems, disciplinary institutions, welfare reforms and foreign policies. Part o f the answer 
lies with Foucault’s hostility towards the juridico-political conception of power. For him, 
political theory had remained trapped in an antiquated formula in which the individual 
right holder is invariably pitted against the power of the state. This suggests a perpetual 
contest between two abstract entities that is based on the ability o f the one to limit the 
other’s power, understood here as a capability which is possessed and exercised in order to
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produce a particular result. Foucault maintains that sovereignty epitomizes the latter 
conception and is above all characterized by the king’s ownership and display of violence. 
According to his historical analysis, once the authority, legitimacy and structure o f the 
state are entrenched within early modem times, the self-legitimating violence characteristic 
o f royal power is transformed and displaced through disciplinary apparatuses and the 
management of life at the individual and societal levels.
In other words, around the end of the 18th century, men’s happiness, health and security 
become more pressing concerns for government than commanding the obedience of 
subjects through violence. Although he does not deny the permanence of coercive state 
organs or influential social groupings, Foucault sets aside the historical transformations of 
sovereign power itself and considers the ongoing attempts to define the bounds of political 
power as flawed and obsolete modes of analysis. This brings us to consider what the 
political may mean within such a framework. Foucault disputes the conception o f a 
political history in which individuals have progressively become free through the 
reassertion of their fundamental juridical entitlements. Political theory, traditionally 
occupied with setting the legitimate bounds o f authority and individual claims, produces 
and nurtures moral aspirations which lie beyond the contingencies of the present. Foucault 
finds this suspect and dangerous, implying that that the paradigm of liberation/oppression, 
based on the notion of an unscathed human essence, is severely mistaken in its 
understanding o f politics and subjectivity. More importantly for him, however, is the fact 
that competing conceptions of Man, or radical humanisms, have been the source of great 
destruction. (Foucault, 1997: 31).
Foucault then insists that power does not only originate from an abstract centre such as the 
sovereign, the state or the people, but from a variety o f discrete domains concerned with 
individual behaviour and the manner in which it may be evaluated with respect to 
autonomously generated norms. The emergence of normalizing sciences in the 19th century 
illustrates the progressive dissolution of state power throughout increasingly specific, self- 
sustaining fields of human activity. Individuals are thus defined more by their 
objectification within different normalizing practices than by their juridical status in a 
political system. In such a context, resistance can no longer be solely conceived through 
the assertion of individual rights against a central power but rather through the assimilation 
and refusal of local modes of objectification. My view is that sovereign power remains 
integral to the deployment of governmental power and that we are constituted by our
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juridical position in a political system to a greater extent than Foucault would have 
admitted. On the other hand, in agreement with Foucault, the citizen/state game of 
conquests and defeats is far from telling the whole story. Games o f power are played on a 
daily basis by individuals acquainting themselves with the present conditions of subjection 
intrinsic to both political and extra-political realms. A conception of resistance of 
foucaultian inspiration should therefore combine the subject’s engagement with a variety 
o f modes of subjection which straddle the cultural-aesthetic and political-legal spheres. 
The regulative aim inherent to such an engagement is that games of power be played with a 
minimum of domination (Foucault, 1997: 299). In contrast with power, states of 
domination are not relational; they cancel out the fluidity and reversibility normally 
allowed and encouraged within the liberal way of government. Domination is akin to 
starker expressions o f power such as juridical subjection and deployments o f force. The 
variety o f means through which sovereign power assets itself during, for example, the 
establishment o f exceptional security measures, are each manifestations o f strategic 
attempts to limit and consolidate the space within which individual freedom usually plays 
out. In order for individuals to ensure that a minimum of domination be brought upon 
them, there is an initial necessity to identify and assimilate the rules of social, cultural and 
institutional interaction. Attentive observation is therefore an essential part of critique 
(Simons, 1995: 78), but it is only the first step in a transformation of both the self and 
socio-political arrangements. To a great extent, studies in govemmentality excel at teasing 
out the processes and rationalities implicit in a variety of micro-practices, but the great 
majority o f those studies tend to offer a reiteration of the ‘real’ that has much in common 
with an objective kind of historical sociology. It is in my opinion important to explicitly 
link the attentive observation o f subjectifying mechanisms with the possibility o f ethics 
and resistance.
1.1 Foucault and Sovereign Power
The relationship between discipline, sovereignty and govemmentality is somewhat unclear 
in Foucault’s writings but he comes closest to work out how these different types of power 
intersect in a series of lectures entitled Society Must be Defended (2003). Proceeding from 
a typically extensive historical overview and in a somewhat experimental fashion, Foucault 
retells the troubled emergence of the constructs of sovereignty and nationhood. Instead of 
analysing the history o f political relations from the perspective of succeeding central 
powers, he exposes the tensions and omissions intrinsic to the conquest of sovereignty as
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an ordering principle for Western polities. However, more importantly for us, he also 
suggests that discipline, biopower and sovereign power come together in the identification 
o f elements, either internal or external, deemed threatening to the biological integrity of a 
national population. Following Foucault, I will consider sovereignty as an expression of 
ongoing modes of subjection inside the state and as the basis from which exceptional 
measures are enacted when the constructs of order and security are deemed threatened. 
Considered in this way, it is at once ontologically prior to power relations because it 
establishes territorial units in which the latter relations become possible, and is manifest in 
the disciplinary and securitizing objectives o f government. Moving away from Foucault, 
however, I also see sovereignty as the expression of decisional and ideological instances 
who have to authority to speak through their familiarity with power and to determine at 
which point the security o f the biopolitical whole is threatened. This section will therefore 
not dwell on the norms and laws that have developed out o f the progressive 
democratization of right, but on sovereignty as fundamentally related to decision and 
violence. This is why Schmitt and Agamben’s insights are complementary to Foucault’s 
discussion of the relation between race, sovereignty and biopolitics.
1.2 ‘Society M ust be Defended9
Foucault suggests that in ancient and early medieval times, history usually assumed the 
role o f justifying the rule of a monarch, who most likely vanquished the enemy through 
heroic deeds. These glorious and mythical stories were eventually supplemented with the 
history o f distinctive groups struggling against the imposition of a rule by a foreign 
monarch. Foucault mentions the example o f the Saxons, who proudly asserted their 
traditional attachment to freedom as opposed to that of the Normans, who brought with 
them the tradition of a divinely appointed king. The articulation of a nation’s rights against 
a central power and the interpretation of history as a series o f struggles rather than as the 
recounting of an unbroken line of kings, releases a potentially disruptive element in the 
constitution of sovereignty. Foucault identifies these undercurrents as historico-political 
discourses unsettling the establishment of a centralizing philosophico-juridical discourse. 
Further into the lecture, he presents Boulainvillier’s account of the erosion of the nobility’s 
rights and privileges under Louis XIV as an example of the increasingly acute self- 
understanding o f the various ‘nations’ constituting the kingdom. By criticizing the Third 
Estate’s (bourgeois, peasants and workers) lack o f historical consciousness and its 
understanding of sovereign authority in technical and legal terms rather than as the
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legitimate entitlement of a superior and more spiritual class (Neal, 2004: 14), 
Boulainvillers somehow alluded to the possibility of political change through o f a group’s 
realization of its own position and aim in the historical development of the state. At the 
time o f the French revolution, the Third Estate was able to articulate its own historical 
mission very clearly and to declare its own guiding principles as universal.
In the midst of the religious wars plaguing the 17th century, Hobbes’ theorization of 
sovereignty essentially aimed to ‘block’ the historico-political discourses that recalled the 
bloody battles and struggles endured by the various warring nations (Foucault, 2003: 111). 
The potentially explosive expression of opposing rights and truth claims had to be 
disarmed by a single legitimate power that would incorporate the entire social body and 
provide for the basic needs of security and order. Hobbes asserted the right o f the 
victorious party to rule as long as it fulfilled the dual duty o f protecting its subjects and 
securing the kingdom. Tied to the existential necessity o f order, the sovereign is invariably 
justified in its decisions over the life and death of its subjects as much as in the means it 
chooses to preserve its integrity. As Foucault indicates, the acceptance o f the basic 
juridical principle of sovereignty marks the beginning of political philosophy, from then on 
framed in terms of rights and legitimacy. It is the latter formulation of political history as a 
contest between rights-endowed citizens and sovereign states that he disputes. Against this 
understanding, he attempts to show the inherent violence and the multiplicity o f forces 
contained in the establishment and perpetuation of sovereign power; Taws are bom in the 
middle of expeditions, conquests and burning cities; but also continues to rage within the 
mechanisms of power_ or at least, to constitute the secret driving force of institutions of 
law and order’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). This is what leads Foucault to invert Clausewitz’s 
aphorism8 and to present war as a potentially more appropriate referent for the analysis of 
political power.
Here, one might contend that in Foucault’s historical account, the violence intrinsic to the 
earlier stages of sovereignty’s establishment progressively conceals and disperses itself 
through the eventually bounded social body. However, as Foucault emphasizes, the 
incipient manifestation of repressive power is still actual in social relations and sovereignty 
is perpetually re-inscribing itself ‘through a form of unspoken warfare... in social 
institutions, in economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves of each and
8 From Clausewitz’s ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’ to ‘politics is the continuation of war 
by other means’ (Foucault, 2003: 15).
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everyone of us’ (Foucault, 1980: 90). Furthermore, in spite o f the later Foucault’s 
insistence on the ubiquity of biopower as a means to make and preserve life, the 
sovereign’s right to take life or impose discipline never entirely disappears. In the domestic 
realm, biopolitics can be also said to exercise violence on the subjects whose lives it 
decides not to preserve by exposing them to greater risks than the rest of the population 
(Kelly, 2004:60-65). Biopower can therefore also ‘let die’ through its internal processes as 
opposed to ‘make die’ through an unwavering external power (Rose and Rabinow, 2006: 
203). The degree and visibility of violence becomes even greater when a population is 
deemed threatened by another. One o f the means by which the notion o f a war o f all 
against all came to recede, apart from the establishment of a juridical order, was the 
progressive displacement o f violence to the state’s borders. The historico-political 
discourses of race rumbling underneath the surface o f state formation from the 17th to the 
late 18th century were integrated to the necessity o f preserving a given population. As 
Foucault remarks, the historico-political discourse of race eventually became a way of;
‘turning that weapon against those who had forged it, of using it to preserve the 
sovereignty of the state, a sovereignty whose luster and vigor were no longer 
guaranteed by magico-juridical rituals but by medico-normalizing techniques. Thanks 
to the shift from law to norm, from races plural to race in the singular, from the 
emancipatory project to a concern with purity, sovereignty was able to invest or take 
over the discourses of race struggle and re-utilize it for its own strategy. State 
sovereignty thus becomes the imperative to protect the race’ (Foucault, 2003: 81).
As we have looked at the emergence of biopolitics in chapter one, the insight relevant to 
our present enterprise is Foucault’s reference to a nostalgic longing for the ‘magico- 
juridical rituals’ inherent in contemporary forms of nationalism and sovereignty’s notable 
capability to re-invigorate itself by strategically assimilating other discursive forms.
As Andrew Neal remarks, one of the innovations of Society Must be Defended and 
incidentally one of the more useful points for international relations, is Foucault’s 
‘recovery of the union between modem sovereignty and collective subjectivity in the 
nation-state’ of which the French Revolution is a prime example (2004a: 18). Once the 
sovereign and the national population are forced and incorporated into one coherent entity, 
sovereignty can also be more easily democratized (Foucault, 1980:105). As we have seen, 
the democratization of sovereignty is concomitant to the development of public right, itself 
the outcome o f liberalism’s negotiation o f the boundaries of state authority. Again, with
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the apparent dissolution of sovereignty into multiple sites o f power including individuals 
and institutions, the necessity to ground and legitimize it diminishes and what remains is a 
governmental preoccupation with the population’s well-being and, ultimately, survival. It 
then becomes a matter o f identifying and formulating threats, which can be located both 
inside and outside of the state, in terms of the biological survival of the population. The 
constitution of extensive disciplinary and military-diplomatic apparatuses from the late 17th 
to early 19th centuries translated in great part the need to identify, interpret and defuse 
those dangers. In effect, the identification o f a threat to the ‘biological survival’ of the 
nation amounts to racism. However, the kind o f racism alluded here is not ‘ethnic’ racism, 
which associates particular characteristics to a dangerous other, but ‘state’ racism.9
The notion o f state racism is intimately linked with the emergence of a new political right 
in the 19th century, which begins to complement and interpenetrate the previously 
established right of the sovereign to kill. Foucault characterizes this new right as the power 
to ‘make live’ and ‘let’ die’ (Foucault, 241: 2003). If through the end of the 18th century 
and into the next century, the role of the modem state is increasingly to protect and 
improve the lives o f national citizens as opposed to solely preserve its authority over 
subjects, ‘racism’; the ‘fundamental distinction between who must live and who must die’ 
(254: 2003)10 for the benefit o f the biopolitical whole, becomes both an obligation for the 
sovereign and a logic that is acceptable to the population (256-258: 2003). The exercise of 
sovereignty through racism manifests itself in the permanence o f disciplinary apparatuses 
but also in the way wars are being justified. As Foucault maintains; ‘wars are no longer 
waged in the name o f a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf o f the 
existence o f everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose o f slaughter in the
9 Here it is important to distinguish between state racism and nationalism. Foucault maintains that the 
struggles in and around the French revolution were taking place between ‘nations’ (in this case between the 
Third Estate and the Nobility), which he defines as the ‘collections, societies, groupings of individuals who 
share a status, mores, customs, and a certain particular law’ (2003: 134). Throughout the process of the 
historical fusion of conflicting ‘nations’ into representative constitutional orders, apparent in many European 
countries toward the mid 19th century, two main discourses attempt to recast race struggles according to novel 
identifications. One of these is the transformation of race struggle into class struggle. The other is the 
emerging conception o f ‘racial purity, with all its monistic, Statist and biological implications’ (2003: 81). 
Broadly speaking, nationalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries tends to oscillate somewhere in between 
state-sponsored aspirations to racial purity and inclusive republican constitutions. But, as Foucault notes, the 
crucial development has less to do with nationalism than with the biological integration of the already 
bounded population, not so much to preserve the pure ethnic, cultural and linguistic make up of the state than 
the population already within the state. Nation as republican unit where troubles and differences must be 
remedied.
10 This is, as will see later, very close to Agamben’s argument about the simultaneous inclusion and 
exclusion of life which underpins Western political history.
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name of life necessity’ (2003: 137). State racism is therefore enacted as soon as the 
perception o f a threat, however unspecified, faces a national population (Kelly, 2004: 61- 
62). To some extent, the vague and all encompassing notion of a ‘threat to the population’ 
leaves substantial license to the sovereign as to what justifies an intervention. This lack of 
specificity also obscures the sources of the said danger and the complexity o f its nature. 
Quoting Foucault again; ‘the enemies are not political adversaries but those identified as 
external and internal threats to the population’ (Foucault in Stoler, 1995: 265).
The receding of ethnic racism in favour of state racism is a feature o f contemporary 
Western societies which refers both to the ongoing liberal pledge to universalism and to the 
biopolitical promise to improve the ‘quality o f life.’ Through processes of self-critique and 
correction, the liberal art o f government continually recaptures and codifies suppressed 
histories on sex, gender, violence and race in Law. As has been said, these processes also 
work through the subject’s own desire for social inclusion, health and safety. When 
looking at the ability o f government to work through the ‘liberty’ of the subject and to 
negotiate the norms bounding its expression without necessarily relying on juridical or 
disciplinary power, the ‘unspoken warfare’ permeating institutions and individual bodies 
Foucault is talking about can become difficult to trace. Although the threat o f death 
through capital punishment or ‘state negligence’ still remains, life in advanced biopolitical 
societies is generally safer and easier.
Following Foucault’s lead, it is reasonable to assume that situations requiring visible and 
prolonged sovereign interventions in advanced biopolitical societies have become fewer. 
However, there is no reason to think that they will stop occurring altogether. In times of 
‘crisis’ or ‘emergency,’ the sovereign, in the form of a variety o f authorized agencies, 
ultimately assesses the nature and orientation of biopolitical needs. As has already been 
mentioned, it is the decisional moment involved in this re-orientation which must be added 
to Foucault’s treatment o f sovereignty in Society Must be Defended.
1.3 Population, Security and the Exception
The presumed lack o f emphasis on sovereign power in Foucault’s oeuvre is pointed out 
with particular force by Giorgio Agamben. Relying upon Carl Schmitt’s notion of the state 
o f exception and on the obscure figure of Homo Sacer in Roman law, Agamben provides a 
provocative account of the fundamental premises o f life and politics in Western history. At
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the risk o f simplifying Agamben and Schmitt’s ideas, it is necessary to give a brief account 
of their arguments in order to extract a particular version of sovereign power and to outline 
the manner in which it interacts with biopolitics.
In Homo Sacer (1998), Agamben sets out to determine the point at which ‘the voluntary 
servitude of individuals comes into contact with objective power’ (Agamben, 1998:6). He 
poses the question as a result of Foucault’s presumed ‘expulsion’ of law and sovereignty 
through the advent of biopolitics (Hunt and Wickham, 1994). Instead of situating the 
inclusion of bare life into Government at the end of the 18th century like Foucault, 
Agamben places its initial inclusion as far back as Ancient Greece. Starting from 
Aristotle’s formulation of Man as a political animal, Agamben argues that Bare Life is 
entrapped in this originary characterization of political activity. In other words, the initial 
condition of possibility for political activity is precisely the simultaneous integration and 
exclusion o f life. The original impetus behind this inclusion is located in sovereign power 
and law is nothing other than that power’s means to continually re-inscribe itself. With 
modernity, the confusion of bare life and political existence, of the rule and the exception, 
becomes ever more complete. Within modem constitutional orders, citizens are invested 
with the principle o f sovereignty through the simple fact of being bom into nation-states 
and included into increasingly extensive regimes of rights (Agamben, 1998:128). The total 
encryption o f the citizen’s existence invariably involves a primary distinction between who 
is part of the political community and who isn’t. Taken to its extreme yet logical limit, 
Agamben maintains that the sovereign activity of managing inclusion and exclusion is 
epitomized in the concentration camp or the refugee camp; a space in which the rule and 
the exception, life and political existence, become indistinguishable (1998:59). Sovereign 
power can ultimately kill without ceremony or justification. Agamben illustrates this point 
through the figure of Sacred Man in Roman Legal texts, he who remains outside the law 
but can be punished by other citizens without fear of reprisal. Sacred Man therefore 
remains outside the law but is nonetheless subject the fatal embrace o f sovereign power.
While he lends a more sinister significance to it, Agamben borrows some his reflections on 
the nature o f sovereignty from Carl Schmitt. The latter contends that the juristic domain 
rests on two different elements; the norm and the decision (Schmitt, 1985: 13). The 
application o f the legal norm requires that a ‘normal’ situation exist but it is the sovereign 
whom decides on whether such a situation actually exists. This is to say that the sovereign 
ultimately determines ‘what constitutes public order, public interest and security’ (1985:9)
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and how the latter must be preserved. For Schmitt, the decision on contentious and 
consequential matters such as distinguishing between friend and foe and, more generally, 
the entertaining o f a perpetual awareness of the fragility of the constitutional order, is what 
constitutes the ‘political.’ The norm and the normal situation during which it applies have 
for him no real interest or political value. As Schmitt maintains, the exception ‘proves 
everything; it confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the 
exception (1985:15). The firm hand of the sovereign is therefore essential to the existence 
and survival o f the juridical order. In asserting this, Schmitt launches a devastating critique 
on the parliamentary democracy of his time by charging it with relegating decisions on 
essential political matters to endless discussion and ‘cautious half measures’ (1985:63). As 
Agamben argues, Schmitt is trying to give a juridical form to the state of exception, and 
despite pretensions to the contrary, the logical outcome of this position is at best politically 
dubious. Other thinkers reflecting on sovereignty during that period such as Walter 
Benjamin, from whom Derrida (1992), Agamben (1998) and perhaps Foucault (1980) have 
taken their lead, also invite us to reconsider the violence intrinsic to the establishment and 
preservation of law (Benjamin, 1996:244 and Agamben, 2005:131), but they rightly point 
to sovereignty as a limit-concept, as a foundational construct with no other ground or 
justification than itself.
Schmitt’s attempt to extract a political element from what he describes as the stultified and 
self-perpetuating motions of parliamentary politics provides valuable insights. The 
degeneration of a discussion of the bounds o f the political into static institutional forms 
somehow relates to Foucault’s own analysis of the progressive internalization o f social 
norms. To my mind, Schmitt also provides us with an analytics of decision which 
adequately complements Foucault’s version o f sovereign power. The notion of 
intentionality carried through the whole o f the thesis has actually more in common with a 
schmittian approach than a foucaultian one. But if Schmitt and Agamben force us to think 
beyond the confines of biopower, there are a number of issues with their respective theses. 
Schmitt’s critique clearly leaves us with a politically dangerous bid for order at the expense 
of democratic deliberation. Despite pointing to the disturbing continuity o f the state’s 
power to ‘command under the threat of death,’ (Rose and Rabinow, 2006:201) and by this 
correcting Foucault’s near omission of the concentration camp as a paradigm of modernity, 
I think Agamben provides an exaggeratedly fatalistic and unitary account o f the nature of 
Western political history. He presents sovereign violence as the essential character of all 
forms o f exclusion and decisions over life without distinguishing between the
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characterization of human beings in a concentration camp and individuals on life support 
in a hospital (Lemke, 2003: 7).11 Ultimately, such a radical account of power makes it 
nearly impossible to find a way out of the sovereign ban. With the total confusion of zoe 
and bios, the very possibility of politics is cancelled out. If Agamben enjoins us to rethink 
the initial sovereign distinction and its reproduction in the exclusionary practices of 
modem statehood and rights regimes, the precise means as to which this power may be 
opposed are less than clear.
2. The Sovereigntv/Biopower nexus in International Politics
In the context of a growing interest for govemmentality as an approach to International 
Relations and of a concern for the modalities of national and international security
i ^
strategies after a series of terrorist attacks on Western soil, a number of writers, all in 
their particular manner, have begun to explore the possible interrelations of 
govemmentality and sovereignty in the international realm. Importantly, if most 
poststructuralists working in the field today would still insist on the arbitrary and 
exclusionary features of sovereignty, few would go so far as to completely discard the state 
as a major player in the creation and perpetuation o f global liberal governance. States are 
still generally seen as the main source o f biopolitical production. In what follows, I will 
give a brief critical account of how this problematique has been presented in international 
relations and in Hardt and Negri’s Empire (2000).
Even if poststructuralists aim to unveil and destabilize the assumptions behind modem 
knowledge constmctions of which International Relations theory is a representation, they 
can hardly deny the permanence of political and territorial units in the contemporary world. 
Julian Reid and Michael Dillon maintain that ‘sovereignty remains an important aspect of 
the organization and operation of international power, including that of contemporary 
liberal peace’ (2000:127). When speaking of biopolitical regimes in their national as much
11 Lemke argues that ‘Agamben limits his argument that everyone is susceptible to being reduced to the status 
o f ‘bare life’_ without clarifying the mechanism of differentiation that distinguishes between different values 
of life. It remains woefully unclear to what extent and in what manner the comatose in the hospitals share the 
fate of prisoners in concentration camps; whether the asylum seekers in the prisons are bare life to the same 
degree and in the same sense as the Jews in the Nazi Camps’ (paper first presented at the University of 
Hannover in 2003).
12 See Claudia Aradau (2007), Claudia Aradau and Reus Van Munster (2007), Michael Dillon (1995) (2004), 
Dillon and Reid (2000,2001), Reid (2007), Neal (2004,2006), Prozorov (2007), Edkins, Pin-Fat and Shapiro 
(2004), Jabri (2007).
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as their international guises, it is indeed difficult to ignore the initial delimitation o f the 
territories and populations upon which government acts nor can we ignore, I would add, 
the decisions as to the needs and the means by which the latter are kept safe. As Dillon 
maintains, govemmentality necessarily relies on ‘the forceful delimitation of the spaces in 
which it can operate. These, of course, are precisely what all the spectacles, assertions, 
legislative, territorializing, and identifying practices o f sovereignty itself help to furnish 
and establish’ (1995: 333). The constitution o f ajuridical ensemble supposes, as Foucault 
demonstrates, the forceful unification of warring ‘nations’ in a state and the forceful 
delimitation of territorial boundaries. These boundaries are perpetually reasserted through 
powerful discursive and legislative injunctions. A variety of exclusionary modes and 
practices are used strategically in order to defuse the inherent fragility o f national identity 
and physical borders; practices of exclusion are integral to presumably stable forms of 
cultural and national identification. The performance of sovereign power is therefore 
visible in the discursive formulation and institutional validations of what constitutes an 
‘imminent threat’ to the population as well as in the specification of preventive or 
defensive measures needed to secure it. The material objectives regarding national security, 
in terms of institutional and military preparedness, are intimately related with the necessary 
consolidation of an object to secure, that is, a population bound by emotional solidarity and 
in accord with the political responses adopted by its governing bodies.
Taking after both Foucault and Agamben, Dillon attests that ‘any power over death, such 
as that which classically characterized sovereign power, must nonetheless also be 
implicated simultaneously in the specification of the life whose life it is that it ultimately 
desires to command’ (2004: 59). Here, sovereign power’s initial gesture to capture life is 
intimately bound with its specification through biopolitical calculations. Power over death 
and decisions to enact security measures are at once prior and contemporaneous to 
biopolitical stratagems. Following Foucault’s lead, Dillon rightly insists on the 
specification o f life as a crucial aspect in the understanding of subjectivity.
In his recently published book, Julian Reid (2006) makes use o f Foucault’s inversion of 
Clausewitz’s aphorism in order to explore the war-like strategies through which liberal 
regimes have asserted and perpetuated themselves globally. Aiming to unsettle the 
normative claims of cosmopolitan liberalism and the democratic practices it intends to 
promote globally, he refers back to Foucault’s genealogy of disciplinary methods and 
rationalities in 19th century France and England. Reid argues that the disciplinary
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techniques developed to pacify and regulate domestic populations of developed Western 
states are now being applied to objectify and correct the behavior o f the countries where 
terrorism or other forms of defiance take hold. As he contends, the current reaction of 
liberal states to the threat posed by terrorism only confirms their continuing ‘willingness to 
wager on their abilities to suborn the life of their enemy to the superiority of the forms of 
peace and humanity on which their own ways o f life are founded’ (Reid, 2006: 11). The 
reintroduction o f the more disciplinarian elements inherent in the promotion of 
cosmopolitan democracy lends a welcome critical edge to Reid’s account. However, 
presented with the problematic conjunction of sovereignty and biopolitics in international 
relations, Reid contends, following both Deleuze and Guatarri and Hardt and Negri, that 
the projection o f the disciplinary modes and juridical endowments of advanced liberal 
states through the institutional channels of international development, reconstitutes a 
sovereign space of sorts according to which tactical interventions can be directed (2006: 
57). For reasons I will explain when discussing Empire, I disagree with Reid’s idea o f the 
global inscription of rights as the corresponding sign of the existence of a global kind of 
sovereignty and govemmentality.
Although Dillon and Reid, in their critique o f liberal cosmopolitanism, recognize the 
continuing relevance o f sovereignty within contemporary assemblages o f power, they do 
not account for the precise ways in which they are either abstractly related or strategically 
combined in particular contexts. Sovereign power is manifest in the delimitation of 
territory as well in the definition of the object and content o f security measures. It is also at 
work in the very intention of either extending or subscribing to a multiplicity of 
development targets and in the strategic use of law in case o f liberal regimes’ premonition 
o f threat. O f course, I do not mean to say that this is an easy task or to say that Reid and 
Dillon do not provide useful analytical trails, but some suggestions as to the precise ways 
in which security, law and government combine at a conceptual and practical level are 
needed.
Among the interesting attempts to elucidate the kinds of power at work in the 
contemporary world within International Relations is Edkin’s and Pin-Fat’s introduction to 
their edited volume Sovereign Lives (2004). Following Foucault, they distinguish between 
a ‘relationship of power [which] “acts upon [the subject’s] actions” and a ‘relationship of 
violence [which] acts directly and immediately on the other’ (2004: 9). The reversibility 
and flexibility that characterizes biopower is contrasted with the immobility and starkness
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of sovereign power. For Edkins and Pinfat, the proper consideration of sovereign power’s 
primordial hold on bare life is an opportunity to both accept bare life as it is and contest the 
ban imposed upon it. If, as they contend, the resistance to the sovereign ban reintroduces 
the possibility of posing properly political gestures, it is impossible to conceive o f such an 
intimation within a relationship of power, as any subjective action is already presupposed 
and integrated in a schema o f biopolitical potentialities.
One o f the more incendiary and thought provoking works of the last ten years, Empire 
(2000), looks at the issue from a rather different angle. The authors’ ambitious objective is 
to re-articulate the multiplicity o f human struggles in our age unto a new plane of 
immanence, which opposes the intangible yet compelling power o f Empire to that o f the 
multitude. Whilst the book is self-consciously experimental and offers a projection of 
future struggles that is largely theoretical and hypothetical, it provides a stimulating 
reflection on the possibility of resistance and politics. It is also a brave attempt to make 
sense o f the diffuse and confusing nature of contemporary reality through a collage o f the 
more important currents of thought o f our day. While I cannot go into a detailed appraisal 
of this imposing work, I will single out some o f the issues that are relevant to our present 
discussion.
Against a liberal understanding of global changes as the result o f spontaneous interaction 
between market forces and civil society, and in contrast w ith the thesis that a single power 
centre is orchestrating the disposition o f global forces, Hardt and Negri suggest that 
Empire ‘stands clearly over the multitude and subjects it to the rule of its overarching 
machine, as a new leviathan. At the same time, however, from the perspective o f social 
productivity and creativity (ontological), the hierarchy is reversed’ (2000:62). They argue 
that sovereignty, as one of the main ordering functions o f modernity and as one of the main 
vectors o f the extension of capital, is being subsumed unto the plane of immanence/empire 
(2000: 332). This plane of immanence is constituted through the self perpetuating activity 
of what Hardt and Negri call a ‘new economic-industrial-communicative machine_ in short 
of a global biopolitical machine’ which is in it o f itself the source of an emerging ‘imperial 
normativity’ (2000: 40). A new transnational form of power is created through the 
mutually reinforcing dissemination of the all-pervasive legal and normative requirements 
of cosmopolitan governance and of the technological and financial advances within global 
capitalism. Apart from being characterized by the spatial and temporal accelerations (in 
terms of the flows of goods, capital and people) brought about by technological advances,
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Empire presupposes a new notion of right. Where the old modem sovereign right was 
intent on drawing lines and boundaries, right is now constituting a global assemblage of 
power in which differences and particularities are actually endorsed, replicated and utilized 
(2000: 138). This new universal right is characterized by a seemingly boundless ethos of 
acceptance and inclusion and is premised upon the conviction that a set of fundamental 
ethical and moral mles apply to humanity as a whole. Imperial biopolitics, in keeping with 
Foucault’s definition, simultaneously individualizes subjects of governance by transcribing 
and controlling particularities, and totalizes by relating and integrating these specificities to 
globalized normative expectations.
When the virtual, self-perpetuating biopolitical machine encounters breakdowns or serious 
derogations to its universal ethical codes, however, imperial right rears its head to redress 
the problem. In Hardt and Negri’s words, ‘Empire is formed not on the basis o f force itself 
but on the basis of the capacity to present force as being in the service o f right and peace’ 
(2000: 15). In theoretical terms, the presentation of sovereign power as a rapid-response 
instance which resurges when the security o f certain global biopolitical processes is put in 
doubt is, I think, correct. However, there are several issues with some of the claims Hardt 
and Negri are making.
Drawing from a great variety o f sources, among them Spinoza, Marx and Deleuze, Hardt 
and Negri describe their method as immanence rather than dialectics. They explain that its 
aim is both to ‘subvert the hegemonic languages and social structures’ through 
deconstruction and to produce alternative forms o f socio-political subjectivity, in other 
words to construct ‘a new constituent power’ (2000: 47). Here, Hardt and Negri’s 
problematization of modem metanarratives, typical of postmodern criticism, seems to give 
way to an identification of the yet-to-be realized historical forces that are nurtured within 
imperial formation and that will, in turn, inaugurate new emancipated political 
subjectivities. This move, bearing a strong tinge of Marxian teleology, operates the sort o f 
ontological closure which they are arguing against in the first place (Walker, 2002). As 
Agnew and Coleman highlight, Hardt and Negri also fall into the teleological trap by 
presenting the modem and postmodern sovereign orders as temporally distinct (2007:329). 
The shift being operated in Empire from a territorial to a boundless international 
biopolitical space is too drastic and seems to, perhaps consciously, project itself unto a 
future state o f existence. Second, as Barkawi and Laffey (2002) point out, it is less than 
certain that traditional forms o f imperial domination have disappeared or that a hegemon
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such as the US is just one more cog, although Hardt and Negri acknowledge it is an 
important one, in a decentred biopolitical machine rather than the direct instigator o f many 
biopolitical stratagems. Further, I do not think that imperial right, as described in Empire 
and Reid’s latest book, is concomitant to the existence o f a global sovereign/biopolitical 
order. The juridical objectification of subjects remains more complete within states, which 
retain a more important role as to the circulation o f people, goods and money than Hardt 
and Negri would recognize. Moreover, the degree to which life is invested by biopolitics 
varies greatly from one context to the other. When applied to recipient countries, these 
requirements are not supported and conveyed by the same cultural and psychological 
means of subjectification as in the states from where they mainly originate. In all, there are 
only limited segments o f the population, as objectified in global liberal governance, whose 
subjectivity is being constituted and transformed through the cultural, moral and 
bureaucratic standards they are replicating on a daily basis.
As many critics have noted, the definition and purpose o f the new constituent power; the 
multitude, is very problematic. Here, the forms of resistance to the new imperial order that 
Hardt and Negri identify, whether it is the struggle of the Zapatistas or of migrant labourers 
across the world, are all conflated in their opposition to a global power centre. Against 
such an assertion, Laclau argues that these struggles are primarily local and particular and 
that they can only be understood and perhaps solved if they are considered as such (2003: 
54-55). As he rightly points out, Hardt and Negri’s presentation o f struggles as primarily 
contextualized and incommunicable, partly inspired by the adoption o f a foucaultian 
approach, sits uncomfortably with the reconnection of those different struggles to a single 
source of authority.
Having looked at how the interrelation of bio and sovereign power is understood in both 
Foucault and Agamben, and at the treatment o f this same problem in international 
relations, it is now necessary to try and further specify the complexity o f their relationship 
within the triad of law, security and government.
3. Law, Security and Government
Foucault’s alternate contrasting and correlation o f juridical and governmental power 
speaks of the difficulty in identifying and characterizing the precise points at which they 
intersect. If government functions by producing and integrating freedom, is it also true to
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say that security practices, which we can reasonably associate with the work of sovereign 
power, function through a degree of subjective participation and replication? Although I 
certainly do not mean to offer a settlement to the latter question or to solve the problematic 
conjunction o f bio and sovereign power, I will attempt to highlight the complications 
involved in such a correlation and to identify the contexts in which these modes of power 
are called upon.
As mentioned above, re-enactments o f sovereign power are not considered here, like in
Agamben, as the essence of the West’s political history. The numerous states of exception
depicted by Agamben in State o f  Exception (Agamben, 2005) surely represent perturbing
and thought provoking occasions, but the sovereign tends to surface more visibly when
established governmental techniques and systems o f signification are momentarily
interrupted or fail. If Sovereignty, as the necessary other of biopolitics, is no longer as
visible as it once was, there are particular, often unexpected conditions under which its
1 ^reammation can take place. Throughout the last four centuries, the way in which 
sovereignty has been practiced and understood changed radically. It is evidently more 
bounded and less assertive in contemporary forms of governance, although not, I would 
say, to the extent that the sources of its operation become entirely hidden. However, 
considering the historical development of its uses and limitations, it can generally be said 
that the discretion or salience of sovereign power depends on self-determined strategic 
necessities at any given time. The closer unfolding events point to an apparent threat to 
fundamental pillars of the state, that is, the integrity of life, goods and territory, the less 
discrete and the more powerful the sovereign becomes. Yet, the idea that the sovereign’s 
decision as to the necessity to preserve the biopolitical entity is to some extent proportional 
to the perceived need for security by governmental subjects introduces further 
complexities.
In contrast with the times where the sovereign could take life away at will, the possibility 
of death in advanced liberal societies has become slightly more remote but the fear of 
mortality and physical harm has increased.14 As Mark Kelly remarks referring to post 9/11
13 I agree with Butler’s idea that post 9/11, sovereignty is reanimated, but I am more sceptical about her 
assertion that it is an anachronism (2004: 53). Although it may appear to belong to a distant past, sovereign 
power has both undergone historical transformations and endured through disciplinaiy measures and decisions 
to go to war.
14 It is not so much that crime has increased drastically but our fear of crime that sky rocketed. On this see 
chapter 6 in David Garland (2001) The Culture O f Control
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security measures, our need for security has become so great that we may consent to the 
enactment o f unusually extensive powers to the sovereign for our own protection (Kelly, 
2004: 65). This is one of the central ambiguities of the governmental tactics of the recent 
years. From the perspective o f govemmentality, the definition and delimitation of security 
is both conducted and premised upon a population’s ‘need’ for security. However, there is 
a simultaneous enactment o f distinctively un-liberal measures, somehow disruptive of the 
normal subjectifying processes of the citizenry.
The 1976 lectures show that Foucault at least hesitated in his theorization o f sovereignty. 
Whilst in History O f Sexuality, Foucault tends to argue for the demise o f sovereignty as a 
unifying mode o f analysis for political relations, we have seen that in Society Must be 
Defended his argument is more nuanced. If Foucault maintains that the object of the 
sovereign’s power changes from the preservation of royal authority itself to the 
preservation of the biopolitical body or ‘race,’ the identification, observation, classification 
and disciplining of individuals and personal habits deemed prejudicial to social health, and 
the identification of an external danger which potentially compromises the survival of the 
population, are both practices that illustrate the persistence of sovereign power. As 
Mitchell Dean remarks, this also relates to the persistence of an authoritarian element 
within the liberal art o f government; ‘the liberal governing through freedom, or in a 
manner consistent with individual liberty, does not necessarily mean that individuals 
should be governed as if  they were already capable o f such autonomy’ (2007: 119). 
Considering the often broad and unspecified definition of freedom and social norms in 
political theory, in practice, these terms are qualified through a series of precise technical 
and intellectual requirements, themselves purported and validated by particular public and 
private authorities.
Sovereign power then effectively endures through the biopolitical age in the form of 
security practices that aim to shield the population from deviant elements inside the state 
and threatening foes outside of it. As much as a case for particular security measures can 
be made, its justification must rely on the rational presentation of a threat and of a 
necessity to adopt specific means to counter it. It follows that sovereign power is exercised 
with a degree of awareness or even consent from individual members o f a population. 
However, it is also clear that, regardless of consent and opposition, the sovereign’s right to 
kill or detain without disclosing limitations or justifications, is not yet proscribed from the 
political life of contemporary liberal societies. Security practices then oscillate between
60
naked violence and relatively consensual and non-violent measures. Consequently, it is the 
sovereign’s estimate o f what is deemed necessary for the population’s preservation which 
must be carefully examined. If Foucault points the way to the location of sovereign power 
in a biopolitical age, further investigation is needed as to how it operates at the intersection 
o f law, security and government.
For Judith Butler, law becomes an essential part o f the governmental strategies through 
which ‘populations are monitored, detained, regulated, inspected, interrogated, rendered 
uniform in their action fully ritualized and exposed to control and regulation in their daily 
lives’ (2004: 97). From the perspective of state authorities who ‘temporarily’ usurp and 
apply legislation, these measures are deemed a necessity. But as Agamben remarks, the 
theory o f necessity ‘is a theory o f exception. It is the particular case where the law does not 
apply ... It does not occur as an objective given, it clearly entails a subjective judgment, 
and the only circumstances that are necessary and objective are those that are declared so’ 
(Agamben, 2005: 25,30). For example, politicians in Washington and military personnel 
in Guantanamo Bay are given the discretionary power to decide on the duration and on the 
conditions o f internment for prisoners.
However, the surge o f sovereign power through the state of exception does not entail that 
law suddenly resurges with it as the principal means of its enforcement. The fact that law is 
used by the sovereign in exceptional circumstances does not reveal its invariably 
prohibitive nature. Foucault’s view of law as always ‘armed’15 obscures the fact that it is 
still included in the multilayered complex of regulatory techniques (Hunt and Wickham, 
1994: 67). Law remains important as a means o f setting boundaries to the functioning of 
normalizing institutions and not only as a strict mechanism of enforcement. As Valverde 
and Rose argue, ‘the legal complex has itself become wedded to substantive, normalizing, 
disciplinary and bio-political objectives having to do with the re-shaping of individual and 
collective conduct in relation to particular substantive conception of desirable ends’ (1998: 
543). A substantial part of the contemporary uses of law has to do with the formalization of 
governmental expectations within the social whole. When speaking about law, however, it 
is important to distinguish between two techniques; that o f the norm and o f juridical rule 
(Valverde and Rose, 1998: 544). On the one hand, law can contribute to set the procedural 
modalities o f the norm, which itself emerges out of the ‘group’s observation o f itself
15 Foucault’s reference to Law as always ‘armed’ appears to be very close to Marx’s own idea that Law is the 
instrument capitalists use to assert their control over production and profit with a semblance of legitimacy.
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(Ewald: 1990: 155). In a normalizing society, the social collective’s own assessment of 
what constitutes dangerous or improper behaviour translates into legally codified 
protections. The regulation of conduct therefore obtains from historically specific material 
and inter-subjective actualities rather than from external referents. On the other hand, 
juridical rule embodies the armed hand of the sovereign that casts its violence, and the 
latter form of power is premised on nothing but its own justification. In the case o f a state 
o f exception, law is either willfully disregarded or used in a strategic way by specific 
agencies. Where such a situation arises, law ‘ceases to function as a legitimating ground’ 
and ceases to act as a boundary of sorts to the forceful intervention of the state, exposing 
the violence and unjustifiability of sovereignty in full force (Butler, 2004: 94). If both 
techniques are directed at realizing biopolitical objectives, the sources and the means of 
legal injunctions must be carefully examined and differentiated.
Throughout the sovereign’s initial decision to reconfigure governmental objectives in times 
of emergency, law becomes tactically subordinate to the imposed necessity o f high level 
security and it is the sovereign imperative of security rather than the existing regulatory 
codes which determines the means by which this objective can be attained. This is a highly 
effective technique o f governance ‘precisely to the extent that no person (or state) can be 
assured o f being secure’ (Dumm, 1996: 131). It confers a potentially limitless mandate to 
increase the state’s knowledge of individual activities, to create extra legal spaces in the 
name o f necessity and to project violence inside and outside of its borders. The 
determination of security is extended to a vast array of objects likely to include individual 
citizens, foreign nationals, foreign countries and even immaterial constructs such as 
‘freedom.’ The identity o f the ‘We’ that suffered the 9/11 attacks resulted in the conflation 
of these disparate elements; the victims and the offended were not just the indistinct mass 
o f American nationals but all those who endorsed truly universal values. In their own coup 
de force, neoconservatives present and justify their democratizing project by regarding the 
abstract and infinitely expandable border of ‘freedom’ as absolutely threatened and in need 
o f being defended rather than using the existing institutional networks to initiate and 
preserve it. This association with unspecified universals, formulated by various 
authoritative voices, provides the sovereign with yet another powerful means to legitimize 
its own existence and its strategic choices without actually having to refer to the legal 
codification that usually bounds its operation.
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One o f the problems at hand in initiating a critique of sovereign power is that in advanced 
liberalism, as Butler and Foucault before her maintained, ‘the problem of legitimacy (and 
therefore sovereignty) becomes less important than that o f effectivity’ (Butler, 2004: 95). 
Through government’s ever more intense and meticulous preoccupation with the 
management of life, sovereignty becomes less visible and is also progressively 
depoliticized. The re-emergence of executive power spearheaded by state authorities 
during exceptional times such as wars, epidemics and attacks on national territory, come to 
be seen as occurrences that the state can manage, rather than as issues pertaining to the 
bounds and modalities o f ‘legitimacy,’ ‘rights’ and ‘democracy.’ This is why states of 
exception present timely opportunities to question and (re)negotiate the premises of 
political community. As Foucault reminds us, the fact that we are no longer discussing or 
questioning the founding violence of sovereignty and how it is reproduced in social 
relations, means that it is in serious need of being discussed.
Conclusion
As violence is still wrought in many different guises within advanced liberal societies, a 
consideration of the relation between power as force and imposition and government is 
necessary. As much as individuals find themselves oppressed or simply left out through 
disciplinary sanctions, the enactment of security problematiques appeals to modalities 
which lie outside of the normal flows of govemmentality. When a threat is considered 
serious enough by ‘expert’ agencies, the operation of law may be suspended and re­
oriented for the purposes of state security. The playing-out of security issues also mobilizes 
discursive and cultural continuities (Jabri, 1996) in order to reaffirm the coherence of 
identities under attack. Identity, associated with order and unity, is typically contrasted 
with what lies outside, that which threatens. As noted in the last chapter, poststructural 
International Relations emphasized the constitution o f identity by maintaining artificial 
distinctions based on state sovereignty. However, in spite of the arbitrary nature of those 
distinctions, the waging o f power in the name of territorial and political integrity is still 
actual in contemporary politics. In the end, by establishing territorial units with developed 
administrative relays, sovereign power poses the founding gesture that makes 
govemmentality possible.
An event like 9/11 certainly contributed to challenge the govemmentality framework and 
accounted for part of the resurgence in popularity of authors like Schmitt and Agamben. In
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spite o f the radical analyses sparked by the terrorist attacks and the ensuing security 
measures, post 9/11 governance should be understood as one more manifestation in a long 
line o f historicized combinations of sovereignty, discipline and government.
In chapter one, I argued that a comprehensive reading of Foucault from his early 
considerations on language, epistemology and power to his studies on discipline and 
government enabled a richer, more complex portrayal o f contemporary rationalities of 
government. As we have seen, one of govemmentality’s main functions is to explicate the 
material and intellectual conditions which subjects have to internalize in order to lead 
successful lives. The inclusion of discourse and discipline to the govemmentality 
framework then contributed to broaden the range of conditions that individuals are 
encouraged to assimilate. However, the apparent occlusion o f centres o f authority that 
impose particular outcomes and determine the strategic uses of law, security and 
government from Foucault’s studies on govemmentality was problematic. In this chapter, I 
addressed this issue by looking at what Foucault and some his followers had to say about 
the role o f sovereign power in the formation of subjectivity. I found that expressions of 
authority such as conscious decisions to exclude particular members of the population and 
to pre-empt threats from foreign enemies constituted important aspects o f biopolitical 
creation. The objective of the two first chapters was then to lay the basis for a more holistic 
perspective on contemporary rationalities of government, one which included coercion and 
discipline as much as suggestive and subtle means of control.
The revised understanding of govemmentality I proposed above will inform the main part 
of the thesis, which broadly consists in tracing the historical transformations o f the key 
practices and ideas that have informed the content of both the domestic and foreign policy 
realms in recent American history. Starting from the beginning of the 1960’s to the end of 
George W. Bush’s second term, I trace the changing roles and locations of freedom, 
responsibility and security by looking at discourses, policy papers and executive decisions 
across various policy domains. Since I argue that government comprises the greater part of 
the intellectual and technical requirements upon subjectivity, I will mainly dwell on the 
history of welfare and foreign assistance programs. However, I also look at the various 
president’s decisions and discursive strategies surrounding the survival and defense of the 
biopolitical whole.
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Chapter Three:
The 1960’s; The Welfare State versus Individualism
Introduction
This chapter will first look at the intellectual and governmental context which has given 
way to current rationalities of rule in the US. Since the birth of the American Republic, 
several ideational and cultural strands have fought out to define the boundaries and content 
o f individual freedom, morality and responsibility. It is important to recall them as they 
prefigure contemporary rationalities o f government and ideologies such as neoliberalism 
and neoconservatism. The chapter will then move on to explore the historical period that 
the thesis is mainly concerned with. It will present a series of different domains of activity 
such as welfare, foreign assistance and foreign policy in order to reconstitute the major 
governmental enactments that have had their course in the period spanning from JFK’s 
brief term in office through to Nixon’s election in 1969. The specific as much as the more 
general examples I use aim to highlight the actual content and interactions of sovereign, 
disciplinary and biopolitical forms of power in contemporary America. I will firstly dwell 
on a specific program that emerged in the early 1960’s; the AFDC (the Aid to Families of 
Dependent Children). The AFDC is particularly significant as it has as its object the moral 
and economic configuration of both the family and the wage earner. Since its inception, as 
one o f the more important welfare programs in the US, it has undergone a myriad of 
reforms which bear out the larger shifts in governmental rationalities. To survey those 
same changes in the foreign policy domain, I look at the Agency for International 
Development (USAID). Examining a combination of historical studies and policy papers in 
both the domestic and foreign policy realms, I find that the conceptualizations informing 
governmental shifts in the domestic domain are intimately related to the means and 
strategies deployed in foreign policy programs. As an example of the coexistence and 
combination of sovereign and biopolitical power during that particular period, I show that 
USAID was involved in the development o f strategically chosen enclaves throughout the 
war effort in Vietnam. Further on, I look at the ways in which the war expressed the 
executive branch’s assessment of a threat to the national population, thereby lending due 
importance to the decisions and assessments of individuals in determining specific 
governmental strategies. Throughout the chapter, I also emphasize the ideational 
components o f what I take to be the main rationalities o f government in contemporary
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American history; neoconservatism and neoliberalism. In some ways, the notion that 
ideological articulations and executive decisions bind and reinforce governmental practices 
constitutes a departure from a foucaultian rendering o f power. Through the ongoing 
discussion of neoconservatism and neoliberalism in this chapter and the ones that follow, I 
hope to spell out my understanding o f sovereign power as associated with intention, 
decision and ideology, and to offer an original contribution to the existing body of work on 
govemmentality.
Importantly, the aim of the chapter is not to provide an exhaustive historical overview of 
1960’s America but to disclose the shifts, disjunctions, struggles and continuities within 
the cultural and governmental domains through the lens of specific cultural manifestations, 
executive decrees and bureaucratic programs. I argue that throughout the 1960’s, the 
formation of subjectivity is divided between a general preoccupation for collective welfare 
standards and a concern for the development of individual potentialities.
1. American Governmentalitv
Since there are hardly any studies on the history o f government16 in the United States, this 
section will introduce some of the themes and ideas that are recurrent through America’s 
governmental history. My ambition here is not to provide a complete picture of the 
ideational currents and rationalities o f government that have had their course before the 
1960’s but to present a selection of ideas relevant to the disposition of freedom, authority 
and responsibility in contemporary representations of rule. Borrowing from historiographic 
studies, I look at the ways in which freedom and responsibility in particular have been 
articulated from the Founding onwards. This section will therefore discuss the specificities 
of American govemmentality and contextualize the expressions of sovereign and 
biopolitical forms of power in contemporary America.
16 Here, I mean Government in the foucaultian sense. Studies on American govemmentality as a whole are few 
and far between. One of the most notable efforts to study contemporary American governance through the lens 
of citizenship is Barbara Cruishank (1999) The Will to Empower. Other accounts include Hannah (2000) 
Govemmentality and The Mastery o f Territory in 19th Century America that concentrate of conceptions of 
subjectivity and governmental control in the second half of the 19th century though the figure of the famous 
legislator Francis Walker. Catherine Holland (2001) The Body Politic is a provocative account of the sources 
of prejudice in the American political thought. Another account is Lee Quinby (1991) Freedom, Foucault, and 
the Subject o f  America. Many of these studies focus on important issues such as race and gender, but my own 
work has more to do with the practical effects of certain ideas on culture and governance.
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In contrast with drawing the history of constitutional arrangements between rights 
endowed individuals and political authorities, the genealogical and historiographic 
perspectives I use point to important ideational currents which may have been obscured in 
the constitution of a unified ideological account, usually liberal, about the American
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Republic. The above perspectives highlight elements of a republican ethos in the political 
and constitutional thought of the Founding Fathers. Arguing that the constitutional 
provisions that fragment political power into many locations and institutions are 
insufficient checks on individual behaviour, the Founders and neoconservatives after them 
hinted at the state’s responsibility in suggesting models o f appropriate behaviour. These 
conceptions have to do with a lingering distrust in the ability o f certain American citizens 
to regulate themselves or to orient their behaviour according to a notion o f the common 
good. This long-standing tradition of thought sustains that the articulation of the public 
good and decisions as to the safety and well-being of the population should be left to an 
enlightened elite. The decisions of particular agents of authority to exclude those who 
constitute a threat or an impediment to the well-being and productivity national population 
have then always been a part o f liberal rationalities of government in US history.
1.1 Freedom and Responsibility in pre-1960’s America
While the reconfiguration of political authority in 18th and 19th century Europe was being 
carried out through an already developed administrative apparatus, in the US, 
administrative and governmental systems were very partial. The economic and political 
organization of many American communities, at least in their early history, relied more 
heavily on the existing dispositions o f the labouring population and local civil society 
networks than on state wide initiatives to provide a variety o f essential services. To this 
day, the local sense o f distinctiveness and independence from the powers to be in 
Washington is still strong. As I see it, the seemingly inherent characters o f the American 
people were generated through the mutually reinforcing bind o f the philosophical ideas 
propounded by the Founders and the ongoing discursive emphasis on freedom and 
autonomy as almost mythical goods. On the one hand, freedom was the subject of 
meticulous legal and political definitions and on the other, it was an undefined symbol of 
hope and inspiration for many Americans and Americans to be. Along with the valuation 
of freedom in all governmental arrangements and innovations, however, was a more or less
17 For a classic account of the fundamentally liberal character of the United States’ constitutional bases 
and political history see Louis Hartz (1955) The Liberal Tradition in America.
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persistent preoccupation with the excesses of liberty, which was expressed through 
injunctions to what I would broadly term ‘responsibility.’ These ideological features are 
here added to a strictly governmental account in the hope of further detailing the available 
representations of political and social behaviour in American history.
It is reasonable to assume that from the late nineteen hundreds, rationalities of government 
operate much in the same way across of the Western world. However, it is useful to outline 
some of the peculiarities o f American govemmentality. Firstly, the distinctive geography 
and ideational bases of the American Republic have rendered the centralization of political 
authority that we observe in many parts of Europe difficult if not impossible. What’s more, 
Liberalism, when considered as a political ideology rather than a ‘way o f doing things,’ 
does have a somewhat different ring in the United States. It is not, as in Western Europe, a 
doctrine o f limitation of the state, it is, as Foucault rightly asserts, the very ‘foundation of 
the state’ (2004a: 223-2). The starting point o f the American political community is the 
distinctive importance accorded to individual freedom. In the United States, citizens 
oppose the government on the basis of the kind of prejudice caused to their freedom while 
in a country like France, Foucault tells us, contentions between governed and governors 
take place around the provision of particular services (2004a: 224). Although Foucault 
would not have overly insisted on the discursive and ideational content of the major 
governmental shifts in Europe, I think that these aspects are of particular importance in the 
American context.
Foucault seems to present successive rationalities of government in the West (mainly 
Britain and France) as coherent, unitary ensembles. The definition of subjectivity through 
the liberal art o f governing as much as later welfarist and neoliberal models usually 
revolves around producing and nurturing a limited set of managerial guidelines and 
individual dispositions. In the American case as much as in Britain and France, the 
emergence o f govemmentality in the 18th century entailed the development o f means and 
techniques to observe, discipline and regulate the activities, choices and desires of
1 fteconomic men. However, as historians from the Skinnerian school have pointed out, 
liberal cannons exposed in the works o f John Locke, Adam Smith and the Federalists are 
riddled with references to a republican ethos, that is, to a notion o f the common good and 
to valued traits of character. As Pocock affirms,
18 For Adam Smith see Winch (1978); for Locke see Tully (1993); for the Federalists see Wood (1992).
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‘It has long been the principal criticism of the liberal synthesis that because it defined 
the individual as rights bearer and proprietor, it did not define him as possessing a 
personality adequate to participation in self-rule, with the result that the attempt to 
ground sovereignty in personality was not thoroughly carried out... But there existed 
alongside liberalism, which is a matter of law and right, a history of republican 
humanism, in which personality was considered in terms of virtue’ (1985: 45).
In spite of the commonplace reading of American political thought as thoroughly liberal, 
there are plenty of allusions to elements of a republican theory from the Founding Fathers 
to modern-day neoconservatives. I suggest that the various injunctions to moral behaviour 
in either political discourse or legislation that have had their course in American political 
history must be looked at to complement the history o f governmental developments in the 
US. Even as liberalism is generally assumed to prioritize ‘fair procedures over particular 
ends’ (Sandel, 1996:4), some of the liberal state’s policies over the years appeared to have 
been be based on the assumption that select individuals were unable to govern themselves. 
The disciplinary measures undertaken by the state must then be studied alongside the 
technologies o f government which take the perpetuation and manipulation of liberty as 
their principal objects.
From the earliest days of the American republic, political elites were particularly 
concerned with the moral content of citizenship. As Graham Burchell points out, 18th 
century political thought was ‘marked by a dilemma arising from the challenge posed to 
this ideal o f the self-aware and self-defining citizen’s (civic) virtue by what were identified 
as newly emergent, essentially historical and uncertain (civil) forms of the individual’s 
private and professionalized subjectivity and conduct’ (1991:121). The free, enterprising 
individual which lay at the heart of the American ideal was also expected to lead a frugal 
and virtuous existence, away from the vices and temptations of the old continent. The 
popular aspirations to open commercial exchange, freedom of religion, of speech and of 
conscience, which embodied the liberal and democratic instincts of the nascent state, were 
to be counterbalanced by a sober, selfless and assiduous ethos. The informal domain where 
relationships between citizens, whether commercial or civic, were taking place, was 
therefore constituted as a governmental object of sorts. As Burchell points out, civil society 
is a ‘transactional reality existing at the mutable interface of political power and that which 
permanently outstrips its reach’ (1991: 141). Whilst political power in the United States 
was and still is both maligned and distant, regulatory functions have been assumed by a
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variety o f character building institutions such as churches, local clubs and associations. As 
Hamilton recognized in the early days of the Republic, the national government ‘depended 
for its success on its capacity to shape the habits of the people, to interest their sensations, 
to win their affections, to ‘circulate through those channels and currents, in which the 
passions o f mankind naturally flow’ rather than on the genius o f the national constitution 
(Sandel, 1996: 133).
Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (2000), written nearly two centuries ago, 
still is one of the more cogent attempts to understand America’s political institutions as 
well as the character of its inhabitants. Among many other counsels, de Tocqueville 
warned that democracy could easily be confused with despotism. As much as citizens in a 
democracy were separated, each with their own private interests and values, they were 
willingly kept apart in despotism. Wary of the dangers of general indifference, American 
legislators organized political activity among different states, counties and districts, 
thereby multiplying the ‘occasions for citizens to act together and to make them feel 
everyday that they depend on one another’ (2000: 487). Self-interested citizens in a 
democracy then had to associate with their fellow citizens by necessity. Local 
infrastructure projects, for example, solicited the participation of all those affected. But 
what was at first a necessity, de Tocqueville tells us, became a choice; ‘what was 
calculation becomes instinct; and by dint o f working for the good o f one’s fellow citizens, 
one finally picks up the habit and taste of serving them’ (2000: 488). Aside from their 
multiple political associations, American citizens were also involved in a dizzying array of 
‘religious, moral, grave, futile, very general, very particular, immense associations’ (2000: 
489). If we look at Foucault’s studies on discipline and government, which mainly 
concentrated on post 18th century France and Britain, the structure o f political authority and 
the means of subjectification in early 19th century America presents very distinct 
characteristics. In the United States, the absence of visible embodiments of the central state 
or of extensive carceral, medical or scientific institutions, meant that standards o f socio­
cultural behaviour were to an extent generated and monitored through civic associations. 
Whereas in France and Britain, the state had a more direct role in perpetuating the natural, 
already-existing processes of civil society, in the US, economic and social exchanges were 
reproduced through more localized and self-contained contexts. Through the development 
o f standardized institutional relays, social sciences and socio-cultural mediums, however, 
the interchange between the state and techniques of self-regulation became greater.
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Accordingly, as Barbara Cruikshank attests, ‘the capacity of citizens to exercise self- 
government itself (eventually became) a matter of government’ (1999: 97).
As de Tocqueville maintained, the individual qualities required for the maintenance and 
survival of democracy in such a large country did not necessarily refer to the Greco-roman 
tradition of civic virtue, they rather developed from a notion of ‘self-interest well- 
understood.’ This doctrine would not ‘produce great devotion; but it suggests little 
sacrifices each day; by itself it cannot make a man virtuous; but it forms a multitude of 
citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, master o f themselves’ 
(Tocqueville, 2000: 502). Bearing in mind that liberal economy and political democracy 
were both extending their empire across Western nations, political thinkers like the 
Founding Fathers or de Tocqueville could only hope that self-interest be exercised 
reflectively with a careful consideration for the use and value of selfless association. 
According to the fundamentally liberal designs of the Constitution, the state was not and 
should never be the enforcer of morality. Particular individual qualities were then required 
to sustain the liberal democratic spirit o f the republic. However, as industrialization 
progressed at a rapid pace after the end o f the Civil War, this kind of self-conscious 
liberalism somehow lost out to narratives of political rights, social protection and 
economic growth. As Eric Foner remarks, constitutional amendments that followed the 
Reconstruction had to do with asserting individual rights, including that o f the recently 
freed black slaves, and to enable the federal state to define and defend those rights (1998: 
107). The impressive development of the US’ industrial output at the end of the 19th 
century was made possible by a growing population o f labourers and consumers. During 
was termed the progressive era, which spanned roughly from thel 890’s to the 1920’s, one 
o f the principle political concerns was to ensure that this growing pool o f workers be 
treated humanely and lawfully.
As Woodrow Wilson asserted in his article The Study o f  Administration (1887), in a 
strikingly similar fashion to Foucault’s own analysis, ‘political history has been a history, 
not o f administrative development, but of legislative oversight not o f progress of 
governmental organization, but o f advancement in law-making and political criticism’ 
(1887: 206). Wilson believed that the study of public administration was essential to the 
development of effective state action. The progressive interlinking of industrial labour with 
human and administrative sciences suggested the contours o f a fully fledged American
thgovemmentality. Throughout the first few decades o f the 20 century, F. W. Taylor’s
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influential theories on industrial management contributed to reorganize factory work 
according to fixed standards of efficiency, whereby specific tasks and responsibilities were 
divided among workers and managers (Taylor, 1911). These impersonal guidelines would 
be arrived at through the meticulous observation of the worker’s daily activities in the 
factories. In order to increase worker productivity, a set o f incentives such as monetary 
rewards in exchange for higher outputs were implemented. Taylor even envisaged applying 
variations of his criteria of efficiency to the ‘management of our homes; the management 
of our farms; the management of the business of our tradesmen, large and small; o f our 
churches, our philanthropic institutions, our universities, and our governmental 
departments’ (1911: 7). To this day, efficiency criteria have played an essential role in the 
constitution of subjectivity and in the organization of governmental strategies in the US. In 
conjunction with the discursive and cultural association of work with self-realization, 
efficiency models contributed to create hard-working, autonomous subjects.
Following the crash o f 1929, Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated a sweeping set of relief plans 
and social reforms which came to be known as the New Deal. The plan, which involved a 
disjointed composite of infrastructural projects, state pensions and unemployment 
insurances, was concocted by cabinet members as well as prominent intellectuals, lawyers 
and journalists (Jones, 1995: 458-464). The orchestration o f these plans and reforms 
embodied a different conception of government. Whilst before the risks and consequences 
of industrial development were left at the discretion of enterprising individuals, risks to the 
population were being aggregated and insecurity was tamed ‘with solidarity and the laws 
of large numbers. In the process the free citizen was locked into the web of social 
solidarities and interdependencies’ (Rose, 1999: 81-82). This new ethos o f government 
sought to objectify the already existing propensities to association and solidarity in civil 
society as opposed to solely the self-interested dispositions of individuals. A new 
vocabulary intent on addressing the reality of impoverished and helpless masses ‘sought to 
locate the law, and the juridical subject of right, as but one region within the wider, 
concrete and more fundamental evolution of society’ (Dean, 1999: 129).
In the United States, the welfare-oriented rationale that was initiated during the New Deal 
and lasted perhaps until the end o f the 1970’s, was very much tempered by the lasting 
belief in the creative and entrepreneurial energies o f the individual. Indeed, many 
neoliberals like Hayek and members o f the Chicago School of economics like Gary Becker 
and Milton Friedman have repudiated the state’s extensive role in the management and
72
regulation o f economic but also social life. In the last 60 years of so, neo-liberalism, as a 
peculiar art o f government, has been hugely influential in the transformation o f social 
scientific methodology and in the administration of services to the population. Most 
importantly, it has progressively imposed itself as a tacit model for self rule. Notions of 
self-realization, choice and empowerment have become particularly meaningful referents 
in the everyday lives of Americans as well as in the elaboration o f effective social 
programs. However, the progressive integration o f these criteria has been counterbalanced 
by a concern to limit and orient individual choices.
1.2 Beginnings of a Conservative Backlash
In this sub-section, the objective is to briefly document the historical and intellectual 
context of neoconservatism’s emergence. In addition, I propose a particular understanding 
of neoconservatism as both an ideology, which relates it to expressions of sovereign power, 
and a rationality o f government, which connects it to more suggestive tactics. Since the 
relevance of both neoconservatism and neoliberal in practical schemes of government is at 
its utmost at the end of the 1970’s and beyond, I will discuss their ideational contents 
further in chapter five.
Since the juridical interpretation of freedom, that is, the state’s gradual recognition and 
defence o f the rights o f the marginalized and less endowed, has made considerable 
advances since the Civil War and has been particularly prevalent since the 1960’s, 
neoconservatives sounded the alarm to reassert the state’s moral authority. While the 
state’s direct participation in defining or imposing collective moral standards is at best 
questionable, particularly in a country like the US, neoconservative strategies would have 
to be more suggestive than forceful. To the extent that neoconservatives have sought to 
create moral and responsible citizens, they have attempted to do so through a mixture of 
incitements, rewards and punishments as much as through direct, coercive means. Dean 
rightly suggests that ‘the ethos o f welfare is located within webs of sovereign powers by 
which subjects are bound to do certain things including deductive and coercive powers of 
taxation, o f systems of punishment, detention, expulsion and disqualification, and of 
compulsion in drug rehabilitation, child support, immunization, workfare programmes and 
so on for the achievement of various goals of national government’ (Dean, 2007:95). As I 
will argue throughout, the exclusion of dangerous individuals for the benefit o f the 
biopolitical whole is as much an effect of disciplinary and governmental mechanisms as it 
is the product o f conscious decisions from a variety of authoritative agencies. The willed
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exclusion of individuals or groups from the realms of national identity and political 
participation, the foremost expression of sovereign power, also requires a sustained appeal 
to discursive constructions. The exercise of sovereign power, as a form of power which is 
more visible and immediate than either government or discipline, then requires sustained 
discursive assertions and differentiations.
In the 1960’s, in the midst of unprecedented prosperity and stability, a rather unexpected 
surge o f refractory cultural and political forces rocked the foundations of American 
society. If American civil society had until then remained quietly observing of values like 
temperance and family unity, although there was evidence of a waning involvement in 
civic and political associations, radically new forms of political involvement and cultural 
mores were beginning to collapse the long established and tacit reliance on self- 
government. Some o f the conceptions emerging from sections o f the American youth 
actively opposed the mentality of rule, technocratic consciousness and the foreign policy of 
the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Although the aesthetic and political manifestations 
of the 1960’s would not be formally included in governmental analysis and would largely 
be interpreted as cultural instantiations, I think that they are essential to understand the 
kind of governmental correctives brought about by a neoconservative rationality of rule 
over the last 40 years or so. As Wendy Brown rightly remarks, current governmental 
arrangements result from the varied and complex combination of a ‘market-political 
rationality’ (neoliberalism) and ‘moral-political rationality’ (neoconservatism) (2006: 
698). If neoconservatives like Kristol recognize the importance of the market and of 
efficient managerial techniques, they are more critical o f neoliberalism’s lack of explicit 
moral content19. In the face of what they saw as the liberal elite’s complacency toward 
outright individualism, consumerism, permissiveness and depravity, various conservative 
groupings, neoconservatives among them, began to call for the reassertion o f state 
authority and for the renewal of a public minded and self-disciplined ethos. The re­
establishment of state prestige and authority supposed that elected representatives had to 
have the moral qualities and intellectual abilities to articulate and even dictate the national 
interest. As the Founders and de Tocqueville before them, neoconservatives believed that 
democracy was best preserved through minimizing the hold of public opinion on the elite 
(Devigne, 1994: 56). As the Federalists put it, the general effect of representation should
19 For a good account of the neoconservative critique of Hayek’s neoliberalism see Drolet (2007).
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be ‘to refine and enlarge public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen 
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and 
who patriotism and love of justice’ (Federalists, 2005: 52). While individuals have the 
incumbent responsibility to cultivate ‘virtue’ in order to realize that purpose, administrators 
must relentlessly ask themselves, as the founding fathers did; ‘ What kind o f  common man 
does our popular government produce?' (Kristol, 1995: 317).
It is not so much that neoconservatives are overtly hostile to liberal thought. In fact, they 
aim to rescue or re-adapt earlier forms of liberal philosophy. As Kristol advances that in 
Adam Smith’s thought, both in The Theory o f  Moral Sentiments and The Wealth o f  
Nations, ‘the primordial individualism of modem political and social thought generally 
culminate(d) in some vision o f a good community’ (Kristol, 1983: 149). For 
neoconservatives, codes of behaviour developed and practiced in the earlier, more self- 
aware forms of American liberalism became points of reference for the perpetuation of a 
society threatened at its very core. Since the influence of institutions such as the family, 
churches and voluntary associations was rapidly waning, neo-conservatives proposed to 
rejuvenate these institutions through all available means. As against the procedural and 
mechanical conception of democracy in contemporary social science, neo-conservatives 
believe that the ‘purpose of any political regime is to achieve some version of the good life 
and the good society’ (Kristol, 1983: 50-51). This objective required that citizens be able to 
govern themselves and that the state act on manifestations o f collective decadence and 
corruption.
2 The AFDC and the Great Society
The substance of govemmentality in the 1960’s mostly had to do with a complex amalgam 
of welfare and neoliberal rationalities. The estimated minimum o f state assistance needed 
to sustain collective well being was almost invariably complemented with incentives to 
individual responsibility. In contrast with New Deal policies, Kennedy and Johnson’s 
social engineering encouraged, at least rhetorically, the pursuit of personal growth and 
‘empowerment.’ As Barbara Cruikshank attests, ‘self-help,’ which she defines as a 
‘technique o f government...which aims to make the poor into citizens through their 
voluntary subjection to their own interest,’ (1999: 54) become one of the central dynamics 
of the welfare programs instated in the I960’s. The free and rights-endowed individual, 
independently of colour or creed, then came to be the unequivocal basis for governmental
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intervention. At the same time, however, subjectivity was defined through collectively 
agreed substantive ends. Through those new governmental configurations, subjects were 
disciplined and formed according to the dual requirement of collectively beneficial ends 
and o f efficiency standards bearing on productivity. Towards the end o f the 1960’s, 
however, strategies aiming to discourage welfare dependency were already attempting to 
work through ‘the capacities o f citizens to act on their own behalf (1999: 39). Although 
the juridical qualifications of social solidarity allowed minimal social insurance for all 
individuals, other governmental and cultural tendencies were advancing alternative paths 
to self-realization. The conflicting visions of a citizen with basic rights and entitlements, 
and o f another with private and social responsibilities, battled out and combined to create 
the governmental landscape o f the 1960’s.
Kennedy and Johnson’s programs identified poverty and the poor as objects of observation 
and transformation. Concretely, the US government’s ambition to eliminate poverty and 
prejudice required a massive overhaul o f administrative capabilities and juridical reforms. 
Developing out o f the concerted effort of a flurry of academics and civil servants, the Great
onSociety was in large part made possible through the elaboration and implementation of 
standardized systems of management which had much in common with the efficiency 
models developed by F.W. Taylor a few decades earlier. In this section, I look at the 
interlinking operations of power and knowledge in a specific welfare program throughout 
the 1960’s, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
Before the 1929 financial crash, care for the poor was relegated to philanthropic 
endeavours and local community associations (almshouses, orphanages, and charities). 
From 1911, the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program mainly provided income for 
white widows. The Social Security Act of 1935, part o f the sweeping New Deal legislation, 
remained focused on the ‘deserving poor;’ namely the elderly and the disabled. Initially, 
the amount of federal aid available for states that chose to assist unemployables was very 
limited. The AFDC was introduced as a reform of the ADC through the Public Welfare 
Amendment (1962). Assistance was from then on extended to family members or relatives 
living under the same roof as the children whose upbringing was said to require more
20 The Great Society was a broad ranging set of planned reforms in health care, education, economic inequality 
and civil rights to be undertaken by President Johnson with the help of the best minds of the time. In that 
sense, it bore great resemblance to modernization theory. Its objective was no less than ridding the United 
States from ignorance, poverty and discrimination. A wealth of social programs like Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO), the Neighborhood Youth Corps, the Community Action Program and Project Head Start 
developed from Johnson’s ambitious and broad ranging initiative.
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favourable conditions. This was one federal initiative among many (among which are the 
Office for Economic Opportunity, Maximum Feasible Participation, Community Action 
Program) in the general attempt to eliminate poverty. Subject to unprecedented visibility 
and increased political will, inequality became one of the main preoccupations in 
American public life during the 1960’s. Indeed, the extensive program of social protection 
under John F. Kennedy was concomitant with the American people’s ‘rediscovery’ of 
poverty (Axin and Levin 1992; 239). Best selling books such as Michael Harrington’s The 
Other America (1962) and MacDonald’s Our Invisible Poor (1963) revealed the unseen 
harms of American capitalism and the social problems which needed to be addressed by 
the state.
In the statement of intent of the Office of Economic Opportunity, created in 1965, poverty 
is defined as ‘a condition of need, helplessness and hopelessness’ (Cruikshank, 1999:73). 
The discursive constitution of poverty as an object of urgent intervention prepared the 
ground for new governmental strategies. The delivery of an increasing array o f services 
and programs dealing with poverty, but also with crime and unemployment, did require the 
creation o f many new governmental agencies and o f improved means to circulate 
information between the various administrative tiers. In order to conceive and implement 
its ambitious welfare plans, the Kennedy administration enlisted a wealth of academics and 
experts. The latter contributed to the mapping out, division and classification o f the 
different areas of intervention and to the introduction o f stricter efficiency quotas. Key 
governmental advisers like Robert McNamara and Charles J. Hitch introduced programs 
like the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), essentially a handbook for 
industrial management techniques and effective budgeting, in order to streamline 
governmental activity. Concurrently with the dominance of behaviouralism and 
structuralism in American academic circles, quantitative research and other scientific 
methodologies were readily applied to social policy. The initial projections of the 
democrat’s welfare plans also displayed a remarkable unity o f purpose, which brought 
together a great variety o f knowledge communities all intent on eradicating political and 
economic inequalities. This outlook was characteristic o f ‘modernization,’ which David 
Apter defines as ‘the process o f consciously directing and controlling the social 
consequences of the increased role of differentiation and organizational complexity in 
society’ (1965: 56). Modernization was then a way to cope with the managerial, 
technological and infrastructural exigencies that emerged in the context of a rapidly 
growing economy and of an expanding welfare state. It was also associated with the belief
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that knowledge and scientific progress had to be used to improve human life (Apter, 1965: 
433).
In the American case, however, the realization of general welfare rested heavily on the 
development of individual qualities. Even as government in the 1960’s intervened on the 
general ‘nexus of collective solidarities and dependencies,’ one of the specific objectives of 
these sweeping reforms was to reverse the individual attitudes normally associated with 
poverty and instil a new ethos of self-sufficiency, optimism and motivation (Rose, 1996: 
40). Concurrently to the looming influence of neoliberal economists like Hayek and 
members o f Chicago School such as Gary S. Becker, the notion of rational choice became 
one of the cornerstones of governmental intervention not only in the economic domain but 
in a variety of other spheres like social security and family life. The more radical 
proponents of American neoliberalism tended to apply economics to ‘all purposive conduct 
entailing strategic choices between alternative paths, means, and instruments’ (Gordon, 
1991: 43). Within the constraints of their personal traits and aptitudes, it is assumed that 
individuals will seek to maximize the rewards of a particular choice, whether it be the 
choice of a life partner or of a job. If economics was indeed capable ‘of addressing the 
totality o f human behaviour,’ it could surely be used to program ‘the totality of 
governmental action’ (Gordon, 1991: 43).
The above discussion of self interested economic actors and the balance that results from 
their individual pursuits has much in common with classical liberalism. The specificity of 
the neoliberal rationality o f government, however, lies in the conscious manipulation of the 
environment in which choices are made. In this context, the state’s specific function is to 
uphold the conditions in which rational economic agents may thrive. Ultimately, the 
establishment o f optimal conditions may entail the manipulation or rectification of 
individual desires (Dean, 1994: 57). As rational agents, individuals are encouraged to 
develop the particular qualities required for a successful adaptation to changing economic 
circumstances.21 As an example, towards the late 1960’s, unemployed and unskilled 
Americans had a choice to either remain on welfare, with the associated stigma of 
dependency and the risk o f seeing their benefits reduced, or to enrol in work programs that 
offered wages marginally higher than welfare checks but were presented as a much more 
dignified alternative. Middle-class Americans, on the other hand, were offered the
21 For a prime example of this mode of thinking, see Becker (1964). With his concept of human capital, 
Becker states that he is concerned with the ‘activities that influence future monetary and psychic income by 
increasing the resources in people’ (1964: 11).
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possibility to re-train and acquire the skills that would allow them to choose among a 
greater variety of occupations. The extent o f choice then also depends on an individual’s 
socio-economic status; if  the upper layer of American society could attain greater wealth 
and happiness by enterprising itself, the poor were basically left to choose between shame 
and honourable poverty. In any case, the values o f hard work, optimism, autonomy and 
sobriety were all warranted signs of rational choice.
In conjunction with the growing civil rights movement, the democratic administrations of 
the 1960’s famously extended social and political rights to the black minority. Throughout 
the decade, impoverished African Americans emigrated from the South in masses and 
settled in the already destitute inner city communities o f the Northern industrial centres. 
This contributed to an unprecedented surge in welfare rolls. From 1960 to 1970 the AFDC 
roll tripled from 787 000 families to 2 208 000 at the end of the decade. Average monthly 
payments increased by 35 % from 1960 through to 1968 (Nancy E. Rose, 1995: 88). 
Between 1965 and 1971, there was a 15% increase in African American women receiving 
AFDC payments. By 1971, only 4.3 % were widows, the first legitimate beneficiaries of 
assistance. From its inception, the Public Welfare Amendment of 1962 was concerned with 
dependency. For the government, the solution was to be found in the development of 
individual capabilities through training, counselling and personalized case management. 
Kennedy’s message to Congress on welfare in 1962 presented a novel approach to 
dependency by tracing the sources of poverty to the individual and proposing measures 
that encouraged welfare recipients to participate in economic activities (Axin and Levin, 
1992: 241, 243). As stated by the US congress, the objectives of the 1962 Amendments 
with regards to the ADC were to ‘strengthen family life’ and help ‘parents and relatives 
with whom they are living to attain or retain capability for the maximum self support and 
personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and 
protection’ (Social Security Act, 1962: 42, USC 601, 1964 supp IV). Federal assistance 
therefore exercised its responsibility to preserve (nuclear) families by developing the 
potential o f each of its members to attain self-reliance. In another piece of legislation, the 
President explained that;
‘The US can achieve can achieve its full economic and social potential as a nation only 
if every individual has the opportunity to contribute to the full extent of his capabilities 
and to participate in the workings of our society. It is therefore the policy of the United 
States to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in this Nation by
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opening to everyone the opportunity for education and training, the opportunity to work, 
and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity’ (Kennedy, 1962).
In spite of the unprecedented federal assistance offered to the American people at the time, 
it is once again apparent that the individual still constituted the basis of a well functioning 
and well ordered society. The hard fought liberties of the American people were built and 
would be preserved through the combined strength of its individuals. Furthermore, work 
and education were represented as basic fulfilments of dignity and self esteem. However, if 
state sponsored welfare and education were considered a right throughout most of the 
1960’s, it was a right that needed to be earned. The state’s duty was to provide an 
opportunity to those evolving in conditions unfavourable to the development o f their 
potential, but those same individuals had to account for their efforts through periodical 
evaluations.
If the provision o f aid to dependent children took into account the erosion of traditional 
moral pillars and changes in sexual mores during most of the 1960’s, legislators become 
concerned about the effects o f the program on the rates o f divorce, illegitimacy and 
employment. The growing number of people on rolls eventually prompted the government 
to impose more restrictions and conditions to assistance. As early as 1962, when Kennedy 
More background information and more reference on this signed the CWT (Community 
Work and Training program), he maintained that this particular initiative was to provide 
‘rehabilitation instead o f relief, and training for useful work instead of prolonged 
dependency.’ (Quoted in Nancy E. Rose, 1995: 92). Two years later, another program 
entitled WET (Work Experience and Training) stated similar objectives. The latter 
initiatives prepared the way for a more lasting plan named Work Incentive (WIN) in 1967, 
part of the Social Security Amendments, more directly concerned with the rising caseload 
o f the AFDC. Until its revocation in the 1990’s, restrictions, punitive measures and work 
requirements were steadily imposed (Nancy Rose E., 1995: 89). As opposed to its 
predecessors, the WIN program was compulsory for selected recipients and directly 
encouraged work experience by not deducing the first 30 dollars of earned income from 
state benefits (Social Security Amendments, 1967: 119). Again, these measures overtly 
impressed the value of goals like independence and self-esteem on the recipient and 
discouraged attitudes leading to dependency and hopelessness.
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Some o f the issues reflected in the multiple reforms and experiments around the AFDC 
program were identified by neoconservatives as early as the mid-1960’s. In their eyes, the 
liberal elite’s definition o f poverty as a ‘paradox’ to be eliminated rather than as a normal 
and acceptable feature of market capitalism was a recipe for disaster. They argued that high 
levels o f social protection would raise expectations beyond the state’s capacity to meet 
them and insisted that it would only encourage the disintegration of the nuclear family, 
particularly in impoverished black and Latino communities (Moynihan, 1965). They also 
saw the AFDC as a pathway to illegitimacy, divorce and desertion (Axin and Levin, 1992: 
240). Equally, the form of personal empowerment advocated by liberal egalitarians, 
presumably based on nothing more than good will, was considered naive and ineffectual. 
Some warned that if  the poor were provided with the organizational skills and political 
consciousness of the liberal elites, a series of intractable social problems would unfold 
(Moynihan, 1969: 111). Ultimately, if the Great Society’s hope to engender independence, 
self-reliance, empowerment and responsibility was to come true, conservative intellectuals 
believed that governmental authorities had to act on the ‘character’ of welfare recipients by 
changing their expectations and imposing stricter work incentives (Wilson, 1985: 9).The 
governmental rationality informing the domestic reforms o f the 1960’s was a highly 
complex hybrid. One of the one hand, it carried the idea that poverty was a structural 
consequence of capitalism and that assistance to the victims of this imbalance was the 
state’s responsibility. On the other hand, contemporary economic thought was adopted to 
further technocratic efficiency and to nurture self-reliance through incentives to a strong 
work ethic and a sober and reasonable outlook. The definition and delimitation o f choice 
and freedom, the focal points of governmental plans and state rhetoric, was also being 
fought out in the cultural realm. In response to expanding welfare rolls and to the 
disintegration of traditional family units, various conservative strands began to suggest 
punitive measures for those who were not deemed to show enough good will or moral 
restraint.
For all the potential difficulties it was encountering in the domestic realm, modernization, 
as a model for economic, technical and moral development, was enthusiastically applied to 
many foreign policy programs. Equally, the belief in the inherent benevolence of American 
moral and political aspirations legitimated wide ranging efforts to implement a particular 
model o f development throughout the world.
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3. AID Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Era
On the whole, the techniques, calculations and rationalities devised to develop domestic 
socio-economic structures were applied to international development programs. The 
backdrop o f aid policy in the early to mid 1960’s comprised three main elements; all of 
which replicated the neoliberal/welfare rationality observed in the domestic realm. First, 
scientific methods would make the management and implementation of aid and 
development programs more effective by setting standards, producing accurate information 
on targeted countries and increasing the coherence between different aid agencies. Second, 
the implementation of foreign assistance objectives as to political participation, welfare 
programs, institutional capacity and economic growth introduced particular requirements 
and dispositions for recipient states and for individuals participating in the projects. Third, 
national identity would be consolidated not only through its opposition to communism but 
through a demonstration o f the superiority o f American Welfare Capitalism as a model of 
development and a way o f life. All three elements were part and parcel of modernization 
theory which offered a measure o f ‘civilization’ and material development as much as it 
validated the economic and social institutions of the United States. Poor countries were 
constituted as objects o f intervention upon which specific norms, criteria and techniques 
were applied. In spite o f a few specific differences, the diffusion o f standards of 
development in poorer countries followed the outlook of the Kennedy-Johnson 
administrations which was put to work domestic anti-poverty strategies. As Gilman notes 
‘modernization theory was the foreign policy counterpart to ‘social modernism’ at home, 
namely the idea that a meliorist, rationalizing, benevolent, technocratic state could solve all 
social and economic ills’ (2003:16). In what follows, I look at the techniques and 
guidelines informing the Agency for International Development’s (USAID) programs in 
order to reconstitute the governmental combinations that had their course in the I960’s.
The passing into law of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act represented a considerable 
change from the aid policy of the previous administrations. Under Eisenhower and 
Truman, aid programs were dispersed, poorly organized and served a mainly ideological 
purpose. President Kennedy’s main objective was to regroup and reorganize the various 
agencies (International Cooperation Agency, Development Loan Fund, Export-Import 
Bank, Food for Peace Program responsible for foreign assistance in one centralized, 
effectively managed organization; USAID. Kennedy asserted that Foreign Aid was 
important because the ‘economic collapse of those free but less-developed nations.. .would
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be disastrous to our national security, harmful to our comparative prosperity and offensive 
to our conscience’ (Kennedy, 1961). He also believed that the prosperity and political will 
generated in 1960’s America presented a timely opportunity to elevate poorer countries to 
self-sufficiency and stability. It was also clear for Kennedy that Americans were morally 
responsible to lead the free world and that international security could be insured through a 
wide ranging increase in living standards. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act stated the 
intention to ‘promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States 
by assisting people of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal 
and external security, and for other purposes’ (Committees on International Relations and 
Foreign Relations, 2001: 1). The pursuit of peace and prosperity at home was therefore 
reflected in its pursuit abroad.
The AID Program Guidance Manual o f 1962 stated that the purpose of foreign assistance 
consisted in developing ‘a community of free nations cooperating on matters of mutual 
concern, basing their political systems on consent and progressing in economic welfare and 
social justice. Such a world offers the best prospect of security and peace for the United 
States’ (in Mason, 1964: 37). The attainment o f common welfare depended upon the 
construction of an institutional structure that allowed for the realization o f sovereign duties 
and the formulation of an equitable model of development, both domestically and in 
concert with a community of states committed to global welfare. Even if  the institutional 
frameworks regulating international trade and politics were not as developed as they are 
today, the majority of Western powers agreed on the necessity and value o f state 
assistance. In general, the elaboration of a social state first entailed the creation and 
education of a bureaucratic core. Secondly, it required elaborate methods to conceive and 
evaluate an increasing variety o f social programs. Third, technical and financial means 
were needed for large infrastructural improvements. Fourth and last, a variety of informal 
and culturally sensitive means had to be devised in order to predispose local populations to 
the supposed benefits o f industrialization and liberal democracy (in Mason, 1964: 37).
The objective o f this renewed aid impetus was no less than transforming the social 
structure of underdeveloped countries through political education, institution-building and 
infrastructure projects. Nils Gilman notes that ‘as development projects began to take as 
their object not the palimpsest of traditional practices, but rather the ‘human material’ 
itself_ conceived as a universal subject whose needs, prospects, and norms could be 
discovered, interpreted, and fixed by science_ modernization theory began to take a more
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revolutionary aspect that aimed at remaking the identities of traditional people and 
societies’ (2003: 10). Concrete measures such as progressive tax reforms, land reforms, 
voluntary work and political participation were actively encouraged, organized and 
monitored (Guess, 1987: 38). Depending on the ‘willingness’ o f specific countries to ‘help 
themselves,’ US development programs would strive to instil desirable qualities such as 
entrepreneurship, efficiency and self-reliance. Foreign assistance encouraged initiatives at 
the level of ‘society’ and empowered those individuals who showed a desire to improve 
their lives by participating in sound economic and political schemes. Assistance programs 
in the 1960’s therefore emphasized the training and education of local populations in view 
of their integration in a working network of institutions related to the central state. 
Development aid was then given to state administrations and civil society associations in 
an effort to enable ‘the transition into self-sustained growth’ (Kennedy, 1961) as opposed 
to a permanent contract of assistance. The treatment of recipient countries, much like that 
o f individuals in domestic welfare programs, rested on incentives to self-help. This meant 
that aid would serve as a ‘catalyst for local self-sufficiency and (eventually) contribute to 
its own self-elimination’ (Guess, 1987: 38). As Lyndon B. Johnson asserted in his special 
Message to Congress on Foreign Aid in 1967, aid should not be provided as a ‘substitute,’ 
it had to be applied to and integrated in the fabric of social, economic and political 
development o f poor countries. Again, in the 1960’s, the substantial responsibility of the 
state in facilitating the attainment of ‘self-help’ was taken for granted. It was also made 
possible, in part, by the distinct unity of moral purpose translated in the solidarist ethos of 
the Kennedy-Johnson era. In a reference to the innate character o f the American people, 
the President claimed that the 1961 Act reaffirmed ‘the traditional humanitarian ideals of 
the American people and renew(ed) its commitment to assist people in developing 
countries to eliminate hunger, poverty, illness, and ignorance’ (Kennedy, 1961). Increased 
foreign assistance was presented as the natural expression and extension of a common 
national purpose.
In effect, development aid was part of an integrated system of thought which included 
goals as varied and ambitious as the use of scientific methods for administrative purposes, 
the repelling of communism and the promotion o f international peace and prosperity 
through the extension of welfare capitalism. As one commentator put it, foreign aid 
became ‘a handy multipurpose instrument of foreign policy, which we have been tempted 
to use in an increasingly wide variety o f ways, for an increasingly broad range of purposes’ 
(Millikan, 1963: 91). Michael E. Latham (2000) associated these aspirations with the
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ideology o f ‘modernization.’ A group of talented intellectuals such as Walt Whitman 
Rostow, Lucien Pye and Gabriel Almond were hired to participate in the conception of 
foreign assistance programs. Civil servants, social scientists and government officials 
worked in concert to produce a more effective bureaucracy, generate economic growth, 
generate orderly liberal democratic institutions and improve services in selected countries. 
The extension of technological and bureaucratic know how and the increase of welfare 
standards throughout the world were viewed both as a duty and in the interest of the United 
States. Amongst the developed nations, America began to assume a leading role in;
‘building infrastructure, furnishing technology, providing training, and even 
demonstrating the virtues of efficiency, long term planning, pluralist politics and 
personal discipline (in order to) promote progress in a world imperilled by communist 
insurgencies.’ (All this would be made possible) through an ‘achievement-oriented 
ethos’ (Latham, 2000: 7)
Sophisticated political systems and developed economic infrastructures were of course 
characteristic of Western nations. As subjects o f governmental intervention, 
underdeveloped countries were constructed as culturally and materially backward and 
judged according to indicators o f ‘modernity’ such as the state of the infrastructure, public 
institutions and economic performance (2000: 5). Rostow’s influential formulation o f the 
five stages of growth provided a classificatory scheme for national economies referred to 
by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (Rostow, 1971: 4-10). Once levels of 
development were determined, a series of specific requirements could be elaborated. The 
populations, resources and existing institutions o f less developed countries (LDC’s) were 
also mapped out more rigorously and an unprecedented amount of data compiled by field 
workers was put to work in an effort to tease out the productive capacities o f poor, often 
recently decolonised countries. Specific factors impeding or enabling development such as 
population growth were isolated and studied through ‘censuses and demographic (reports), 
surveys of knowledge practices of conception control, fertility patterns, and methods of 
evaluating family planning programs’ (Agency for International Development, 1968a: 8).
Apart from providing technical assistance and amassing an ever greater variety of 
information, local project managers posted in various countries were also expected to 
transmit some of the personal qualities required for a healthy economic and political life. 
Invested with a dutiful professional ethos, American representatives were made to 
demonstrate the virtues of social engineering and comprehensive planning. The dedication,
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diligence and competence o f the personnel on the ground would serve to validate 
American aspirations to welfare and justice in other countries. Animated with an almost 
missionary zeal, the cause volunteers and program managers were associated to was to 
build a prosperous and free world against the advances of the communist enemy.
It was in the spirit of countering the perceived emergence of a communist threat in Latin 
America, South East Asia and elsewhere as well as to enhance the image of America
99abroad that organizations like the Peace Corps and initiatives such as the Alliance for 
Progress were created in 1961.
To some extent, the ethos permeating the US’ assistance plans translated the welfarist 
assumption that it was the wealthier states’ responsibility to transfer some o f their wealth 
to deprived countries. Eminent economists such as Gunnar Myrdal (1970) insisted on the 
West’s moral obligation to redistribute capital in the absence of a world state. He partly 
attributed the causes of underdevelopment to the economic legacy of colonialism; third 
world countries had a very limited amount o f segregated development enclaves brought 
about by colonial enterprises and generally lacked the infrastructure and the means to 
generate capital. Within such a mindset, poverty was identified as an undesirable 
phenomenon which required immediate intervention for both security and humanistic 
purposes. The State was the principal agent charged with this task and it accordingly had to 
be given the legitimacy and the means to instate justice and prosperity.
In order to further integrate his foreign policy program, Kennedy assimilated development 
aid with security assistance. By linking aid with national security, he provided it with more 
legitimacy, importance and funding. Americans were asked to ‘help prevent the social 
injustice and economic chaos upon which subversion and revolt feeds’ (quoted in 
Eberstadt, 1988: 33). Strategic and altruistic objectives were then fused together in a 
complex system in which counterinsurgency plans and agricultural aid worked to the same 
objectives (1988: 33-34). Improving the lives and extending the liberties of citizens in 
poorer countries was considered the surest method to quell social unrest and to stop the 
advances of communism. Many believed that the sole demonstration of the capacities of 
American liberalism to empower and inspire the destitute throughout the world would
22 The Peace Corps consists of a 2 year voluntary service in development projects abroad. Chosen individuals 
had to have the necessary ‘qualities of character;’ in Peace Corps (1962) Memorandum.
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vindicate the superiority of American values over communist ones. In fact, Kennedy’s 
initial approach to communism was not to ‘fight it negatively’, but to respond with ‘a 
historical demonstration that in the 20th century, as in the 19th_ in the southern half of the 
globe as in the north_ economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand’ 
(Quoted in Packenham, 1973: 54). The perpetuation of a way of life through peaceful 
means was a defensive measure in itself. Furthermore, the United States, as the most
tliauthentic and successful embodiment of liberal principles in the 20 century, was the 
example to follow and to promote. This confidence in the founding principles of the United 
States was clearly stimulated by the perceived threat o f totalitarianism and its 
contemporary manifestation, Soviet communism. American liberal intellectuals like 
Ehrman, Schlesinger, Niebuhr, speaking in the aftermath o f Nazism and warning against 
the emergence of a new totalitarian power, urged for a defence o f the ‘vital centre,’ which 
lied in a passionate attachment to individual liberty. The defence o f liberty and o f the 
institutions that have preserved it was both a moral and a security imperative. In 
Schlesinger’s words, ‘free societ(ies) survive in the last resort only if enough people 
believed in it deeply enough to die for it’ (1970: 245).
4. The Vietnam War and US foreign policy
War-making counts as an obvious expression of power as might rather than as productive 
force. Well-worn accounts o f world politics usually survey the comparative ability o f one 
country to make other countries act according to its will and analyse the considerations and 
tactics involved in various states’ quest for power. Rather than seeing the Vietnam War 
according to the bipolar model of Cold War politics, I am more interested in the discursive 
tactics that prepare the decision to intervene in another country. The decision to make war 
is itself conditioned by the assessment of threats to a national population by foreign policy 
experts and executive authorities. These assessments are processed through a series o f 
discursive strategies which typically present intervention as morally worthy and, more 
particularly, as essential to the security of national citizens. Looking at the processes of 
legitimization surrounding American interventions in countries like the Philippines, 
Vietnam and Iraq, US foreign policy has largely functioned according to the same 
modalities of exclusion and differentiation as in the domestic realm. What’s more, the 
tacitly held sentiment of ‘manifest destiny’ appears to have been a lasting driving force in 
the extension and validation o f American models, whether economic, technical or political.
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The US did not really commit men or resources to realize its emerging ambitions on the 
world stage before the very end of the 19th century. The missionary spirit that drove 
thousands of Americans across the planes and onto the pacific coast was beginning to 
outgrow the now fixed national boundaries. In an attempt to thrown off Spanish rule in 
Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam, Mckinley initiated a series of armed 
interventions in 1898 and 1899. Newspapers like Journal and World incensed the 
American public by exaggerating or even inventing Spanish atrocities in Cuba (Jones, 
1995: 400). Those reports contributed to exacerbate an already simmering nationalistic 
fever and to drive the American public’s demand for the annexation of Spanish colonies. 
The Spanish-American War of 1898, as David Campbell remarks, was justified ‘in the 
same terms that had rationalized the oppression of the Indians and others at home: the need 
(if not duty) to civilize, educate, and look after primitive peoples, and the anarchy, 
barbarism, and danger that would flourish if  the United States did not act’ (1998: 135). 
American interventions were then largely made possible through the constitution of a 
realm o f signification in which identities were defined in a hierarchical, mutually exclusive 
way. As Campbell says, the objectification of internal as much as external enemies was 
‘animated by a moral concern to distinguish between the normal and the pathological, and 
largely impervious to the characteristic and qualities of the other, these figurations 
instantiate a fictive self that has meaning principally as the negation of difference, and 
which then performs as a regulative ideal by which contingency can be domesticated and 
identity enframed’ (Campbell, 1998: 136). In the case of the US intervention in the 
Philippines, which resulted in a drawn out and violent colonial struggle, Americans 
consistently viewed themselves as diligent, organized and principled all the while 
representing Filipinos as lazy, backward and barbaric. As Roxanne Lynn Doty observes, 
‘the reality 'instantiated' in this (racist) discourse facilitated practices that led to the death 
o f more than a million Filipinos and the subsequent denial of their right to self- 
government’ (1996: 48). These discursive instantiations contributed to enable murderous 
American tactics against the Filipino insurrection but also to force the infrastructural 
beginnings o f a govemmentalized space.
Whilst Woodrow Wilson vowed to overturn the US’ imperial ambitions, he held a strong 
belief in the inherent value of liberal democratic principles. Although the run up to the 
American entry into the First World War enjoyed the usual flaring o f nationalistic 
sentiments, Wilson was determined to extend some of the principles of progressivism he 
had put forth at home to foreign policy. In his famous 14 points speech, Wilson expressed
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his wish that standards such as free trade, open agreements, democracy and self- 
determination be extended and respected by all international players. These wishes 
translated into a proposal to form the League o f Nations which would presumably see to 
the preservation of peace, fair exchanges and territorial integrity among its members. The 
idea that the principles espoused by the United States are of universal validity has been 
echoed throughout American history. Neoconservatives have notably embraced this nation 
albeit in a less conciliatory manner than Wilson idealism.23
4.1 The Vietnam War; Extending the American Model by force
The Vietnam War was the longest and most divisive war in US history. Although 
Indochina had been a strategic concern for American policy makers since after the end of 
World War Two, the war did not formally begin before the end of 1964, early 1965 under 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s tenure. The evaluation of the stakes either in terms of national 
security, strategic interests or international credibility were carried out, as is usually the 
case, by the president, highly ranked officers and influential political advisers. 
Interestingly, however, military operations were supplemented by a colossal development 
effort. Bearing the visible imprint of modernization, US policy in Vietnam was an attempt 
to instate working liberal democratic institutions and a prosperous economy in order to 
minimize the appeal of communism. The following discussion of American involvement in 
Vietnam is by no means an exhaustive historical account o f the war, its aim is rather to 
illustrate the particular entanglements of executive decisionism with the extension of 
domestic governmental rationalities to another land.
As early as 1956, John F. Kennedy affirmed that Vietnam represented ‘the cornerstone of 
the Free World in Southeast Asia’ (Kennedy, 1956). Soon after leading his revolutionary 
troops to victory in Dien Bien Phu and forcing the French colonists to capitulate, Ho Chi 
Minh became president o f North Vietnam and instated land reforms inspired by Stalin and 
Mao. Fearful that South Vietnam might also succumb to communism, US policy makers 
vowed to extend American influence in the region. A series o f American presidents would 
support Ngo Dinh Diem, although not unreservedly, in his attempts to defeat the National 
Front for the Liberation o f South Vietnam (NLF), made up of nationalist and increasingly 
numerous communist elements. In conjunction with the growing discontent of the South 
Vietnamese with Diem’s authoritarianism and elitism as well as with the increasingly
23 On the parallel between Wilsonian idealism and neoconservatism, see Boot (2002).
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visible US presence, the NLF, otherwise known as the Viet Cong, captured substantial 
parts of the countryside. Seeing that most of President Kennedy’s efforts to overturn the 
insurgency such as Strategic Hamlets and large scale development projects, had had 
minimal success, Lyndon Johnson opted for outright military intervention. Even though the 
events are still clouded in mystery, Johnson reportedly reacted to an attack on the USS 
Maddox by North Vietnamese patrol boats in the Tonkin Gulf (Herring, 2002:142). After 
hesitating to heed to his foreign policy advisers about military escalation, Johnson ordered 
the bombing of North Vietnamese targets in February 1965.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and others such as Walt Whitman Rostow, McGeorge Bundy 
and Robert McNamara initially believed that the fall o f South Vietnam would incur a 
domino effect and accelerate the spread of communism in South East Asia. Even if public 
officials, the President included, frequently stated that the US’ main objective was to 
‘assist the people and government’ of South Vietnam in ‘their contest against the 
externally directed and supported communist conspiracy’ (NSCA 273 Memorandum in 
Herring, 2002: 132), a series of other justifications were given. As a former high ranking 
officer recalls, Secretary o f State Rusk first invoked the ‘defense of Vietnamese freedom, 
then... national interest, and finally a defense against the yellow peril in the World’ (in 
Lind, 1999: 33). If the variety of rationales to intervene in Vietnam represented the 
multifaceted strategic game of the Cold War, with its imprecise estimates o f intentionality, 
threat and risk, it was also indicative o f the American population’s increasing scepticism 
about the war. The mobilization of public support did require a wide ranging discursive 
campaign, which depicted the danger of a communist aggression as not only possible but 
real. Equally, what was presented to be at stake was the defence of freedom itself against 
the tide of oppressive forces, not only in South Vietnam but throughout the entire world. 
American intervention in foreign soil involved, as it often has, the discursive association of 
an innate individual and national attachment to freedom with a belief in its universal 
character. Typically, it also labelled the communist enemy as bloodthirsty, evil and 
immoral.
The need to defend freedom demanded greater efforts and sacrifices from ordinary 
Americans. By the summer of 1967, draft calls exceeded 30 000 per month and a ten 
percent surtax was instituted to finance the war (Herring, 2002: 211). In a fully fledged 
show of executive power, several bills amending existing conscription laws were passed to 
allow for the enrolment of more young combatants, the majority of whom were either poor
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white working class or African American. As difficulties started to emerge on the ground 
and as domestic discontent grew, the Vietnam War became a real test of strength for 
President Johnson and his close advisers. In a private communication, Johnson said the 
loss of Vietnam would ‘shatter (his) Presidency, kill (his) administration, and damage our 
democracy’ (Kearns, 1976:252). From the mid to late 1960’s, the Vietnam Quagmire was 
seen as a direct threat to executive authority and the political structure it upheld; decisive 
action was therefore seen as urgent. An increase in the influx of troops, military equipment 
as much as developments funds and agents was the US government’s response to the crisis.
As early as 1959, the US mission in Saigon was the largest in the world (Herring, 2002: 
69). In 1966,43% of the US’ international development funds and a similar proportion of 
personnel went to Vietnam (Eberstadt, 1988: 34). In keeping with a modernizing outlook, 
the improvement o f the South Vietnamese population’s welfare would be the most 
effective means to prevent all-out insurgency. Throughout the sixties, most of the AID 
reports submitted to Congress alluded to the need to build a strong central government, 
capable o f overseeing the distribution o f wealth and services through all levels o f society. 
As stated in the 1971 AID document US Foreign A id in Vietnam, one o f the organization’s 
principal objective was to provide technical assistance in fields like ‘taxation, customs, 
statistics and manpower utilization’ to help the government increase its revenue and 
capabilities (Agency for International Development, 1971: 8). On a more general level, 
AID’s function would consist in demonstrating to the Vietnamese population that the state 
could be trusted and contribute to its well-being. As the agency’s 1968 report Population 
Program Assistance illustrated, some programs aimed to ‘directly reach the people’ such 
as health, education and agriculture, while others concentrated on improving the state’s 
capacity to deliver services and manage infrastructure projects like electrification (Agency 
for International Development, 1968a: 55-63).
In conjunction with these strategies to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, 
USAID eventually had to compose with wartime conundrums such as refugees, the 
reconstitution of crops and villages and the organization o f self-defence forces. Targeted 
rural populations, more inclined to sympathise with the Viet Cong, were also placed in 
‘strategic hamlets’ from the early I960’s. These consisted in enclosed spaces where 
peasants would build modem homes and instigate community activities under the 
supervision o f American soldiers, aid workers and South Vietnamese officials. Such a 
strategy was intended to demonstrate the benefits o f organization, effective public
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administration, new and advanced agricultural technologies and political participation. The 
extension o f central government to previously overlooked rural areas transformed ‘passive 
farmers...into active, empowered citizens through voting in local elections, forming 
committees, and undertaking projects to meet community needs’ (Latham, 2000: 154). 
Those governmental experiments acted directly upon the cultural and personal character of 
the individuals concerned. They aimed to supplement, some would say replace, traditional 
cultural behaviour with new attitudes and desires. Monitored community initiatives would 
eventually; ‘make them want better things, clean wells, a school, improved crop practices, 
a road’ (Staley in Latham, 2000: 172). Targeted countries were represented as having a 
clear interest in adopting American institutional, economic and political forms. To make 
local populations appreciate that it was indeed in their interest to follow particular models 
o f growth and public representation, American aid agencies had to skilfully balance the 
disciplinarian element involved in organizing ‘development communities’ with the 
justification o f such efforts based on the promise o f more freedom, prosperity and 
contentment for the local population.
Even if in operative in very different contexts, the freedom of either the welfare recipient at 
home in the US or that o f the South Vietnamese peasant are both subject to a variety o f 
calculations and adjustments. To some extent, the targeted individuals’ expectation o f the 
state’s commitment to personal freedom and of its responsibility to organize resources and 
deliver services equitably, also informed governmental projects. Interventions in particular 
countries often amounted to establishing standardized forms of governance informed by an 
ethos o f bureaucratic, administrative and individual efficiency. Not without certain 
difficulties, the rationality informing development projects in countries like Vietnam, 
meaning the rules and modes of classification of different domains of intervention, was 
transposed unto local structures.
Conclusion
The 1960’s witnessed an active reconsideration of the state’s role as to the provision of 
welfare and the development of individual potential. The complex combination o f 
efficiency based models for state administration and of strategies of responsibilization and 
self empowerment for individuals largely constituted the governmental landscape of the 
I960’s. Modernization, with its belief in progress, rationality and human flourishing was 
perhaps the decade’s most typical brand of governmental thinking. Guided by an
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unprecedented number o f intellectuals, Kennedy and Johnson’s policies applied scientific 
expertise and collective good will to the perennial problems of prejudice, poverty and 
underdevelopment. In both domestic and foreign policy realms, the poor at home and 
deprived countries abroad were represented as objects of intervention through a range of 
new plans and targets orchestrated by the central state. The poor were also made into 
subjects faced with the necessity to internalize certain attitudes and requirements, 
particularly in domestic welfare programs. While some penalties were imposed upon those 
who failed to comply with the conditions of welfare assistance, these were counterbalanced 
by the state’s responsibility to provide for minimal standards of living. During the first half 
o f the decade, the United States’ sense of self was shaped by its unparalleled wealth and its 
stable and open political system, but also by its opposition to the main alternative model of 
development; communism. Confident in the superiority o f its own values and methods, the 
US planned to extend the rationale informing its Great Society programs to the rest of the 
world. In a show of both its military power and its determination to outshine communists 
in South Vietnam, the US attacked with a massive development effort and military strikes.
As I have shown in this chapter, the constitution of personhood throughout most of the 
1960’s was tom between multifarious forces and rationales such as a pastoral-welfare 
ethos, a reliance on individual impetus, clear manifestations of executive authority and the 
liberalization of cultural mores. The next chapter will trace the transformations of the 
above forces and rationales and focus more particularly on the gradual validation of 
individual effort and self-realization in rationalities o f government throughout the 1970’s. 
The 1970’s marked the further erosion of the welfare ethos, the intensification of efficiency 
standards, the introduction of more disciplinary measures on recipients of state assistance 
and the dissolution of protest movements, all of which were part and parcel o f the changing 
governmental mindset throughout the decade.
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Chapter Four:
The 1970’s; The Welfare Model Under Pressure.
Introduction
This chapter will address the gradual shift from the welfare oriented rationale of the 1960’s 
to the emerging neoliberal govemmentality which was apparent in many administrative 
reforms throughout the 1970’s. The definition of subjectivity, that is, the development of 
the personal aptitudes necessary to thrive in particular governmental and cultural 
contingencies, was being pulled in opposite directions. If  Americans were expecting a 
certain threshold o f state assistance, the requirements of higher productivity pointed to 
self-reliance as the more reasonable expectation. Similarly, if  poor nations of the world 
were expecting first world countries to contribute a larger share in the contest against 
global poverty, the terms of responsibility for foreign assistance were restricted and 
redefined. The chapter will dwell on these emerging tendencies and complex combinations 
by looking at the reforms of the AFDC and USAID in the 1970’s. It will also look at a 
selection of political decisions in both the foreign and domestic realms which were enacted 
through discourses of exclusion.
The modernizing outlook of the 1960’s, characterized by the use o f technology for human 
betterment and by the state’s central role in creating the conditions for individual 
productivity and insuring standards of collective welfare, was beginning to wane into the 
next decade. If the state was still expected to provide care for the destitute throughout 
much of the 1970’s, governmental plans seemed to be putting a sharper focus on the 
individual. The individual was indeed becoming the object o f more conscientious 
observation. Managerial plans to reform the American labour market were increasingly 
taking into account the desires and habits of workers in order to suggest more productive 
arrangements for factory workers as much as civil servants. Through the right kinds of 
perks and incentives, individuals could potentially be made more productive and 
conscientious in their daily tasks. In the competitive labour market of the 1970’s, rationales 
of rule concentrated on creating the conditions for self-realization and happiness in the 
workplace. Similarly, the logic behind welfare reforms was to impress the necessity and 
obligation to work in the minds of welfare recipients who were now being labelled as 
‘dependent’ and ‘irresponsible.’ As Nixon insisted; ‘let us remember that America was
94
built not by government, but by people—not by welfare, but by work—not by shirking 
responsibility, but by seeking responsibility’ (Nixon, 1973). Throughout welfare reforms in 
the 1970’s, more punitive measures were enforced and eligibility for state assistance was 
restricted. Work was slowly becoming one of the main conditions for welfare assistance. It 
was both the object o f experiments in governmental thought and represented as having 
intrinsic normative and regulatory value. This re-orientation of subjectivity around notions 
of individual effort was supplemented by exhortations to moral responsibility. In public 
discourse, stable family life was presented as one of the more viable forms of social 
existence. Part of the reason for the steady rise in AFDC caseloads was attributed to the 
disintegration of the nuclear family in many impoverished communities. Neoconservative 
intellectuals and practitioners, Pat Moynihan among them, were particularly concerned 
with this cultural turn and tried their hardest to reverse it.
Once again, the programmatic shifts in rationales o f liberal rule observed in the domestic 
realm were also manifest in many aspects o f foreign policy. Reforms towards 
administrative efficiency cut across policy domains and affected the intellectual and 
technical make-up of foreign assistance perhaps even more than domestic programs. 
Administrative cuts and re-arrangements as well as experiments in privatization, already 
under way in the delivery of social care to Americans, were bolder and more extensive in 
foreign aid programs. The responsibility for development was clearly being delegated to 
the individual citizens and administrative units of recipient countries. The objectives of 
foreign aid were also considerably more modest, focusing more on relief efforts towards 
the truly destitute than on wide ranging developmental plans. Just as the state was 
beginning to crack down on the poor at home, the US government inflicted more 
disciplinary measures on countries who were not fulfilling their obligations.
In spite of the increasingly refined incitements toward economically and socially 
productive behaviour, the imprint of state power had all but receded. The establishment of 
employment and eligibility quotas as much as the objective to make welfare recipients 
become conscious of what was in their own interest contained traces of direct and indirect 
commands. From the perspective of the security problematique expressed by Foucault in 
Society Must be Defended, protests against the Vietnam war were deemed dangerous to the 
security and stability o f the nation. The boundaries of normality were being defined 
according to general differentiations between the politicized elements of the counter­
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culture and patriotic and law-abiding citizens. The presidency of Richard Nixon in 
particular was marked by a series of forceful interventions.
1. Welfare and Work in the 1970’s
As noted by Judith Skhlar (1991), work has been a particularly important part of American 
identity. In popular consciousness, work is the gateway to freedom, itself traditionally 
associated with autonomy and self-reliance. In the midst o f the transformation of obsolete 
economic and industrial structures throughout the 1970’s, workers had to adapt to new 
conditions of production and performance quotas. Concurrently, the workplace was 
invested with a flurry o f new psychological techniques. Managerial expertise integrated 
these new techniques in the hope of making workers more fulfilled and satisfied with their 
tasks in order to increase productivity. The values associated with work, namely self- 
discipline and effort, served as an inspiration for what the state now saw as the problem of 
‘welfare dependency.’ Reforms of the welfare system in the 1970’s were more and more 
intent on turning recipients into job seekers, in other words to make them more actively 
engaged in providing for their own welfare. This renewed focus on developing personal 
aptitudes and encouraging contentment and self-realization through work announced a 
more drastic shift in governmental thinking. However, responsibilization was not solely 
associated with work ethic, it was also implicitly related to family life. In what follows, I 
look at the reforms of the AFDC throughout the 1970’s and discuss the combinations of 
power that emerge in the progressive remaking of subjectivity in post welfare governance.
From 1969 to 1976, the Nixon and Ford administrations evolved through what was dubbed 
a welfare crisis. Profound divisions as to what the extent and function of welfare should be 
took place between the ruling parties. During his first term, Nixon called on 
neoconservative politician Patrick Moynihan to reform the AFDC. As a result o f his 
endeavours, the Family Assistance Plan (FAP) was proposed to Congress in 1971. In the 
proposal, Moynihan vowed to reduce the number of social workers, whom he saw as 
unnecessary intermediaries between families and the federal government. The FAP had 
two main components; first it was to set a fixed federal allowance to families24 which 
would be distributed by states at their discretion and second, it aimed to establish work as a 
primary condition to receive benefits (Nancy E. Rose, 1995: 100-101). Although it was
24 It was inspired by a report from Bob Finch which recommended introducing a fixed income for 
families, itself modelled on Milton Friedman’s idea of a negative income tax. He suggested sending 
payments to families directly.
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rejected by Congress because of the liberals’ complaint that the minimal federal allowance 
was too low and the conservatives’ objection that it was too high, the report announced a 
shift in how the subject of governance was thought of and how it could be shaped. 
Concurrently with Nixon’s proclivity for traditional values, market economy, corporate 
interests and a general politics of stability, government plans hinted at a transfer of 
responsibility towards the individual and local authorities. But if  Nixon’s social policy was 
more conservative, it was by no means a complete demotion o f the welfare state (Banfield, 
1973: 33). A substantial part of the American population was not willing to accept a radical 
decrease in government spending. Once again, Moynihan put most of the blame for the 
permanence o f a large welfare apparatus on left leaning Democrats, who he assumed did 
not want to lose their jobs in community programs or share their benefits with the needy 
(Moynihan in Steinfels, 1979: 135).
In Moynihan’s view, the social engineering of the previous decade had accustomed 
citizens to overly generous state benefits and had allowed for the disintegration o f the 
moral fabric o f civil society. In The Politics o f  a Guaranteed Income (1973a), he implied 
that stronger measures had be taken to reverse the worrying trends that were developing 
within the underclass;
‘Among a large and growing lower class, self-reliance, self-discipline, and industry are 
waning; a radical disproportion is arising b/t reality and expectations concerning job, 
living standard, and so on: unemployment is high but a lively demand for unskilled 
labour remains unmet; illegitimacy is increasing; families are more and more matrifocal 
and atomized; crime and disorder are sharply on the rise.’ (1973a: 76)
Again, neoconservatives, with Moynihan as their political ambassador, advocated 
interventions which could have a direct effect on the morality o f welfare clients. In order to 
modify the character of complacent and amoral welfare recipients, obligatory work was 
seen as a legitimate measure. Throughout the seventies, many experimental work programs 
like the Community Work Experience Program (CWEP), known as workfare, were 
introduced. Welfare recipients were now obliged to register with state employment 
services, sign up for training and support sessions as well as carry out community work. 
Those who did not meet these conditions simply saw their benefits reduced (Nancy E. 
Rose, 1995:100). However, the first phase of the work incentive program (WIN I) came 
under criticism for failing to increase participation. The program was eventually replaced 
by WIN II, which stressed immediate job placement over individualized training and
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counselling services. AFDC applicants as young as 16 years old were obliged to register, 
and deregistration from the program would incur serious sanctions (US Department o f 
Labor, 1979: 51). The remaining programs for the unemployed also became increasingly 
binding. It was slowly becoming apparent that the 1960’s ideas o f empowerment through 
rehabilitation and training were being replaced with more coercive measures to end 
‘welfare dependency.’ In the 1970’s, paid labour was increasingly considered as an 
effective means to regulate a range of social ills associated with welfare dependency such 
as alcoholism, idleness and delinquency. Work came to assume the function of social and 
psychological integration previously offered by the immaterial solidarity o f Great Society 
programs. The kind of qualities required of a productive, well adapted worker, provided a 
model to follow for welfare recipients.
Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (1995) argue that accounts of economic transformations in 
the 1970’s are incomplete without surveying the psychological expertise that developed 
around the person of the worker. Elaborate representations of the states of mind, needs and 
aspirations o f the worker as well as incentives to productivity and satisfaction have become 
an integral part of managing economic activity, labour relations and social behaviour. 
During the Taylorist and Post World War I years, industrial production was based on 
efficiency-driven scientific models in which labourers featured as little more than lifeless 
instruments. Concomitantly, the pre WWII social movements decried the dehumanising 
effects of work and a separation between the sphere o f productivity and that of the 
workers’ rights and aspirations started to appear. As Jacques Donzelot suggests, this 
dissociation o f ‘the social from the economic’ led to an effort to recreate a ‘community of 
labour where each individual understands his or her place in the enterprise, and the 
enterprise itself attains the status of an institution seen as serving a common idea which 
transcends the individual’ (1991: 258,259). During the war and the immediate years that 
followed, the creation of corporations with distinctive identities contributed to reclaim the 
allegiance o f individuals estranged from their work. Workers became involved in the 
management of the enterprise and the state acknowledged the workers’ rights to 
advantages like family health plans, paid holidays and leisure activities. Most Great 
Society programs of the 1960’s were informed by this same commonly agreed ‘right’ to 
social protection. However, the renewal of the subject’s emotional bond with his or her 
workplace and of the extensive role of the state in realizing the common good, soon gave 
way to a reflection on the adverse effects of uniform integration. Somehow, the
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counterculture exposed the conformism of American society partly brought about by 
corporatism and pleaded for the expression of individuality.
The solidarist ethos o f enterprise and the focus on harmonious group relations began to slip
away in the 1970’s. The concern to increase productivity required that responsibilities be
allocated according to competency. This meant that a hierarchy of skills and managerial
experience was being progressively instituted in the workplace. The possibility to acquire
new skills and be promoted were also inviting prospects for workers (Rose, 1989: 98). In
the few decades that followed the war, the Marxist-inspired critique o f work as a series of
dull and compulsive motions, and of the severance of labour and self-fulfilment, gave way
to all kinds o f psychological surveys on how to increase happiness in the workplace. 
9 €Research institutions in Europe, Scandinavia and North America published various 
studies on the ‘quality of working life’ (Miller and Rose, 1995: 439). Experts on work 
relations, government officials and psychologists joined forces to represent the worker’s 
needs and aspirations and make them consistent with prevailing conceptions of democracy 
and liberty. A lot of CEOs found that getting workers more involved in the production 
process and making work more interesting increased productivity.
In a historical overview of the Work Incentive program (WIN) from 1968 to 1978, a 
congressional report vowed to increase the ‘quality and range of jobs’, provide ‘high 
quality training, help youth to make transition between work and reliance on welfare, 
further refine self help techniques’ in ‘order to enable WIN registrants to acquire the skills 
necessary for successful participation in the job market’ (US Department of Labor, 1978: 
38). As Donzelot points out, the articulation of an emerging subject demanding personal 
fulfilment, independence, humane and interesting tasks, opens the way for a formation 
permanente\ ‘a continuous process of retraining, from the cradle to the grave, designed to 
provide the individual with a feeling o f autonomy in relation to work, and at work’ 
(Donzelot, 1991: 273). Through the careful identification o f the individual’s feelings, 
ambitions and misgivings, work was to become an integral part of personal life.
As a result o f the budgetary pressures on the welfare system, international competition and 
technological advances in the production sector, a series o f adjustments were required.
25 On this, see Miller and Rose’s historical study of the Tavistock Institute (1988) in which they assess the 
effect of psychological and managerial techniques on the reconceptualization of the workplace and the 
families from the welfare to the advanced liberal state.
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New management schemes were being developed in order to increase efficiency, reduce 
waste and streamline services. Training programs also had to be implemented to keep up 
with a flurry o f technological ameliorations. Government studies compared the American 
workforce with that of countries with higher productivity indicators like Japan. In a 
congressional report published in 1982, an assortment of academics, scientists, government 
officials and company representatives concluded that the U.S. labour force was struggling 
to adapt to technological developments, lacked the necessary training and skills and 
suffered from poor relations with management (Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources, 1982:2-4). The proliferation of psychological studies and government reports 
intent on discovering what makes workers’ happy and therefore productive, meant that 
human relations were now the object of conscientious calculation and manipulation (Miller 
and Rose, 1990: 22 and 1995: 441). On the one side, the productivity o f each worker was 
measured by attributing the roles of specific characteristics like age, sex and race (Baumol 
and McLennan, 1985: 106). On the other, each individual’s behaviour was monitored 
through personalized counselling sessions and remedies customized to the worker’s needs 
or problems were made available.
The drive for efficiency characteristic of the emerging entrepreneurial culture of the 1970’s 
also affected state operation. Throughout the 1970’s, social programs were subject to 
closer scrutiny. Quality Control Programs conceived for the AFDC consisted in ‘producing 
a better administration o f the Program by requiring States and localities to measure, 
identify and correct errors in administration. As stated in the 1978 administrative report, it 
is also directed at ‘reducing Federal matching of erroneous payments to a minimum’ 
(Committee on Government Operations, 1978: 202). Some reforms then vowed for a 
transfer o f responsibility from the central state to smaller administrative units. In order to 
avoid administrative mistakes such as undeservedly high welfare checks, accountants and 
local civil servants were instructed to be more scrupulous. Quality control programs began 
to investigate suspected fraudsters and devised formal selection processes between 
deserving and undeserving recipients. In conjunction with high inflation, these various 
efforts to monitor individual cases and payments more closely actually succeeded in 
slowing and reversing enrolment (Axinn and Levin, 1992: 279).
Again, the impetus towards efficiency across economic and administrative realms entailed 
a central role for the individual. It also insisted on the importance of paid labour as a means 
to restore self-confidence and facilitate social integration. Within the emerging
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entrepreneurial culture o f the 1970’s, the multiplication of positive incentives like 
promotion and negative ones like redundancy, clearly impressed the value o f hard work in 
the individual’s psyche. This valuation was also enabled by the concerted discursive 
production o f many different agencies from local government offices to multinational 
corporations. For welfare recipients, however, the suggestion of labour’s intrinsic value 
was backed up by disciplinary measures. Work was the obligatory first step on the road to 
self-realization. If governmental rationality in 1970’s America was oscillating between 
meeting individual desires and dealing with structural necessities, the poor usually bore the 
brunt of the latter adjustments. For the more fortunate, the attraction of rewards and 
bonuses in a competitive environment clearly associates happiness with effort and a 
measure of self-sacrifice. In typical neoliberal fashion, the quest for individual happiness 
could at once increase general economic output and regulate social behaviour.
However, at the end of the decade with Carter as President, a substantial portion of the 
American public and o f its elected officials still considered poverty and unemployment as 
a consequence of the economic structure. For example, the 1977 Report o f  the WIN 
Program and Related Experiences persists in blaming the American economy for ‘its 
inability to provide jobs’ (US Department o f Labor, 1978:37) and states that ‘most persons 
are on welfare because they cannot earn enough in spite of their efforts to support their 
dependents (US Department of Labor, 1978:11). Responsibility here mostly lies outside of 
the individual’s reach and what is lacking is neither a desire to work nor succeed, but the 
adequate context to do so. The general aspirations of the social state such as the even 
distribution of ‘opportunity’ and the provision of welfare as a ‘right’ then seemed to 
endure. In 1974, about l/4 th of subsidized opportunities for employment and training 
programs were provided through the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA), which supplied jobs within the public sector (US Department of Labor, 1978:36). 
Even if welfare recipients had to demonstrate their motivation to overcome the obstacles 
inherent to a competitive and rapidly changing labour market, there was no real political 
emphasis on imparting responsibility to the individual for his or her poverty. However, this 
was to change with the election of Ronald Reagan in the early eighties, as his 
administration actively favoured the transfer of ‘the social and economic risks of 
unemployment from state bureaucracies to the individual’ (McDonald and Marston, 2005; 
374-401).
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Throughout the 1970’s, welfare was subject to contrasting conceptualizations. On the one 
hand, the individual’s own efforts were considered to be the surest means to quell 
unemployment and welfare dependency. On the other hand, in the immediate aftermath of 
Great Society projects, the state was still expected to provide care for the destitute. These 
rationales battled out and combined until neoliberal governance produced more visible 
effects in the 1980’s. Another of the realms which was said to affect the distribution of 
welfare around the same time was the family. In addition to an appraisal o f the regulatory 
capacities of both state and individual, in terms of either providing opportunity or seeking 
to enterprise oneself, the nuclear family was subjected to an increasingly thorough 
governmental and moral assessment.
2. The American Family
The family has always been an ambiguous area o f governance. On the one hand, it has 
been considered beyond the reach of government, particularly in the United States where 
the public and the private realms have traditionally been kept apart. On the other, it has 
been seen as a crucial stage o f social integration. As an area of governance, it has also 
marked the symbolic limit of the state’s moral authority. While it could in theory 
encourage lasting marriages, the state could not directly coerce individuals into preserving 
their unions. The liberalization of cultural mores and the increasing preoccupation with 
self-realization from the 1960’s on, did play a part in unsettling the institution of marriage. 
Traditional sources of moral authority, the state included, were seen to have suffered a loss 
in legitimacy. Once the family could no longer be relied on for the moral education o f its 
members, the state could only enjoin individuals to ponder on the consequences of 
desertion. In what follows, I will present the changing representations of the family as an 
object o f knowledge and its moral problematization in schemes of governance.
In Policing the Family (1980), Donzelot draws a historical account of the rationalities 
behind the institutional treatment of the family. Throughout the industrial revolution in 
France and England, working class families became subject to more scrutiny. Educative 
campaigns around hygiene, reproduction and education were led by doctors in an effort to 
advise mothers on how to manage their households. These measures were instated to 
counter the effects of industrialization on each members o f a family by teaching them self- 
preservation and autonomy (Donzelot, 1980: 57). The regulation of working class families 
through philanthropy and medical attention was to foster a climate o f mutual surveillance
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conducive to moral behaviour. It also had a more clearly economic purpose because the 
means for autonomy were associated with hard work and thrift. From the philanthropic 
organizations of the second half of the nineteenth century to the social state o f the first half 
o f the 20th century, medical and civil authorities progressively invested the family with 
various modes of observation and regulation. An inventory o f the internal dynamics and 
habits (sexual or others) of families was made possible by a network of institutions such as 
schools and hospitals. The state’s newfound responsibility to ensure welfare required a 
more extensive knowledge of the various social domains, and the further introduction of 
the family as an object of government was enabled in great part by developments in 
medicine and psychology. In the 19th century, the family became a privileged site of 
observation to discern between normal and abnormal behaviour at the early stages o f an 
individual’s life. The forms of subjectivity observed in the private realm constituted 
essential referents as to what had to be changed or simply taken into consideration. As 
Rose notes, ‘the private family has, on the one hand, been linked into new forms of 
political rationality which have developed over the last century, and, on the other hand, has 
been central to transformations in subjective realities and desires’ (Rose, 1987: 66).
In 1935, the ADC set out to assist children and mothers living in poverty. One of the main 
objectives of the program was to enable mothers to stay at home for their children’s 
education. The provision of attentive emotional support was represented by state agencies 
as the mother’s natural duty (Rose, 1989). In parallel, the abuse of children became one of 
the instances where the state could intervene in the name the young person’s newly 
acquired right to grow up in a stable environment. In dealing with cases, governmental 
agencies determined whether the child lived in a ‘suitable home’ and disqualified mothers 
who hadn’t been married (Blank and Blum, 1997: 30). With the introduction of the AFDC 
program in the early sixties, benefits were extended to one or two unemployed, often 
unmarried parents with children under their care, including relatives living under the same 
roof. By the end of the 1960’s, the greater portion of recipients were either unmarried or 
divorced. The government began to focus on neighbourhoods where children bom out of 
wedlock were a common place. A 1965 report from Pat Moynihan portrayed the alarming 
rate of illegitimacy in Puerto Rican and Black communities and recommended measures to 
discourage family breakdowns. Issues such as teenage pregnancy and cohabitation were 
subject to prevention campaigns and social workers were asked to offer individualized 
counselling to young persons in deprived communities.
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Throughout the 1970’s and 80’s, the White House organized a series of conferences to 
discuss the disintegration of traditional households. People across the country were invited 
to voice their concerns about the general relationship between the government and the 
family. They were encouraged to share what they expected, disliked or wanted from the 
government. For example, a summary o f 1980 conference revealed that many participants 
wanted to be given courses and workshops on married life. We can infer from this that a 
number o f Americans still wished for some sort of institutional guidance on how to behave 
rationally in their professional and personal lives. Here again, there is evidence that the 
transfer of responsibility to the individual was far from complete. Revealing one of the 
government’s lasting preoccupation, the report also stated that ‘the American family (was) 
disintegrating because o f a break down in the moral structure. The family of today is in 
need of something to believe in that would give it substance, cohesiveness and the ability 
to withstand pressure’ (White House Conference on Families, 1980:160). In spite of these 
concerns, successive administrations did not manage to reverse the steady rise in family 
breakdowns. Reflecting the complexity and ambiguity o f the moral problematique at hand, 
the report also attests that ‘what we are witnessing is not the break up of traditional family 
patterns but the emergence of a pluralism in family ways’ (White House Conference on 
Families, 1980: 70). This meant that in spite of the government’s displeasure with family 
breakdowns, both for instrumental and perhaps moral reasons, governmental plans also had 
to operate through readily constituted family structures. If the nuclear family was then 
implicitly valued as a preferable arrangement, nascent forms o f subjectivity in the shape of 
self-realization tended towards the opposite pole. The emerging subjective propensities for 
performance, self-realization and happiness entered in contradiction with the rather more 
static and limiting structure o f the family. Equally, the explicitly moral objective of 
encouraging lasting marriages was held back by a widespread recognition that the 
prevailing forms of family arrangements were seen as a private matter.
At the end of the 1970’s and though the 1980’s, the workplace and family life become 
permeated with the same modes of subjectivity. As exemplified in a study for the Russell 
Sage Foundation, a Democrat think tank, Rosabeth Moss Kanter argues that both could be 
studied according to the same principle of the maximization o f happiness. Following the 
economic logic, the level of satisfaction in relationships and at work can be assessed in 
terms of performance;
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‘emphasis on performance standards as an indication of membership and contribution, 
measurement of performance by ‘objective’ standards derived from more universalistic 
and impersonal notions of minimum and ideal performance (grades at school, frequency 
of intercourse, number of orgasms, etc.), rewards and contributions controlled by each 
person given or withheld depending on performance, achievement rather intrinsic 
qualities as the measure of the person, an expectation of more (goods, services, rewards, 
comforts) with increasing seniority and a legitimate ability to ‘fire’ or ‘trade in’ spouses 
if they do meet standards. (Kanter, 1977: 72)
A cost and benefit analysis is here presented as a standard to judge of the validity of 
personal and socio-economic relations. Individuals should choose on the basis o f the best 
possible alternatives presented to them in terms of services or potential partners. The 
application of more thorough standards of performance is linked to enhancing ‘quality of 
life,’ which is ultimately what scientists, social workers, psychologists, company 
executives and government officials are interested in generating and sustaining. The 
govemmentalization of family life then includes everything from the labouring activities of 
the parents to the psychological troubles of the children. Affects as much as work should 
therefore be integrated, studied and remedied in order to guide the various agencies that 
come into contact with families.
Once again, a look at the changes in the representation o f the family in governmental 
schemes shows that the economic logic was being progressively adopted to regulate many 
socio-cultural expectations. In response to an existing disposition to pleasure and self- 
realization, the emerging subject of advanced liberalism is made freer and happier through 
his or her ability to choose from the best available avenues. He or she is also held 
responsible for his own well-being and delivered from the belief that higher authorities 
should guide individuals on the way to happiness and prosperity. However, the acceptance 
of a new subjectivity suggested by dispersed agencies and behaviours is supplemented by 
more coercive elements; the conquering rationality o f self-realization provides the 
legitimacy to coerce those who fall short o f these requirements.
Following the thesis that governmental shifts in the domestic domain are intimately related 
to the means and strategies deployed in foreign policy programs, the peculiar combination 
of welfare and neoliberal rationales in American governance of the 1970’s was reproduced 
in the various reforms of foreign assistance plans.
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3. New Directions for American Aid (1973)
The all-embracing ambitions of modernization proved difficult to realize. The willingness 
to increase living standards throughout the world was thwarted by a lack of resources and 
organization. Concurrently to material limitations, the content of responsibility was 
shifting. Throughout the modernizing era, the representation of poverty as the product of 
economic imbalances meant that most of the responsibility for international development 
lied with rich countries. However, in the early moments of the 1970’s, states who received 
financial assistance were beginning to be held accountable for their own shortcomings. As 
a result, US foreign assistance focused on the most deprived individuals of a designated 
country instead of trying to build up infrastructural capabilities. As with domestic welfare 
programs, the conceptualization and the techniques pertaining to the US development 
effort were also informed by more rigorous efficiency standards. As I show here, poor 
countries receiving aid became objectified according to new power and knowledge 
configurations; an efficiency driven mentality was effectively impressing normative 
expectations upon recipient countries by suggesting a series of warranted models of 
subjectivity and development. Again, the failure to comply to performance standards could 
involve certain penalties and informed the processes of selection as to who was deemed fit 
to receive aid and who was not.
In the early 1970’s, the growing gap between the expectations of foreign aid bodies in 
Washington and that of the personnel on the ground became apparent (Packenham, 1966: 
212). Program officials were seen as more concerned with attaining quotas and respecting 
regulations than with fulfilling the original intentions of assistance projects. Those 
responsible for conceptualising aid policies were also criticized for paying exaggerated 
attention to economic, institutional and industrial ‘outputs,’ instead of focusing on the 
‘real’ needs o f the poor. Seeing that costly infrastructural projects were doing little in the 
way o f improving the conditions o f life in targeted countries, Congress passed the New 
Directions legislation in 1973. As was made clear in the 1980 report on US assistance to 
developing countries, the legislation’s main objective was to redirect development funds 
towards ‘basic human needs’ (United States Congressional Budget Office, 1980: iv).
In many cases, the transfer o f funds for infrastructure projects did not seem to reach its 
intended beneficiaries. Corrupt and ineffective state apparatuses absorbed most of the 
money and development opportunities were not evenly distributed. In response to these
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assessments, the general purpose of foreign aid changed from promoting self-sustaining 
growth and trying to raise living standards, to the distribution of basic means of survival 
like food, clothing and shelter in situations of emergency (Eberstadt, 1988: 38). While the 
initial aid strategy consisted in augmenting the state’s operational capacity to provide 
growth, interventions now focused on attending to the needs of the population in mainly 
poor rural areas. Since the philosophy of development in the sixties was now viewed with 
suspicion, Congress started to scrutinize the decisional structure and funding of US-AID 
more closely. Detailed budgets and implementations as well as economic and financial 
analysis were demanded in the reorganization of the development effort (Hoben, 1989: 
259).
In times of fiscal restraint, foreign assistance programs were among the first ones targeted 
for budgetary cuts. The U.S. government was no longer justified in allocating funds to 
endeavours that advanced neither American interests nor the causes o f peace and 
prosperity. Much like the programs of the 1960’s such as the War on poverty, the 
aspirations of the aid effort were seen as too hasty, far-reaching and ambitious. However, if 
international involvement was seen neither as a moral obligation nor a budgetary priority, 
the conservation of the domestic welfare system benefited from a more solid consensus. 
This lack of public will exposed foreign assistance to experimental reforms such as 
privatisation, new evaluation methods and selective budget cuts earlier than welfare 
programs. Aside from the variations in degrees of priority, both governmental areas were 
transformed by increasingly strict standards of efficiency and performance. In the early 
1970’s, the organization of USAID was also considered seriously ineffective. A variety of 
reports to Congress, notably the Pearson commission and the Paterson study group which 
culminated in the Foreign Assistance Act o f 1973, suggested that programs and missions 
be evaluated and monitored more closely as well as better coordinated with existing civil 
and state institutions. This could be done through; ‘specifying and elaborating quantitative 
and behavioural models, constructing and testing hypotheses in the field of local action 
capabilities and providing consulting assistance to field missions and local collaborating 
entities’ to enhance their ability to collect, analyse and utilize local data to improve the 
effectiveness of rural development programs (Michelwait, 1979:4). Criticism was levelled 
at the decisional structure o f the organization; the allocation of funding was deemed far too 
complex and lengthy and the ‘discretionary and arbitrary’ nature of its administration 
obscured the rules of implementation for many field workers. There were appeals to
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proscribe congressional restrictions on particular programs and to impart more decisional 
power to local bureaus (1979: 226-230).
In an effort to improve the administrative and implementation capacities o f US Foreign 
Assistance, administrators then agreed on separating Aid into what were considered as the 
most important areas o f intervention namely health, education, agriculture and population 
planning. Concurrently to these reforms, security assistance, previously connected to 
development objectives under Kennedy, was reassigned to the military component of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. In the mid-1970’s, the Middle-East (primarily Egypt and 
Israel) replaced Southeast Asia as the primary recipient of security assistance (Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, 1983: 1), demonstrating the administration’s pragmatic orientations 
toward securing vital economic resources. Apart from facilitating the administration of 
assistance programs, the aim behind the separation of development and security aid was to 
soften the ‘ideological’ tones of the previous administrations’ strategy.
Underneath the linear history of new legislations and administrative techniques, lies a more 
general rethinking of the activity of government and the individual requirements for life. 
The separation of centralized aid programs in specialized areas of intervention, the increase 
of effectiveness through the reduction of bureaucratic impediments to decision-making, the 
increase of coordination between existing institutions and the evaluation o f project 
performance, are all measures which in some way also modified the attitudes, roles and 
expectations of states and individuals alike. This focus on administrative efficiency 
translated the progressive loss o f coherence in the foreign assistance logic o f the 1960’s. 
The unity o f purpose implicit to the active diffusion of liberal democratic technologies of 
government was tainted by the failure of the American war effort in Vietnam. 
Consequently, foreign assistance programs became less outward and were subjected to a 
host of internal reforms. The multiplication of evaluation reports, performance indicators 
and quality control programs set stricter conditions for assistance, which now required that 
particular dispositions be cultivated in order for countries receive aid and for projects to 
stay afloat. A new development rationale was progressively seeping in through various 
practical changes. These covert governmental transformations formed new identities, 
validated new credos, generated new practices and created new requirements, one of which 
was the diffusion of responsibility.
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3.1 The Distribution of Responsibility
In his address to Congress in 1970, Nixon insisted that developing countries had to 
‘assume a larger role in defining their own development strategies’ (quoted in Rutton, 
1996: 96). Countries that proved unable to make good use o f the aid money saw their 
assistance reduced or in more extreme cases withdrawn. The earlier governmental priority 
of increasing general economic output meant that issues surrounding accountability and 
quality control had not yet surfaced to the fore. But around the mid 1970’s, assistance 
would be directed toward ‘deserving’ countries which, through the comparative assessment 
of their performance, had shown that they could ‘help themselves’ (United States 
Congressional Budget Office, 1980: xviii). If the larger portion of aid was still being 
channelled through state institutions, the latter were held more accountable and were 
subject to more scrutiny. The world was now increasingly seen as a collection of 
responsible sovereign nations deemed capable of looking after their own populations. Their 
success or failure to do so was a matter of their making the right kinds of choices. In its 
effort to make aid more direct, visible and effective, American Foreign Assistance held 
indigenous state institutions responsible for identifying ‘high priority’ development and 
relief needs.
Yet, at the same time, the New Directions (1973) approach for bilateral aid was to ‘be 
carried out to the maximum extent possible through the private sector, particularly those 
institutions which already have ties in the developing areas, such as educational 
institutions, cooperatives, credit unions and voluntary agencies’ (Smith, 1990: 5). The 
responsibility for the colossal task of developing third world countries especially in times 
of fiscal restraint, had to be distributed through a greater array of agencies. Asked to 
increase their contribution to international development, multilateral institutions such as 
the World Bank and the IMF substantially augmented their operational capacities. The 
growing internationalisation o f life at the financial and institutional levels in the mid- 
1970’s is well documented. In order to further coordinate and organize USAID in an 
increasingly interdependent world, President Carter created the International Development 
Cooperation Agency (IDCA) in 1979. Governmental initiatives at the end of the 1970’s 
essentially continued the reforms of 1973 by multiplying evaluation programs,
26 The most famous example in International Relations in the 1970’s is Keohane and Nye (1977).
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decentralizing decision-making overseas, encouraging the private sector and soliciting 
international donors.
Through the IDCA, the Security Supporting Assistance o f 1971 was renamed as the 
Economic Support Fund (ESF) in 1979, still in existence today. The ESF put renewed 
emphasis on the economic as opposed to the military component of security assistance. As 
foreign policy experts in government stated, the ESF was more discretionary, had a simpler 
administrative structure and its reworked objective was to support the U S’ political, 
economic and security interests through the promotion o f economic and political stability 
in particular countries (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1983:2). A clearly more malleable 
foreign policy instrument, it was alternatively used by the state department for both 
economic and strategic purposes without too much interference from Congress. Following 
the 1979 reforms, American Foreign Assistance was also formally divided between 
Development Assistance (DA), the ESF and the Food Program (PL 480), and it remains so 
to this day.
The humanitarian and pacifist leanings of the Carter Administration also transpired in the 
inclusion of human rights and democratic practices as incentives for US assistance; ‘in 
distributing the scarce recourses o f our foreign assistance programs, we will demonstrate 
that our deepest affinities are with nations which commit themselves to a democratic path 
to development’ (Carter, 1977). The emphasis on Human Rights and democracy 
represented an important development in foreign policy practices because it raised the 
questions o f governmental accountability and of the rights of individuals. Some states were 
now criticized by the US for failing to respect the social, political and economic rights of 
their citizens. Individuals, and not solely governments, became objects of value, concern, 
observation and regulation. Before any appurtenance to political communities, there were 
rights bearers, worthy o f being rescued from cruel, incompetent and corrupt governments. 
The degree of adherence to international treaties pertaining to the treatment o f individuals 
required improving the capacity to monitor and compile human rights records and an 
increasing number of country specific reports were drawn. The Carter doctrine, even if 
applied in a very limited way, entailed a form of political conditionality not dissimilar to 
the ‘good governance’ covenants o f the 1990’s, albeit integrated within a different set of 
relationships. The interest for human rights in the 1970’s was of course not enmeshed in as 
diffuse and complex a network of civil institutions as we have today. Yet, the limited 
institutional support for human rights policies, the statist nature of assistance contracts and
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the jealous preservation of national sovereignty in a lot of third world countries represented 
major obstacles to Carter’s agenda.
In response to the perceived amorality of Kissinger and Nixon’s realpolik and to the 
cultural fragmentation taking hold o f the country, Carter proposed to rejuvenate the spirit 
o f unity and optimism latent in the American psyche. He also hoped to restore the US’ 
international reputation by displaying a conciliatory attitude toward the demands and 
criticisms of some third world countries, who blamed the regimes of trade spearheaded by 
the United States for world poverty. Through the United Nations, LDCs articulated 
demands for a New International Economic Order
‘based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest, and 
cooperation among all states, irrespective of their economic and social systems, 
which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to 
eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries 
and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development in peace and 
justice for present and future generations’ (U N , 1974).
This plea for a general framework to achieve international welfare advocated the sovereign 
right to choose between modes of economic development and insisted on the fundamental 
right to redistribution and welfare for all members o f the nascent international community. 
In this context, foreign assistance was seen more as a formal moral obligation than a 
charitable act. However, such a plan required transformations which received little support 
in the West and by the end o f the decade, it was becoming clear that the United States was 
relinquishing its more selfless tendencies to bring about justice and welfare on a larger 
scale. The growing emphasis on institutional and personal responsibility as well as on 
economic performance was announcing a peculiar turn in US foreign relations. From the 
welfarist covenant of the late 1960’s, where poverty and violence were identified as 
consequences of world capitalism and colonial rule, third world countries started to be 
indicted for their inability to govern themselves.
Whilst the New Directions legislation and the continuing efforts to address the real ‘needs’ 
of poor rural populations involved the participation o f sovereign states, the 1980’s 
translated a deep suspicion of centralized institutions. The self-interested actions of 
enterprising individuals, private firms and non-governmental organizations were deemed 
both more effective and legitimate instances o f development. Furthermore, states that did
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not meet specific criteria o f performance, for whatever reason, became increasingly 
marginalized and held accountable for their failures. Reagan also adopted a more 
belligerent stance toward nations unyielding to capitalist forms of development and 
insisted on the defence of American values abroad as a moral imperative.
4. Leadership, Order and Morality
The conflicted mixture of cultural subjectivities in late 1960’s, early 1970’s America 
affected some of the governmental considerations pertaining to family breakdowns and, to 
a lesser extent, welfare dependency. Coupled with renewed notions of self-realization, 
changes in mores and cultural habits called for the integration of new variables in the 
definition of self-government. As conservative and neoconservative commentators readily 
admitted, it was necessary to restrict behaviours which threatened the social order. 
Concurrently to the disciplinary measures and moral injunctions enforced upon welfare 
recipients throughout the 1970’s, both of which conveyed the conscious exclusion of 
particular individuals from the usual entitlements of citizenship, other manifestations of 
sovereign power had their course. President Nixon attempted to reassert presidential 
authority by adopting heavy-handed tactics against campus protests, increasing the 
surveillance of suspicious political groups and reclaiming discretionary powers to 
formulate foreign policy. This reaffirmation included both legislative changes and the 
ongoing objectification o f socially prejudicial elements. In what follows, I look at Nixon 
and Carter’s respective orientations of govemmentality and at the discursive and legislative 
strategies used to order the domestic and foreign policy realms. Secondly, I discuss the 
beginnings o f a conservative reaction to the progressive institutionalization of counter- 
cultural values.
Even though he was mindful of the legitimacy gap opened by Johnson’s disastrous 
handling o f Vietnam and aware o f the American public’s sensitivity to presidential abuses, 
Nixon believed that ‘a strong use of executive power was not only within his constitutional 
prerogative but would eventually restore the presidential ‘glory’ that had been squandered’ 
by the previous commander in chief (Greene, 1992: 234). The aesthetic and political forms 
of resistance initiated in the mid 1960’s were spilling over into the next decade. With race 
riots taking place in various cities, anti war feelings still soaring and political violence at an 
unprecedented high, Nixon vowed to bring back a semblance of domestic order. He 
promised to bring peace with honour in Vietnam, to deal with radical militancy in an
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effective way and to restore public trust in political institutions. In contrast with his pledge 
to reach a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, Nixon went ahead with the invasion of 
Cambodia and the bombing of several areas of Indo-China without the approval of 
Congress.27 Again, the assessment of the ‘security situation’ and of the measures it 
required as much as the suspension of normal legal procedures were all indications of the 
actuality of sovereign power either within or alongside governmental and disciplinary 
schemas.
Nixon’s decision sparked a series of protests across American campuses. Spurred on by the
Kent State shootings, which saw four demonstrators killed by the National Guard, students
embarked on a national strike in which as many as four million participated. Following the
strike and a 100 000 strong demonstration in Washington DC to protest against the killings
and the administration’s continuing offensive in Southeast Asia, leaders of the main
intelligence agencies’ (CIA, the FBI and the NSA) met to discuss ways to investigate and
hinder militant groups. As a result of their consultation, the Huston plan was drawn up.
The proposal basically demanded clearance ‘for opening mail and tapping telephones
without warrants, breaking into homes and offices, and spying on Student Groups through
electronic surveillance and campus informants’ (Slocum-Schaffer, 2003: 15). In spite of
the plan being vetoed, several of its provisions were implemented and the President used a
• • • 28multiplicity of other channels to spy on groups deemed to have foreign affiliations. Nixon 
endorsed the Huston Plan because ‘he felt they were necessary and justified by the 
violence we faced’ (Colodny and Gettlin's, 1991:125). He also declared, when asked about 
a series o f decisions regarding national security issues, that ‘when the president does it that 
means that it is not illegal’ (Nixon, 1977). Combined with the president’s estimate of the 
reach of executive power and of the necessary moment to enact exceptional surveillance 
powers, the justification and implementation of concrete measures was made possible by 
the discursive objectification o f dangerous militants. Nixon often distinguished between 
student protesters and young soldiers sent to Vietnam; ‘you see these bums, you know, 
blowing up the campuses. Listen, the boys that are on the college campuses today are the 
luckiest people in the world, going to the greatest universities...out there (in Vietnam) 
we've got kids who are just doing their duty. I have seen them. They stand tall, and they are 
proud... when it really comes down to it, they stand up and, boy, you have to talk up to
27 On this see Caldwell (1973), Shaw (2005) and Schlesinger (1973: 192).
28 On CHAOS see Athan Theoharis, Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the 
Huston Plan, Temple University Press, 1978.
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those men’ (Nixon, 1970). The discursive designation of a clear boundary between 
appropriate modes of being and thinking is again part and parcel of decisions pertaining to 
the security o f the biopolitical order.
If domestic politics occasionally proved to be a difficult arena to bring under the Oval 
Office’s all-embracing control, foreign policy, said to be Nixon’s strong suit, presented 
opportunities for more discretionary forms o f influence. As Nixon himself asserted, in 
contrast with his presumed inclination for a strong hand in domestic politics; ‘this country 
could run itself domestically without a president, all you need is a competent Cabinet to 
run the country at home. You need a president for foreign policy’ (Nixon in Evans and 
Novak 1971: 11-12). Along with his trusted adviser Henry Kissinger, Nixon vowed to 
overturn the underlying principles of Kennedy and Johnson’s foreign policy. In contrast 
with the ambitions o f modernization, Kissinger declared that US foreign policy could no 
longer be based on ‘enthusiasm, belief in progress, and the invincible conviction that 
American remedies can work everywhere’ (Brown, 1979: 6). According to the new 
administration, the bureaucracy in charge o f creating and implementing foreign policy 
programs was too costly, scattered and ineffective. In his 1971 State of the Union address, 
President Nixon vowed to ‘focus and concentrate the responsibility for getting problems 
solved’ rather than ‘scattering responsibility by adding new levels o f bureaucracy’ (Nixon, 
1971). As the president vowed to transfer responsibility for security and development to 
individual states and local communities, he considered that the establishment of a stable 
world order was too important an objective to be left to the convoluted foreign policy 
establishment.
The planned displacement of responsibility to smaller administrative units and individuals 
was then counterbalanced by a reinforcement of presidential authority. More specifically, 
the reconfiguration o f US foreign policy under Nixon was informed by renewed ideas on 
the role and nature of executive power. What was deemed necessary was a selection of 
individuals with the ability to make quick and even-handed decisions. As Kissinger 
mentioned, bureaucracy ‘avoids risks, awaits results, and base decisions on quantifiable 
factors. Leadership requires above all else, decisiveness_ the willingness to act when facts 
are ambiguous and when opportunities to affect events are great’ (Strong, 1986: 51). 
Kissinger believed that heads o f state and diplomats had to have a good knowledge of 
history and local traditions as well as the cogent ability to manipulate events in their favour 
(Strong, 1986: Xiv). Many of Nixon’s foreign policy ventures, from the treaty on arms
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limitation with the Soviet Union to the support of General Pinochet’s coup, relied on 
discretionary power and diplomatic dealings which were carefully tucked away from the 
American public and the bureaucratic foreign policy elite. In line with the realist school of 
International Relations, the administration’s general goal was to enhance the ‘nation’s 
capacity to act purposefully in international affairs and resist being controlled by others’ 
(Brown, 1979: 2). Whilst the elaboration and implementation of aid and development 
packages could be taken up by multi-tiered trans-national bureaucracies, decisions as to the 
beneficiaries and strategic purposes of foreign aid were best left to a few well informed 
individuals. The reorientation of govemmentality and therefore of the respective tasks and 
responsibilities of either private entrepreneurs or state agencies, fell to executive decrees. 
The initiation of secret surveillance programs, secret diplomatic dealings and of covert 
military operations were all indications that executive power had a hand in inaugurating, 
directing and limiting governmental and security schemes.
Until the Watergate scandal in 1972, which saw the arrest of five men attempting to burgle 
and wiretap the Democratic National Committee’s office, Nixon was able to make a few 
inroads into the Congress’ ability to restrict presidential power. However, following a 
string o f journalistic and federal investigations into the scandal and the uncovering of a 
growing list o f ‘dirty tricks’ which were very likely to have involved the President himself, 
Nixon resigned. In the midst o f these machinations, however, acute tensions appeared 
between what were identified as serious threats in official discourse and the population’s 
willingness to accept the authorities’ assessments. With Americans still pondering the 
Watergate scandal, President Jimmy Carter vowed to reignite public trust in political 
institutions. In contrast with Nixon, Carter admitted that he was confident enough in the 
‘good sense o f American people... (to) let them share in the process of making foreign 
policy decisions’ (Carter, 1977). The President’s aspirations also seemed to tap into the 
long standing penchant for liberal idealism in US foreign policy. In the vein o f Woodrow 
Wilson’s internationalism, Carter called for ‘nothing less than a sustained architectural 
effort to shape an international framework of peace within which our own ideals gradually 
can become a global reality’ (Carter, 1976). Once again, the extension of America’s 
founding principles and institutional structures in view of the universal good was presented 
as a self-evident formula. As Carter maintained; ‘our support for human rights in other 
countries is in our own national interest as well as part o f our own national character... our 
policy is rooted in our moral values, our policy is designed to serve mankind’ (Carter, 
1980). The willing confusion o f national and universal interest could certainly have
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entailed a forceful approach to foreign policy or even a concerted effort to extend 
American govemmentality abroad, but Carter favoured inspirational rhetoric and 
conciliatory diplomacy over imperial pursuits. In contrast with the functionalist, 
deliberately amoral realism of Nixon and Kissinger, US foreign policy at the end of the 
1970’s aspired to be guided by moral rather than strategic ends.
5. The Counter-Culture and its Offsprings
In the 1970’s, the experiments and dissensions which had taken place at the margins of 
institutional structures in the 1960’s were becoming part and parcel o f the personal lives 
and legal entitlements of Americans. Save perhaps race relations, which Nixon carefully 
neglected, several domains such as environmental protection, gender equality and gay
9 0rights benefited from important legislative advances. In contrast with the previous 
decade, a growing number of activists considered that there were enough institutional 
channels to carry particular issues through. As Todd Gitlin points out, a large portion of the 
New Left were now willing to think of themselves as ‘unabashed reformers, availing 
themselves o f whatever room they found for lobbying, running for office, creating local, 
statewide, and regional organizations’ (1987:422). Where countercultural values were so 
widespread as to become institutionalized, some intellectual groupings believed that it was 
the state’s responsibility to resist the liberal colonization of the political sphere. 
Particularly active in the reconfiguration of the republican party in the late seventies, 
neoconservatives brought issues of cultural subjectivity to the fore. Convinced that the 
dissemination of liberal mores at home and of a conciliatory liberal internationalism abroad 
were prejudicial to the country’s moral standing, neoconservatives began to advise political 
officials on more aggressive retaliatory strategies. For them, the definition o f cultural 
subjectivity could partly be influenced by the state, which would have to tread carefully 
between suggestions and outright commands.
29 In terms of environmental protection, several statutes were passed; the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(1972), the Endangered Species Act (1972) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976). One 
of the most important victories for Women’s Rights was the ratification of the Equal Right Amendment in
1972. One of the crucial Supreme Court decisions of the decade was in the Roe v. Wade case, which 
outlawed impediments on abortion (Slocum-Schaffer, 2003: 132-138 and 155-167). Between 1969 and
1973, six states removed laws that banned same sex relationships. Several gay rights ordinances were 
signed, most famously in Miami and San Francisco, but the legal and cultural recognition of 
homosexuality remained very partial throughout the 1970’s and beyond (Berkowitz, 2006).
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In The Cultural Contradictions o f  Capitalism (1976), Daniel Bell commented that the 
yearning for a liberating spiritual experience in the work of modernists like Beaudelaire 
and Nietszche had begun to seep in the consciousness o f a larger number o f American 
youths, albeit in a diluted form. Modernist remnants, which had to do with an ‘idolatry of 
the self_ life as a work o f art’ that could only ‘express itself against the conventions of 
(bourgeois) society’ (Bell, 1976: 19) were considered dangerous influences which could 
put the cohesiveness and stability o f the country at risk. Concerned with these tendencies 
and with the growing influence o f liberals within the Democratic party in the early 70’s, 
neoconservative intellectuals like Irving Kristol were calling on the state to restore national 
prestige, curb immorality and drug taking in urban areas, and to actively challenge left 
leaning liberals for their part in the degradation of American values. Neo-conservatives 
suspected that this ‘adversary culture,’ constituted by what they saw as a fairly large 
number o f American intellectuals, was also steadily infiltrating the educational system. 
The ‘Left’ had for them retreated into universities, transmitting its version o f seditious 
thought to a widening array o f students (Hoeveler, 2004: 36). Kristol claims that the anti­
war, libertarian and anti-capitalist ethos of an educated elite had been adopted by a 
sufficiently large portion o f Americans as to drive a ‘president out of office (Johnson, 
1968) and nominate its own candidate (McGovern, 1972)’ (Kristol, 1983: 211-212).30
To some extent, the ethos of self-realization through work and individual effort was tied to 
the numerous practices of self-improvement which former countercultural agitators were 
now abiding by. The pastoral solidarity of the welfare era was effectively dissolving into a 
multitude o f private versions o f contentment. Somewhat disenchanted about the possibility 
o f drastic political and social changes, left-leaning middle class individuals were 
withdrawing into settled family lives, academic jobs and capital ventures. What’s more, 
personal happiness and fulfilment was no longer to be found in collective articulations of 
pleasure and rebellion, they could be achieved through careful introspection and 
personalized psychological and spiritual remedies. In his best selling book The Culture o f  
Narcissism , Christopher Lasch attested that having failed to transform society in any 
meaningful way, Americans ‘convinced themselves that what matters is psychic self- 
improvement, getting in touch with their feelings, eating health food, taking lessons in 
ballet or belly-dancing, immersing themselves in the wisdom of the East, jogging, learning 
how to ‘relate,’ overcoming the ‘fear o f pleasure”  (1979: 4). The quest for individual
30 George McGovern was famously described by journalist Michael Novak as the ‘candidate for abortion, 
amnesty and acid.’
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fulfilment was catered for by a burgeoning industry of personal trainers, peaceful country 
retreats, spiritual guidance centres, popular psychology books and individualized therapy. 
If those inclinations reinforced current governmental criteria, other forces extraneous to 
liberal governance were beginning to bear down on the constitution o f subjectivity. 
Neoconservatives deemed that values associated with the counterculture such as 
promiscuity and idleness were having a serious effect on society, not least on the provision 
o f social services.
Conclusion
The 1970’s saw a variety of contests about how and where to set the adequate boundaries 
o f freedom in the governmental as much as in the cultural and political realms. On the one 
hand, the social engineering o f the 1960’s, with its faith in science, progress, welfare and 
liberal democracy, remained a promise awaited by a large number of underprivileged 
Americans. On the other, an ethos of hard work, self-sufficiency and personal 
responsibility, was presented as a more viable way of being, particularly in light of a 
faltering national economy. On the whole, the American welfare state was being partially 
reformed according to criteria of administrative efficiency and able bodied welfare 
recipients were instructed to find work instead of relying on the state. Those who failed to 
comply with the increasingly numerous requirements to be eligible for assistance were 
disciplined in due course. Like the domestic welfare system, the US’ main development 
agency, AID, was reformed according to criteria o f efficiency and many o f the 
responsibilities for development were devolved to recipient countries. In terms o f the US’ 
relations with the rest of the world, the modernizing outlook which guided the American 
strategy in Vietnam was receding. In the early 1970’s with Kissinger and Nixon, US 
foreign policy pursued international stability rather than the transformation o f local 
political, cultural and economic structures. Back room diplomacy and carefully weighted 
decisions by a few select individuals were preferred to drawn out bureaucratic plans and 
forceful displays.
In response to structural constraints on the world market, the push for technical 
proficiency, performance and productivity seeped into individual consciousness. As the 
decade went on, personal calculations o f pleasure and benefit proved more alluring than 
thinking about means to bring about collective welfare. Governmental impetus to shape the 
subject’s behaviour was becoming increasingly personalized, more and more in touch with
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one’s own desires and needs. On the other hand, as we have seen with the White House 
Conferences on the Family, the objectification of the family as an object of government 
was a testament to the incorporation of private mores into governmental plans. Although 
not formally orchestrated by neoconservatives, these concerns reflected their own 
preoccupation with the state and the wider consequences of liberalized cultural habits. In 
some sense, expressions of selfhood through particular aesthetic displays and demands for 
political recognition were part and parcel of the continuities and renewals characteristic of 
rationalities o f government. If the new left’s public outbursts eventually faded, its anti­
authoritarian ethos developed into occurrences ranging from left leaning corpuses in 
universities to a change in sexual mores and an increase in drug taking. The extension of 
these trends through a variety of socio-cultural spheres like educational institutions, mass 
consumption but also inner city communities, were subject to much concern from 
neoconservative intellectuals. In response to those trends, they admonished on the need to 
reform what they saw as ‘character-forming’ institutions like schools and community 
organizations.
As highlighted throughout the chapter, sovereign power was integral to the orientation of 
govemmentality or the enforcement of disciplinary measures upon welfare recipients and 
foreign countries. As obvious embodiments of sovereign power, American presidents and 
their closest aides could decide upon the direction of particular governmental plans or 
foreign policies. Whether through Nixon’s own views on the rights and responsibilities of 
the President, his illegal tactics to quell domestic dissent, or through Carter’s performative 
confusion of national and international interest, the sovereign’s arm was extended to a 
variety o f important endeavours. Governmental plans were in a way made possible by 
conscious decisions to apply and encourage particular rationales of rule. Equally, sovereign 
power was inherent to the discursive objectifications of internal and external enemies 
which participated to legitimize certain security measures and warrant particular social 
and cultural identities. Although occupying an uncertain space between govemmentality 
and sovereign decrees, neoconservative exhortations were aiming to legislate on the moral 
and psychological development of individual subjects in view of generating an ordered 
social body.
So far, I have argued that the rationalities of rule which had their course in the 1960’s and 
1970’s presented a mixture of collectively agreed welfare standards and of cultural and 
political propensities to accept a wider range of individual mores. In order to expose the
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various criteria of subjectivity actual throughout this period in detail, I made use of the 
triadic conception of power (sovereignty, discipline and biopolitics) presented in the two 
first chapters. In chapter five, I examine the decisive shift from the welfare rationale that 
lingered on through the 1970’s to a combination of neoliberal and neoconservative 
exhortations. The emerging requirements on individual subjects included an intensification 
o f individual obligations and the materialization of an ethos o f competition. Newly elect 
President Ronald Reagan saw the executive office an inspirational pulpit which combined 
incitements to free enterprise, national greatness and moral uprightness.
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Chapter Five:
Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism in the Reaganite Era
Introduction
This chapter aims to illustrate the peculiar combination o f govemmentality, discipline and 
sovereign power at work during most of the 1980’s. First, government was further operating 
through the subject’s ability to assess its own needs and to identify and choose the means to 
personal health, success and happiness. Second, the subject’s failure to self-regulate 
incurred punishments which were administered by the state and the economic and 
institutional agencies that were beginning to carry out its work. Lastly, the propensity of the 
executive and of other authoritative agencies to identify and suppress threats to the stability 
and security of the country became more intensified both in discourse and in practical 
measures. In all, evidence suggests that a disciplinary turn which is concomitant to the 
dominance of conservative politics throughout the 1980’s was taking place across several 
policy domains. As I argue throughout the chapter, this disciplinary turn was informed by 
the peculiar combination of neoconservative and neoliberal rationalities o f government. 
Although reforms of the domestic welfare and foreign assistance programs were largely 
informed by the same rationales, I will point to the specificity of their interpretation and 
application in both the domestic and foreign policy realms. To do so, I continue to look at 
administrative reports and policy reforms in both AFDC and USAID programs.
With the arrival o f Reagan in office, governmental experiments of the 1970’s such as the 
regulation o f workers’ behaviour through the establishment of performance criteria were 
furthered. The qualities required for professional success like motivation and self-restraint 
were impressed even more forcefully on both entrepreneurs and welfare recipients. Even if 
several of the governmental instantiations which were developing in the two previous 
decades were pursued in the 1980’s, the Reagan presidency did mark an important shift not 
only in the rationality and practice of government, but also in the discursive framing of both 
freedom and responsibility. The almost unprecedented number of references to the 
Founding Fathers and de Tocqueville in Reagan’s speeches conveyed a will to guide 
American citizens back towards moral values, by which he meant religion, participation in 
community associations and a renewed commitment to family, land and nation (Busch, 
2001). Reagan’s rhetoric pointed to the vision of an ordered community sustained by a
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belief in common principles, but it also supposed a transfer of moral responsibility to the 
individual in line with the affirmation of an economic ethos. The valuation of rational 
individual choice, central to the neo-liberal turn of the 1980’s, was effectively being 
supplemented with clearer moral boundaries, as the liberalization of mores was still gaining 
ground in most facets of American cultural life. Neoconservatives argued that individual 
tastes and choices, taken as unproblematic variables in neoliberal schemas of social 
regulation, did not always correspond to the optimal image o f an ordered social body. On 
other counts, there was also a growing concern about the moral and cultural consequences 
on the increasingly individualistic, fragmented and self-interested proclivities of many 
Americans.31
The neoconservative intellectual critique, combined with the policy-making credentials of 
many of its advocates, maintained that when the regulatory ideals of neoliberalism failed 
in particular instances, the state could use its authority to clamp down on those individuals 
who proved unable to govern themselves. In other words, the state was justified in claiming 
the moral authority to regulate the behaviour o f individuals who had repeatedly failed to 
conform to the minimal requirements o f employment, lawfulness and enterprise. In the case 
of welfare recipients and of countries receiving American assistance, the norm of behaviour 
was primarily dictated by the notion that each were held responsible for their failures and
31 The progressive cultural shift toward individualism in contemporary America, particularly after the 
1960’s, was also discussed by prominent sociologists like Bellah (1985), Etzioni (1993) and Putnam 
(2000), all of which tap in to the Tocquevillian concern with the excesses of individualism in American 
political, cultural and moral life and with the need to elaborate common moral standpoints for an 
increasingly atomized and utilitarian society. What makes neoconservatives particularly important and 
influential in terms of actual governmental effects is that they are very much involved in social policy.
32 Neo-conservatives had a lot to do in convincing business leaders and conservative politicians to delve 
into technical and managerial politics. Huge sums of money were invested in conservative policy think 
tanks like the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Manhattan Institute, the Heritage Foundation and 
the Hoover institute, to name but a few prestigious ones. These non-profit organizations were meant to 
create a space for discussion between the various conservative interests and to articulate a conservative 
agenda (Steinfels, 1993: 29). With the exception of the AEI, the latter organizations had predominantly 
conservative views especially as regards to state intervention. Over the years, the AEI has become one of 
the most important think tanks in Washington and is widely seen as the major base for neo-conservative 
intellectuals. Traditionally a conservative pro market organization, it began to integrate slightly more 
liberal views in the 1970’s by hiring a number of intellectuals, among which were James Q. Wilson and 
Irving Kristol. The organization’s current work covers nearly all aspects of domestic and foreign politics 
and all major neo-conservatives and Straussians (Novak, Nisbet, Bems, Kristol, Wilson, Glazer, Banfield, 
Lipset, etc.) have either participated in its research projects, given speeches or have joined as fellows. 
Their essays are generally highly praised and well renumerated (Steinfels, 1979: 13). Clearly displaying 
sympathy for business interests, its board of trustees includes former C.E.O.s and executives of the biggest 
American companies. Seventy-eight percent of its funding comes from private donors either corporations, 
foundations and individuals. Its research on the advancement of freedom and democratic government at 
home and abroad, private enterprise and defence policy is aimed at officials as much as the educated 
public. As an indicator of its neo-conservative dispositions, the highest annual research award is named 
after Irving Kristol. George W. Bush estimated that the research fellows and other staff at the AEI have 
been doing ‘such good work, that (his) administration has borrowed twenty such minds’ (AEI, 2006).
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that each had a duty, to a certain extent, to uphold particular ethical standards. 
Governmental intervention in the 1980’s was even more focused on observing and 
disciplining the poor, the irresponsible and the deviant than in previous decades. 
Concurrently, the discursive justification of state intervention both at home and abroad 
relied heavily on stark differentiations between idle and productive, moral and immoral, 
good and evil. The executive had a skilful hand in producing idle welfare recipients and 
secretive Russian policy makers as serious threats to the integrity of the biopolitical order.
1. M oral and Economic Discipline a t Home
In this section, I pursue the discussion on neoconservatism and neoliberalism initiated in 
chapter three in order to introduce the practical manifestations o f both rationalities of 
government. The changes instigated in the conceptualization and administration of welfare 
which were beginning to emerge in the 1970’s were given their full intellectual articulation 
and justification during Reagan’s terms in office. Before describing the practical changes 
operative in both realms during the 1980’s, it is useful to reiterate some of the constitutive 
elements of both the ‘market-political rationality’ that is neoliberalism and the ‘moral- 
political rationality’ that is neoconservatism (Brown, 2006: 698). As much as they are 
rationalities of government which frame normative and administrative expectations, 
neoliberalism and neoconservatism are intellectual movements which articulate the 
positions and roles of governmental actors. I argue that the ideas circulated by individuals of 
both persuasions through mediums like books, conferences and television addresses actually 
feed into techniques of rule. As political rationalities, neoconservatism and neoliberalism 
did not impose their version of truth on unknowing subjects but rather suggested 
articulations of the specific roles, strategic locations and requirements pertaining to society, 
the individual and the state. As opposed to simply imposing budgetary cuts and parental 
guidance programs upon a pre-determined subject whom either welcomed these measures as 
rational or deplored them as unjust and exploitative, they produced and enabled certain 
kinds o f subjectivity. If, however, subjects who had internalized the plausibility and 
necessity o f specific political interventions failed to practice what they knew was required 
o f them, sovereign power was given the legitimacy to intercede. Neoconservatism, in spite 
o f its functioning as a rationality of government, ultimately aspired to moral ends which 
required the modification of individual behaviour in a more or less direct way. The 
authoritarian edge of neoliberal policies under Reagan was certainly reflected and 
encouraged by neoconservatism’s programmatic interventionism. In what follows, I will
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point to some of the ways in which the above ideational strands may have intersected and 
combined to produce not a unified and coherent rationality but ‘the contemporary landscape 
o f political intelligibility and possibility’ (Brown, 2006:693). It will progressively become 
apparent how ideas regarding the definition of freedom and responsibility became operative 
in technical and practical programs.
Even if they seem at odds on a theoretical level and if they propose different means to reach 
their objectives, neoconservatism and neoliberalism ultimately value the same ends of order 
and stability. For neoconservatives, the question was ‘whether we can arrive at a set of 
normative rules which seek to protect liberty, reward achievement, and enhance the social 
good, within the constraints o f ‘economics”  (Bell, 1976:26). Accepting the basic value of 
free enterprise, of protecting business interests and of applying a cost/benefit rationale to 
many areas o f social life, they nonetheless found that the neoliberal hesitancy to legislate on 
matters o f personal morality was likely to create serious problems. It is no so much that 
neoconservatives blamed the neoliberal ethos developed by people like Hayek and 
Friedman for generating nefarious cultural habits, but they did infer that the lack of an 
explicit formulation o f political and moral responsibility in neoliberal philosophy left room 
for many kinds of cultural behaviour, some of which were prejudicial to social stability. As 
other thinkers like Habermas have gathered, the neoliberal ‘conception of the person as a 
‘rational decider’ is not only independent of the idea of the moral person who determines 
her will through an insight into what is in the equal interests o f all those affected; it is also 
independent of the concept of the citizen o f a republic, who participates in the public 
practice o f self-legislation’ (Habermas, 1992: 94).
The notions of individual choice, self-interest and rationality, central to American neo­
liberalism, were to be re-examined and modified according to moral standards which bound 
the entire community. The gap opened by neoliberalism, which begged for the formulation 
o f civic duties as well as restrictions on dangerous thought, excessive pleasure and reckless 
behaviour, was adequately filled by neoconservatism because of its propensity to encourage 
responsibility through concrete policy. In practical terms, whereas freedom in the neoliberal 
sense was being furthered through tax cuts, privatization and devolution, responsibility was 
being promoted through community schemes and incentives to family unity. There is, 
however, a precise juncture at which neoconservative inputs and interventions began to 
apply. For neoliberals, morality was essentially a private matter and it had no real effect on 
social order unless it hampered the capacity of the subject to act rationally, in which case
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some form of intervention was warranted. Given that neoliberalism was ill-equipped to 
justify state intervention in its own terms, especially since it was openly distrustful of an 
overly interventionist state, neoconservatives hurried to give it solid moral underpinnings. 
As James Q. Wilson said; ‘moral philosophy simply supplies a fuller statement of the uses 
to (economy) can and should be put’ (1985a: 15). What’s more, the object of intervention 
for both rationalities was the individual. As a governmental combination, the liberation of 
individual potential from excessive state control and the limitation of individual expression 
according to socially beneficial ends, seemed to go hand in hand. Borne out of a variety of 
contrasting premises, the multifarious make of governance in the 1980’s produced strategies 
to transform subjects into agents of their own regulation. The combined influence of 
neoconservatism and neoliberalism contributed not a little to the sharper shift away from the 
welfare-oriented rationale which took hold throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s. The following 
picture of government in the 1980’s will begin by presenting part of the intellectual 
framework which enabled Reagan’s reforms to then give examples o f how the above ideas 
and rationalities played out in practice.
1.1 Intellectuals and Social Policy
In the process of operationalizing its economic and social reforms, the Republican Party 
solicited the help of many intellectuals. Inasmuch as subjectivities were formed through 
changing governmental practices, the ideas disseminated by a handful of public intellectuals 
did have some sort o f influence on the architecture of those governmental shifts and, 
perhaps more indirectly, on the constitution of personhood itself.
While the reconsideration of morality and character had borrowed from neoconservative 
intellectuals, ‘Reaganomics’ vindicated the ideas o f prominent political economists and 
sociologists like Milton Friedman, Charles Murray and George Gilder. As Friedman 
asserted, not in a dissimilar fashion to classical economists, ‘economic freedom (was) an 
essential requisite for political freedom’ (Friedman, 1980: 2). Liberty was the access to 
social mobility and the possibility to express qualities such as innovation. Friedman argued 
that the creative spirit o f the individual should not be weighted down by the demands for 
equality, as the most dynamic areas o f production in the American economy proceeded from 
unrestrained competition. For him, welfare programs should be judged not according to 
their good intentions but to the actual evils they produced such as weakening families, 
reducing ‘the incentive to work, save, and innovate’ and limiting freedom (Friedman, 1980:
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127). While claiming the responsibility to provide equal opportunity, the state’s ideal of 
justice was tainted by its actual incompetence, leniency and tyranny. The expression of 
liberty also required that the government recognize the transcendent qualities o f nature in 
order for individual potential to thrive. As Friedman says; ‘life is not fair. It is tempting to 
believe that government can rectify what nature has spawned. But it is also important to 
recognize how much we benefit from the very unfairness we deplore’ (1980:137). This idea 
o f ‘nature’ has a long association with liberal economics. The deregulation of talent and 
innovation and the consequent liberation of markets, would lead to the re-establishment of a 
‘natural’ hierarchy and equilibrium. Friedman also claimed that ‘moral responsibility is an 
individual matter, not a social matter’ (1980: 106). Some critics, neoconservatives among 
them, pointed to the rather optimistic estimation of the individual’s capacity for self­
regulation. Seemingly aware o f these shortcomings, and in a bid to appose ethical 
boundaries to neoliberal economics, Reagan advocated traditional values in his public 
addresses and a strong hand against those who lacked personal discipline.
In the early 1980’s, the welfare state came under attack from all sides. The left 
acknowledged its dehumanizing and exclusionary nature while the right, its more pungent 
and influential critic, decried its harmful effects on the personality of recipients. In his best 
selling book Loosing Ground (1984), Charles Murray insisted on the necessity to change 
individual attitudes as to the acceptability of state assistance. In line with what he saw as 
tested psychological verities, Murray asserted that ‘changing human behaviour depends 
heavily on the use of negative reinforcement’ (1984:217). In order to modify the recipient’s 
attitude toward welfare and put an end to ‘dependency,’ social benefits simply had to be 
reduced. The responsibility to calculate the risks of unemployment had to be entrusted to the 
individual. Consequently, while it was up to individuals to identify their own worth, it was 
the government’s duty to ‘protect a society in which the worthy can identify themselves’ 
(1984:234). Again, specific conditions had to be in place for this kind of self-identification 
to be possible. The levelling nature o f a welfare-oriented rationale had to be formally 
replaced with the valuation of individual potential up to then shackled by an artificial 
concern for equality. Another influential conservative thinker of the early eighties, George 
Gilder, presented poverty as an individual choice which was actively encouraged by an 
irrational and irresponsible welfare system. Gilder blamed programs like the AFDC for 
breaking up families and failing to provide monetary incentives to maintain family unity. In 
Wealth and Poverty, he attests that the welfare system has been creating ‘moral hazards 
because the benefits have risen to a higher level than the ostensible returns of an unbroken
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home and a normal job’ (Gilder, 1981:118). Even in purely economic terms, the stability of 
social structures like the family was for him desirable as it reduced public spending. To this 
end, the state should then try to provide incentives towards both employment and marital 
stability.
At the economic and political levels, the state began to rely increasingly on the market to 
stabilize and ‘re-naturalize’ traditional domains of intervention. Through the Omnibus 
Budget and Reconciliation Act (OBRA) in 1981, Reagan devolved many federal 
competences to states and to the business sector. The administration of social services was 
passed on to private agencies and decisional capability was brought back to local and state 
authorities. In privatisation schemes, the government effectively delegated the ‘production’ 
o f services to lower agencies but ultimately retained financial responsibility (Handler, 1996: 
89). The state then acted as an investor choosing from the most competitive agencies in the 
private sector, at once setting performance quotas and allocating budgets. In the same spirit, 
the 1980’s and 1990’s marked the introduction of vouchers for services such as housing, 
child care, education and food programs (Bendick, 1989:110). Consumers and parents were 
given the possibility to use their income freely and the responsibility to choose amongst 
service providers based on their respective merits. An increase in purchasing power, 
disposable income and therefore social mobility became preferable to preserving the 
entitlement to certain social and economic rights. On the other hand, those who failed to 
comply were punished more severely. Importantly, the devolution o f federal powers and the 
major budgetary cuts in the 1980’s, did not amount to a ‘retreat’ or disappearance o f the 
state but rather to a different configuration o f its activity. The state’s role was to stimulate 
incentives toward a particular mode of being from a distance and to consciously organize 
the delegation of public competences to other economic and social actors.
In the welfare reforms of the 1980’s, the transfer of responsibility from the state to the 
individual was accompanied by a revocation of unproductive and culturally undesirable 
behaviour. The Reagan administration marked an especially sharp turn in the 
conceptualization and administration of the American underclass. More than ever before, 
governmental action was specifically directed at the poor and uneducated. While educated 
middle class professionals could continue to enjoy irreverent art forms and could choose 
among a variety of lifestyles, the poor and the marginal were to be controlled more closely. 
As Garland asserts; ‘the new conservatism proclaimed a moral message exhorting everyone 
to return to the values of family, work, abstinence, and self-control, but in practice its real
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moral disciplines fastened onto the behaviour of unemployed workers, welfare mothers, 
immigrants, offenders, and drug users’ (Garland, 2001: 100). Direct state control, as 
opposed to an approach which enabled individual potential, was what these objectives 
required.
The notion of individual responsibility also became increasingly isolated from the 
determining influence of the social structure. For example, governmental strategies towards 
criminality changed from considering the importance o f social conditions such as 
unemployment, income and race, to holding individuals responsible for not having the 
moral or intellectual qualities to comply with the law. This shift coincided with a move 
away from a social scientific approach concerned with identifying the ‘root causes’ of crime 
like that adopted throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s toward the credence that individuals 
were largely to blame for their inclinations, choices and actions. As prominent 
neoconservative sociologist James Q. Wilson affirmed; ‘wicked people exist. Nothing avails 
except to set them apart from innocent people’ (Wilson in Garland, 2001: 131). However, 
governmental concerns about individual propensities to violent behaviour had to translate 
into effective modes of observation. To do this, strategies to prevent crime from the 1980’s 
on have been enlisting the help o f local citizens and municipal officials. In an influential 
article published in the 1980’s entitled ‘Broken Windows,’ (Wilson, 1982) Wilson proposed 
a form of intervention which tied the perception local inhabitants have o f their 
neighbourhoods to the assessments o f local authorities. Wilson’s main argument was that 
getting rid o f the signs o f disorder in particular areas, which would mean either graffiti, 
prostitution or gangs o f youth standing on a street comer, would go a long a way in 
encouraging more ‘depent people’ to use the streets (Wilson, 2004: 7). Citizens and 
community officials would then be encouraged to meet and discuss their neighbourhoods’ 
specific needs. Equally, police officers had to be assigned specific areas to patrol on foot in 
order to develop closer ties with local communities. Admittedly, each and every community 
could develop its own mles as what constituted acceptable behaviour and what justified an 
intervention. Throughout the 1990’s and beyond, the Broken Windows theory was actually 
used by several municipal administrations, most famously and successfully by Rudolph 
Giuliani in New York City.
The tense combination of governmental rationalities throughout the 1980’s had as its core 
the individual. Intellectual projects and practical measures were specifically devised to 
enable individual subjects to behave both morally and rationally. The definition o f moral
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and rational behaviour was no longer dictated by the social collective’s determination of its 
own needs like in the welfare rationality but by the discursive constitution of the individual 
as capable of rational choice and as compelled to follow a series of extrinsic, yet undeniably 
worthy moral standards. There was also a marked change in the epistemology of social 
insurance. Dean observes that in the gradual shift from a welfare-oriented liberalism to a 
more strictly neoliberal mentality of rule, ‘needs formations is no longer a matter of the 
scientifically informed production of truth by professionals employed under the welfare 
state; it is allowed to enter into a space negotiated settlement conducted in the name of user 
rights’ (1994: 169). This notion of personal responsibility and consumer’s choice reigned 
over and above ideological divisions and became a standard o f sorts for the governmental 
changes that followed in the 1990’s. Government was from then on overseeing from a 
distance while simultaneously exerting its power over those who failed to self-regulate.
1.2 Reagan’s Welfare Reforms
The above ideas on freedom and responsibility were manifest within the practical strategies 
that disciplined and govemmentalized welfare subjects. The representations, incitements 
and punishments brought upon the person of the recipient reproduced an amalgam of power 
specified through the roles, relays and locations of government, disciplinary institutions and 
executive decisions. Seemingly absent from the diagram, sovereign power actually seeped 
in through punitive measures and the wilful neglect o f particular individuals. Beyond the 
transfer o f legislative power to states, tax cuts and budget cuts, there was a series of 
strategies to encourage the individual to evaluate himself or herself according to the 
internalized necessities o f performance on the one hand and self-restraint on the other. 
Following the assumptions at work in the welfare reforms o f the 1970’s, work was still 
presented as the basis for self-realization but was backed up by stronger discursive 
injunctions and disciplinary measures.
33 As much many welfare recipients were left out in the cold in the midst of Reagan’s reforms, the 
homeless population also increased dramatically during his years in office. Lynn Hecht Schafran of the 
NY Times noted that ‘according to the National Coalition for the Homeless, since 1981 the Federal 
Government has cut back on housing funds by nearly 80 percent. In 1981, this country was spending $32 
billion to build and subsidize low-income housing. In 1988, the figure is $7 billion. According to the 
Children's Defense Fund, many of the small numbers of new low-income units being built were authorized 
in the 1970's. Virtually no new units have been funded since 1980’ New York, Aug. 21, 1988 New York 
Times.
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Reagan blamed the US’ poor economic performance in the 1970’s on excessive federal 
interference and vowed to bring freedom of choice back to individuals, local authorities and 
state legislatures. For him, a partial withdrawal of the state from economic and policy 
domains was long overdue because the Great Society had failed to deliver on its promises of 
equality, employment, education and crime control. By the time Reagan came into office in 
1980, work for welfare programs had generally failed to enrol recipients in permanent jobs. 
Most states were finding federal targets difficult to meet and recipients were subjected to 
growing resentment from the rest o f the population. The administration was particularly 
determined to end welfare dependency and put a number o f discursive and practical 
injunctions to work. On the discursive level, it objectified the welfare client as potentially 
idle and dishonest. On the practical level, it imposed a variety o f sanctions and obligations 
on applicants. With regards to welfare, the OBRA focused on three areas: targeting those in 
need, improving administration and strengthening work requirements (Committee on Ways 
and Means, AFDC, 1986: 15). The AFDC was directly targeted by the reform, more 
specifically through the restriction of eligibility requirements, the reduction o f payments and 
the obligation o f individual states to develop WIN demonstration Programs (Nancy E. Rose, 
1995:129). Due in part to high inflation and economic recession, benefit payments actually 
dropped between 1981 and 1982. A glance at the history AFDC during the 1980’s shows 
substantial restrictions on the eligibility to assistance and on its duration. State 
administrations were also given more responsibilities and stricter federal targets were 
instituted to move recipients from the rolls unto the labour market.
Single welfare mothers in particular were subject to intense moral profiling. They were 
identified by a large part of the American public as black and Hispanic women giving birth 
outside o f wedlock and imposing the consequences of their lifestyles on the rest of society 
(Nancy E. Rose, 1995).34 From the inception of state-sponsored assistance and even 
philanthropy before it, the underclass was at the very heart o f sociological surveys and 
private or public forms of governmental intervention. As Foucault remarked, the very 
existence o f an under-privileged class seemed rather important to the maintenance of 
institutions and modes of control that were politically and economically profitable to
34 During his presidential campaign of 1976, Ronald Reagan used the following anecdote about a supposed 
‘Welfare Queen’ from Chicago; ‘She has 80 names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security cards and is collecting 
veteran's benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands. And she is collecting Social Security on her cards. 
She's got Medicaid, getting food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each of her names.’ Reagan used 
the anecdote through the rest of his political career.
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dominant social groups (Foucault, 2003: 33). Minorities, who generally constituted a large 
proportion of welfare recipients, were represented, monitored and spoken about by political 
elites, whom constituted their political programs on the basis o f the problems and possible 
solutions concerning the regulation of the underclass. The voiceless poor more often than 
not provided fertile terrains for experimental reforms from family planning initiatives to 
work for welfare programs. As Connolly observes ‘the dispensable subjects of political 
representation (that) become indispensable objects of political disposability;’ they were the 
principal target of a host of political agendas (Connolly, 1991: 208, 209). The 
institutionalization of the racial underclass in the United States also amounted to the denial 
o f its claims to identity. The excluded other’s identity was ‘bom out of alienation and 
desire’ (Renwick, 2000: 18) and was only recognized in reference to what it aspired to be, 
namely morally irreproachable, hard-working and financially independent. Claims to 
welfare entitlement or to institutional discrimination were represented as deviant and 
worthless expressions o f identity.
The government became increasingly concerned with the marital and educational habits of 
welfare recipients. In the federal programs of the 1980’s and 1990’s, participation in paid 
labour and enjoyment of a normal family life constituted the explicit foundations o f a 
healthy social body. In a report before Congress on the state o f the AFDC in 1986, Jo Anne 
B. Ross, the associate commissioner on family assistance, explained that ‘a child who sees 
his parent get up every morning and go to work leams the rewards_ both financial and non 
financial_ that come from work. And he leams that goals are reached through work’ 
(Committee on Ways and Means, AFDC, 1986: 7). Ross continued; ‘with regular benefit 
payments, however small, recipients tend to lose sight o f their obligation to work toward 
self-sufficiency. This is not to say that recipients would not prefer to provide for their 
families themselves; it is just that it is hard to know how to start and many give up. They 
give up on themselves’ (Committee on Ways and Means, AFDC, 1986: 4). A premature 
descent into desperation was precisely what was to be avoided if underprivileged citizens 
were to make it unto the labour market. Defeatism had to make way for optimism and the 
state was bound to reward those who show such inclinations. However, a clearer obligation 
was bestowed on the recipient to recognize his or her part in the contract between himself 
and the government. This contract took the form of an ‘obligation (of the recipients) to 
move toward self-sufficiency, (and of an) obligation of government to help them toward 
their goal’ (Committee on Ways and Means, AFDC, 1986: 4).
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Unlike in the 1960’s, the government’s responsibility had now less to do with motivating 
people to work than to assist those who were already motivated. The targeted individual was 
‘capable of self sufficiency’ and could no longer be given the option to choose social 
benefits over employment (Committee on Ways and Means, AFDC, 1986: 5). Whilst before 
the rationale of governance acted upon the social communities formed out of disparate 
individuals, it now sought to stimulate the innate capability o f each individual to respond to 
criteria o f happiness and collective prosperity. Within this ethos, work once again occupied 
a central function as the purveyor of self worth and purpose. Unless they were incapacitated, 
individuals could not reasonably oppose the fulfilment o f their humanity through labour. 
But if  choices were valued as essential components of self-realization in a competitive 
economy, they also had to be oriented in the right direction. Dependency could no longer be 
a choice as it was both morally wrong and economically unproductive. Substantive moral 
education then took place through the control of incentives and choices. Recipients were 
eventually brought to prioritize specific values and concrete institutional measures intent on 
inspiring uprightness, family cohesion, stability and pride were implemented. Yet, in spite 
o f their disciplinary leanings, governmental programs continued to display great optimism 
as to the abilities of individual to overcome deprivation. As Ross observed ‘the work ethic 
that shaped our nation and drives our lives is alive in AFDC recipients (but they don’t know 
it yet, and it’s our job to make them realize it) The fact is they want to work as much as any 
American but they lack the essential tools, skills and equipment and something more basic 
like motivation and self-confidence’ (Committee on Ways and Means, AFDC, 1986: 19). 
Once again, the individual was presented as the source o f national character. If he or she 
was not already contributing to the creativity, energy and prosperity o f the nation, nearly 
every American had the innate ability to do so.
The Family Support Act o f 1988 continued the OBRA’s devolutionary initiatives and 
required states to produce their own guidelines for the attribution of benefits. It 
computerized individual dossiers and child support payments, introduced paternity tests in 
order to identify who had to pay child support and withdrew payments from non-custodial 
parents. Welfare reforms through the FSA were also directly associated with work 
requirements in the form of the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program 
(JOBS). The JOBS obliged non-exempt AFDC recipients to participate in the program, 
required states to comply with quotas o f 20% participation by 1995 and provided job 
training and job ‘readiness’ activities. The successful transition from welfare to work 
incurred several rewards such as free Medicaid for a year, coverage o f travel expenses and
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earned income disregards (Family Support Act, 1989: 2-3). The rewards associated with 
work were made as clear as the disadvantages o f unemployment and the rhetoric employed 
reinforced that opposition. By the end o f the 1980’s with the introduction o f the FSA,35 
liberal and conservative platforms alike represented the American Public’s distaste for what 
was viewed as the inappropriate lifestyle of the poor. Recipients needed public support, it 
was argued, because women were having children out of wedlock, men were sidestepping 
their responsibilities as fathers and because very few showed enough motivation to work 
(Nancy E. Rose, 1995: 139). While the introduction of work as a mandatory condition to 
receive benefits was obtained by conservatives, liberals added a variety o f training 
programs. The FSA, in conjunction with the JOBS program, ultimately vowed to eliminate 
long-term dependency and attempted to inculcate determination, independence and 
responsibility to demoralized welfare recipients. However, aside from the occasional 
training program in community schemes, the governance of both crime and welfare in the 
80’s and 90’s was largely informed by the exclusion of individuals considered beyond the 
reach of state assistance. Some individuals were simply seen as irrevocably corrupt and 
ultimately responsible for making the wrong kinds of choices (Wilson, 1983). Accordingly, 
penal and welfare institutions had no other option but to exclude them from the rest society. 
Individuals had to calculate the risks of their own actions, be they crimes, drug deals or the 
desertion of their wives, husbands or children. The regulatory instances of individual 
responsibility, self-control and self-management were to become governmental standards 
for years to come.
Through multiple discursive injunctions, the legitimacy o f minimal state assistance 
dwindled in favour of assistance to the ‘deserving,’ who had to prove that they were doing 
everything in their power to find work or that they were seriously incapacitated. As we have 
seen, the incentives and rewards surrounding employment, as much as the consequences of 
failing to find a job, marked an intensification of the disciplinary currents observed in the 
previous decades.
2. Moral and Economic Discipline Abroad
Even as the scale and object of intervention were different, the intellectual reasoning behind 
the reform o f foreign assistance programs followed the same logic as that of domestic
35 Congressional Hearings and Reports on the FSA were conducted by neoconservative senator Patrick 
Moynihan
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welfare programs. However, since neoconservatism and neoliberalism constitute modes of 
being and governmental critiques that take root at the domestic level, their conceptual 
extension to the international requires a little more qualification. In the foreign aid programs 
o f the 1980’s, responsibility for economic development and the constitution o f effective 
political structures was clearly being displaced unto recipient countries. Much like in the 
domestic realm, foreign aid programs began to identify and encourage the elements which 
could potentially enable national economies to become productive and self-sustaining. 
Development programs suggested a variety of means to liberate the potential contribution of 
individuals and private firms in particular. Instead o f transferring funds from one state 
administration to the other in order to bolster infrastructure, foreign aid programs started to 
fund local initiatives and to rely on intermediary institutions like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund to administer structural adjustments. Again, these 
developments were very much influenced by the valuation of freedom, self-interest and 
rationality expounded in the neoliberal textbooks o f the 1980’s. However, as argued in 
chapter one, the extent to which individuals, private firms and state administrations in 
recipient countries could self-regulate was determined by existing standards o f cultural, 
economic and political development. In other words, countries targeted for assistance were 
expected to demonstrate the same ability to self-regulate as welfare recipients in the United 
States without the support and enablement o f highly developed institutional, infrastructural 
and informational channels. Accordingly, the kinds of adjustments required o f many Third 
World countries were limited to fiscal and budgetary reforms. The requirements o f a world 
economy succumbing to a wave of deregulation had grave consequences for most poor 
countries throughout the 1980’s.36
In conjunction with the virtual imposition of fiscal discipline on recipient countries, the 
rationale guiding America’s international involvement included a more interventionist, 
morally assertive foreign policy. Somewhat in line with the neoconservative exhortation to 
restore the confidence and prestige of the US on the world stage, Reagan adopted a more 
embattled rhetoric and a bolder foreign policy outlook. In a bid to improve national self­
perception and rebuilt a sense of common purpose, the president and his close advisers 
elaborated on the emergence of serious threats to national security and on the moral and 
strategic justifiability of specific interventions. Decision makers couched the necessity of 
military escalation and security related assistance in existential terms. They presented the
36 On this, see Bello (1994).
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very survival of freedom, right and truth as fundamentally endangered by the forces of 
darkness, evil and unfreedom. Tapping into the long standing perception of America’s 
distinctive predilection for freedom and righteousness, Reagan succeeded in sparking a 
patriotic revival.
Although the principal goal of foreign assistance in the two previous decades was to 
encourage national self-sufficiency and responsibility, the rationale behind attempting to 
realize this objective changed from promoting administrative and infrastructural capability 
to nurturing the energies of individuals and private firms. Along with this shift in 
governmental targets of intervention, the attribution of foreign aid in the 1980’s was more 
avowedly dictated by strategic necessities and development packages were frequently 
accompanied by substantial military assistance. The decision to assist specific countries or 
national factions compliant with the US’ own ideological and economic model, and the 
presentation of the moral-discursive justification to do so, remained in the hands o f a small 
group o f state officials, not least Reagan himself. Faced with an increasingly deregulated 
world market, countries receiving money from the US government were also obliged to 
discipline their national economies to meet standards of economic viability. The make up of 
governmental intervention in the 1980’s then was characterized by a more visible 
disciplinary turn generated through a mixture of executive decisionism and de-centred 
regulatory instances such as international financial institutions and market mechanisms.
2.1 USAID in the 1980’s
Just as he did with domestic welfare, Reagan identified the size o f the least developed 
countries’ governments as one of the main impediments to economic progress and adopted 
measures to increase the contribution of the private sector. In fact, the very notions of 
government-sponsored welfare and foreign assistance were put in doubt, as they generally 
seemed to ‘undercut the recipient’s ability for sustained growth’ (in Osterfeld, 1990: 12). 
The administration broadly based its reform of foreign aid on the four pillars laid out by the 
then head of USAID, Peter McPherson. These suggestions were designed to generate 
sustainable development mainly through the stimulation of private enterprise. More 
precisely, the first pillar consisted in instigating ‘dialogue’ with Third World Nations over 
the radical reform of their social and economic structures. Second, a reorientation of
37 See Stephanson (1995) Manifest Destiny.
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assistance programs towards de-centralization and a renewed stress on the private and 
voluntary sectors was put in motion. Third, the American public and private sectors would 
initiate direct technology transfers and, finally, indigenous private sectors would be targeted 
for development and assistance (Rutton, 1996: 122). Heeding these recommendations, 
USAID set up the Bureau for Private Enterprise, intent on the ‘growth of productive, self- 
sustaining income and job-producing private sectors in developing countries using the 
financial, technological expertise of the U.S.’ private sector, indigenous resources, 
multilateral institutions and agency resources’ (1996: 135). In practical programs, this 
meant identifying the domains which would benefit from being managed by the private 
sector such as marketing, heavy industry and utilities. Again, the involvement of private 
individuals and firms in development schemes did not mean that the state disengaged 
completely from these programs. It would rather concentrate on bringing about the 
appropriate environment, legal framework and requisite public services to conduct 
development activities. The renewed importance of the private sector in development policy 
then resulted in the widespread perception that centralized administrations neither had the 
will nor the capacity to generate growth, and that enterprising individuals were better suited 
to contribute to their country’s economic output.
Various commentators concluded that there were major problems in the distribution of aid 
such as the diversion of funds by unscrupulous states officials and single party dictatorships, 
wasteful infrastructure projects and disincentives created by the ‘dumping’ o f food or other 
surpluses from the West. A number o f free market ideologues such as Nicholas Eberstadt, 
Doug Bandow and Peter Bauer hinted at a more fundamental problem. The basic fact being 
that ‘even when public officials are not corrupt they are human. Relief from the economic 
constraint of serving consumers enables public officials to substitute their own priorities, 
however well intentioned, for those of consumers’ (Osterfeld, 1990: 9). For these 
development experts, the motivations and calculations of individual consumers served as the 
basic materials for economic growth. They blamed foreign assistance programs such Food 
for Peace (PL 480), introduced in the 1950’s, for discouraging the local production and 
consumption of agricultural stocks. Following a plain cost/benefit calculation, individual 
consumers were naturally inclined to choose free goods over those that were not. 
Furthermore, the initial provision of aid had only created a subsequent need for more aid 
and generated an unbroken circle o f dependency (Bandow, 1985: xiv). According to radical 
proponents of free market ideals, the very notion of foreign assistance or welfare benefits 
(apart for seriously impaired individuals) was irrational and had to be abolished. This new
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outlook was part of the intellectual ascendancy of neoliberal thought. As early as the 1950’s, 
thinkers like Milton Friedman (1958) and Irving Kristol (1957) warned against the adverse 
effects of foreign assistance. As Friedman advanced, the provision of bilateral economic aid 
would encourage some foreign governments to devote their capital to ‘economically 
wasteful projects’ and indulge in ‘monument-building’ as opposed to substantial 
development (Friedman, 1958: 505-506). The state, he maintained, had to do no more than 
provide the basic functions of law and security for people and for goods. Individuals 
therefore had to be allowed and encouraged to participate in a consciously unconstrained 
market because;
‘Private individuals’ risk their own funds and thus have for that a much stronger 
incentive to choose wisely and well... What is required in the underdeveloped 
countries is the release of the energies of millions of able, active, and vigorous people 
who have been chained by ignorance, custom, and tradition... What is required is 
rather an atmosphere of freedom, of maximum opportunity for individuals to 
experiment, and of incentive for them to do so in an environment in which there are 
objective tests of success and failure_ in short a vigorous, free capitalistic market’
(Friedman, 1958: 509).
Particular conditions then had to be set to liberate the natural creativity and ability of 
individuals. The new governmental reason striving to establish itself through the critique of 
previous rationales o f development was firmly set on the individual as a site o f intervention 
and referent of social change. From a macro structural approach to development mainly 
working through state institutions, the strategy was reversed and energies were now 
expected to come from the primary units of society. This required developing and 
encouraging qualities such as self-reliance and entrepreneurship, as was explicitly 
recognized in USAID programs. Those who used their abilities successfully would in turn 
set the right example and involve others in the pursuit o f profitable enterprises. On a 
practical level, private entrepreneurs, presumably disposing of more information, of a greater 
determination to succeed and in some cases of more funds, would instill life in inefficient 
and stagnant economies.
Local development projects in the 1980’s began to foster the participation of the poor. As 
stated in a congressional report on countries receiving US assistance, one o f the objectives 
o f the organization was to ‘improve the fundamental life skills of adults’ (USAID, 1982: 
43), which presumably meant enhancing their ability to organize their own lives, start 
viable enterprises and take responsibility for the welfare of their families and communities.
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As a governmental disposition, the free expression of individual energies in the market 
place seemed to apply as a rational solution to economic and political problems across time 
and space. Means for neoliberal economic development included ‘encouraging individuals 
to capitalize themselves, to invest in the management, presentation, promotion and 
enhancement o f their own economic capital as a capacity o f their selves and as a lifelong 
project’ (Rose, 1999:162). As targets of intervention, individual subjects in poor countries 
were at once free to pursue their own economic goals and made responsible to integrate the 
guidelines for economic success. They became inserted in new systems o f relations and 
their treatment and definition in project reports changed almost suddenly. As one 
commentator on USAID agricultural programs put it; ‘farmers suddenly become rural 
entrepreneurs’ (Newfarmer, 1975: 45).
Holding the oversized welfare states responsible for the poor economic performance of the 
past decade, the Reagan administration imposed stricter conditions for foreign assistance. 
While USAID was careful not to support conditionality with too much enthusiasm, it 
nevertheless participated in the implementation o f structural adjustment programs put in 
motion by the World Bank and the IMF in the early 1980’s. Considering its delicate nature, 
the task of requiring deep-seated changes in economic and social management was 
attributed to international financial bodies rather than bilateral institutions. By the 
beginning of the 1980’s, dependency on bilateral and multilateral aid was so firmly 
entrenched that rigorous requirements were introduced. In order to borrow money from the 
above institutions, underdeveloped countries now had to accept macro economic 
transformations such the devaluation o f their currency, the removal o f subsidies on basic 
food items as well as wage and salary freezes. Needless to say, these measures were deeply 
unpopular with recipient countries. In recognition of these difficulties, USAID used 
alternative means such as ‘side letters’ in order to enforce a set o f specific requirements or 
simply waited for the adjustments to be implemented before starting the project 
(Rothschild, 1982).
2.2 Conditionality
The implementation of fiscal discipline in countries receiving foreign assistance marked a 
change in governmental representation. The very possibility o f development in third world 
countries was made to depend upon meeting procedural rules. The development compact 
was effectively shifting from the provision of enabling funds and technologies to the
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imposition of financial reforms. Even as the state’s role in using and distributing aid 
money was waning, the intervention of international financial bodies like the IMF and the 
World Bank in various national economies had a very real effect on the livelihoods of 
many citizens in third world countries. The disciplining o f national economies was 
facilitated by the fact that these modifications were presented as being in the interest of 
those targeted by the reforms. However, in the case o f foreign assistance, it was a less a 
matter o f inducing compliance as in domestic welfare programs and more to impose an 
extraneous vision o f self-interest upon entire nations. The incipient neoliberal logic was 
not merely suggesting new and improved standards o f rationality; it was setting a basic 
threshold as to who was fit to participate in a neoliberal economy and who was to be 
excluded from it. Only once international actors had adopted a certain rationality and 
specific techniques o f rule could they participate in the world economy.
Initially, conditionality was only used by the IMF in the 1970’s. Its objective was to 
increase the role o f markets relative to the public sector, improve incentive structures, 
augment the efficiency o f the public sector and mobilize additional domestic resources 
(Killick, 1998). Towards the end o f the 1970’s and through the 1980’s, the US government 
started to apply it more decisively through the co-financing o f the World Bank’s policy- 
based operations. Through the ESF, American bilateral aid also began to set particular 
conditions for its grants (Gordon in Killick, 1998: 42). USAID, not associating directly 
with the Structural Adjustment programs of International Financial Institutions, used 
program headings such as ‘policy dialogue’ to further macro-structural reforms in some 
countries. Conditionality was rarely applied integrally in practice but its apparition was a 
major development in the conceptual relationships pertaining to foreign assistance. 
Towards the end the 1980’s and through the 1990’s, American bilateral initiatives were 
further refined through the incipient representation o f economic and political reforms as 
being in the interest o f the poor countries. Once those interests were constituted in a 
rudimentary form in the subjects’ cognition or that contractual obligations for aid were 
firmly established, more conditions such as ‘good governance’ could be added.
In practice, the implementation o f conditionality in USAID programs amounted to drawing 
more performance reviews and negotiating loans more thoroughly. It also entailed more 
punitive actions in case of a recipient’s non-compliance. As stated in a policy paper issued 
by the Agency in 1982, the modalities of negotiation had to be carefully thought through 
and carried out with great prudence; ‘credibility can be established through a combination
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of tact with firmness’ (USAID, 1982a: 15). The granting and lending procedures were also 
more stringent; recipient countries had to ‘develop comprehensive public investment 
programs, with full economic justification in their budgets,... that the structure of 
industrial protection be rationalized, and the average level o f tariffs reduced and that a 
comprehensive export promotion procedure be worked out’ (Mosley, 1986:109). Reports 
enjoined USAID to hire more trained economists on the ground in order to maximize the 
loans’ performance and provide first hand knowledge of micro economic modifications 
(USAID, 1982a: 26). Even if  the adjustment programs had limited success in the majority 
o f cases, the neoliberal model of strict fiscal discipline became the standard for 
international development, a fact poor countries were not in a position to ignore.
Between 1985 and 1988, secretary of State Baker’s plan for debt relief in the Third World 
increased the availability o f loans from multilateral and American banks provided that 
recipient countries agreed to major structural transformations including privatization, 
deregulation and a reduction o f state spending. This involved defining and expanding the 
international role of the IMF and the World Bank. Multilateral institutions, previously 
considered unimportant and potentially prejudicial to American interests, were now 
actively embraced and utilized. The very notion o f conditions for assistance, namely a 
forced adaptation of state and society structures to the mechanisms of international 
financial markets, was a defining development o f the 1980’s. The poor countries who 
failed to take appropriate action for their own development were penalized. Again, this had 
striking similarities with the disciplining of welfare recipients. However, if the exchange of 
welfare for work in Reagan’s time was done progressively and within a relatively 
developed institutional frame, structural adjustments programs demanded highly 
sophisticated neoliberal reforms from states unable provide adequately for their citizens’ 
basic needs. Once again, and this is one o f the ongoing differences between the domestic 
and the foreign assistance realms, the lack of supporting networks o f knowledge, basic 
infrastructure and mechanisms of cultural diffusion (consumption culture, psychological 
and therapeutic services, media, etc.) in Third World countries could not produce the same 
sort o f responsive subjects as in the US, and the implementation of new market policies 
were often seen as controversial, alien and ineffective.
Neoliberal measures in the 1980’s firmly marked the passage from the modem development 
theory espoused by Kennedy to the regulation of individuals and institutions through market 
mechanisms and performance criteria. As Neumann and Sending argue; ‘rational,
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knowledge-based planning and social engineering had been replaced by a conceptualisation 
of development as best promoted by establishing an institutional framework within which 
the self-regulating mechanisms o f the market and of civil society could be realized’ (2006: 
661). The world market and the financial institutions’ attempts to manage and regulate 
recipient countries began to displace the richer states’ responsibility in developing 
infrastructure and encouraging reforms in the Third World. Economic development was 
simultaneously becoming the responsibility of recipient countries as sovereign entities as 
well as that o f individual entrepreneurs, and not wholly that o f donor countries. This 
perspective was carried through by the administrators of international institutions such as 
the IMF and the World Bank. Consequently, the responsibility for inadequate economic and 
social policies had to be formally recognized by third world countries themselves and those 
who refused or failed to reform their economies according to specific standards were 
subjected to punitive measures. However, in the American case, the celebration of the 
market’s capacity to solve problems incurred by the state’s failings was to be supplemented 
by distinctive moral premises.
3. The Restoration of American Grandeur Under Reagan
Taking full advantage o f the presidential pulpit as a means to inspire the American people, 
Reagan cut an imposing figure as a US leader without getting too involved in the details of 
policy making. Itself an embodiment o f negative power, the disciplinary turn observed 
across domains o f social policy was enabled by a web of discursive categorizations 
fomented by the political elite. The designation of internal enemies was replicated with even 
more virulence in the designation o f foreign enemies. Frustrated with the unprincipled 
functionalism of Nixon and Ford’s foreign policy as much as with the sentimental and 
conciliatory musings of Jimmy Carter, some established neoconservatives began to make a 
case for a more decisive and self-confident American foreign policy. Although Reagan’s 
own muscular reaction to the presumed expansionism of soviet communism was not 
necessarily informed by neoconservative advisers, the president’s articulation of the US 
own interests and moral responsibilities was in some ways very similar to the 
neoconservative outlook. The logic of affirmation which dominated Reagan’s rendering of 
foreign policy helped consolidate American identity by appealing to in-temporal values. The 
confusion o f the United States’ founding principles with the plight o f the rest of humanity 
was purposefully repeated in public addresses and the violence o f the affirmation was 
accompanied by more aggressive militarism. The work o f political authorities in defining
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governmental directions and in creating collective identifications is again important to 
mention, it evolves with and alongside govemmentality in the formation o f subjectivity. 
Although the realpolitik o f the previous decade was still very much actual in Reagan’s 
foreign policy, the rationale of comparative advantage against the Soviet Union was 
supplemented by the pressing moral necessity to defeat the ‘evil empire.’ However, in the 
aftermath of the Vietnam War and throughout the Nixon, Ford and Carter presidencies, the 
deployment of executive authority in foreign policy was limited to a series of secretive 
military ventures and diplomatic deals. Still mindful of these impediments, Reagan was 
nonetheless firmly disposed to prevent the spread of communism throughout the world by 
actively supporting anticommunist guerillas (Cannon, 1991:335-336). Without engaging in 
full scale war and without publicly suspending law, Reagan managed to reassert a strong 
American identity by mobilizing and furthering the lingering sentiment that Americans had 
always stood for what was good and true. As David Campbell maintains, ‘the (re)production 
of American identity has relied on a recurrent logic of foundation and augmentation such 
that performative statements are presented as constitutive utterances’ (1998: 131). Not 
relying on the usual ties of blood and nation, American identity has been perpetuated 
through continuing references to a series of immaterial principles such as freedom. Clearly, 
the founding attributes of the United States have also been constituted through their 
perpetual contrasting with the loathsome attributes of their opponents.
The familiar discursive strategies o f exclusion and affirmation were enacted to neutralize 
the potential contradictions and asperities that emerged in the historical constitution of 
American identity. The tendency to equate US foreign policy with patent benevolence or to 
universalize American values and endeavours, once again expressed with particularly 
vigour during Reagan’s terms, also resulted from these performative declarations. Here, 
difference, dissent and alternative historical narratives were wilfully submitted to the 
necessity for permanence and coherence. However, this form of identification was not 
entirely self perpetuating, official instances made the conscious choice to (re)constitute a 
specific identity and to justify the need to defend it. The presumed unity and benevolence 
associated with American identity was further strengthened by the construction o f a variety 
of threats, ranging from Soviet Leaders to welfare recipients. Keenly aware of the cultural 
and political forms o f dissent propagated by liberals at home, and of the doubts and 
misgivings expressed towards US foreign policy both domestically and internationally, 
neoconservative thinkers and policy makers provided the intellectual backdrop for Reagan’s
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rhetorical addresses and contributed to perpetuate an ‘evangelism of fear’ that led to a more 
aggressive posture towards domestic and foreign ‘enemies’ (Campbell, 1998: 166).
As Jeane Kirkpatrick insisted, it was a necessity to re-establish ‘the conviction that 
American power is necessary for the survival of liberal democracy in the modem world’ 
(Kirkpatrick, 1983:14). Importantly, neoconservatives saw foreign policy as one o f the last 
possible mediums through which state legitimacy and the moral unity of the country could 
be rekindled. Whilst the governmental reasoning of the 1980’s nurtured and reflected the 
fragmentation o f the social body into self-reliant units, the ongoing danger of licentious 
individualism decried by neoconservatives would have to be countered. Believing that the 
mediating institutions o f civil society had become ineffective and that the government’s 
prestige was at an all time low, the crisis o f confidence in public and political institutions 
could be displaced to the outer limits of state’s realm of action. If a fundamental change in 
American cultural mores was difficult to envisage, a collective re-alignment toward 
patriotism, a celebration of fundamental American values and the drawing o f clearer lines of 
enmity with the Soviet Union could serve the revitalization of the nation and its founding 
principles. This strategic re-moralisation of the domestic sphere through foreign policy had 
to be adopted as a complement to the thin normative content, lack o f ‘vision’ and 
conciliatory tones of neoliberal doctrines.
After nearly two decades of simmering national fragmentation and self-doubt, Reagan 
believed that the country needed to reconnect with its vital purposes and reclaim a 
meaningful and important international role. He maintained that the abstract and fragile 
equilibrium of the realpolitik adopted by previous administrations as well as the culture of 
appeasement through economic cooperation and political compromise, had been prejudicial 
to the self-confidence, power and prestige o f the United States (Dorrien, 2004: 49). 
Reagan’s arrival in office certainly marked a change of tone toward the Soviet Union and its 
allies. It also put an end to the strategy o f appeasement and arms control pursued by 
previous American presidents. From 1980 to 1985, spending on defense increased from 134 
to 253 billion dollars (Busch, 2001:190). Reagan was particularly successful in presenting 
the Soviet Union and the several communist-inclined insurrections throughout Latin 
American and elsewhere, as a threat to the security of the United States. A select group of 
officials and political advisers then worked to identity the sources of a threat to national
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security and decided upon the appropriate means to guarantee it.38 Aside from its decision to 
enhance the US’s military capabilities, however, authoritative agencies executive made a 
willful attempt to modify the perception of American foreign policy both at home and 
abroad.
Carter’s liberal internationalism, based on the extension of individual rights and commercial 
ties, was castigated by neoconservatives for its inability to engender national solidarity, 
propose compelling moral injunctions and respond to existential threats. Picking up on the 
potentially costly disengagement o f the US from the international scene, not least because of 
the ensuing dissolution o f national pride, neoconservatives advanced a critique of Nixon and 
Carter’s foreign policies which took two forms. The first one indicted the policy of 
containment pursued during most of the decade, which, neoconservatives argue, had 
effectively resulted in the loss of American pre-eminence in the Cold War and in the 
ensuing moral degeneration of the country. The second one consisted in resisting the 
tendency to depreciate the United States’ international efforts by some sections of the 
American public and by a number o f third world representatives. Importantly, the 
neoconservative impulse was also an attempt to re-legitimize the use o f force in foreign 
policy after what they saw as several years of self-defeating hesitation and moral confusion.
Whereas Carter famously derided the ‘inordinate fear of communism,’ the Reagan 
administration based itself on anti communism to justify its foreign interventions. The 
reinvigorated sense of optimism and national pride in the President’s public addresses was 
combined with the identification of clearer lines of enmity. Reagan’s address to British 
Parliament in 1982 stated that the ‘the march of freedom and democracy... (would) leave 
Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history’ (Reagan, 1982). Again, Reagan’s anti-Soviet 
posture was influenced by a number o f intellectuals and legislators such as Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, Norman Podhorezt and Patrick Moynihan, all o f whom understood communism 
as an inherently totalitarian and expansionist ideology that would never rest until the 
inevitability of the revolution would be insured. As Kirkpatrick asserts in her famous paper
38 Here, I do not wish to go into a presentation of the historical intricacies o f the Reagan doctrine, which 
called for providing military support to movements opposing Soviet-supported, communist governments 
(whom Reagan also called ‘Freedom Fighters’ in his Second State of the Union Address in 1985) or to 
detail the military/nuclear escalation initiated throughout the mid-1980’s but rather to outline the 
intellectual justifications behind the re-moralization of US foreign policy. For more details on Reagan’s 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) derided by his critics as star wars see Fitzgerald (2001). There are 
countless books on Reagan’s foreign policy but among the more readable and informative accounts are 
Gaddis (2006), Halliday (1986), Cannon (1991), Patterson (2005) and Bell (1989).
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Dictatorships and Double Standards (1982), the reason socialism represented a very serious 
threat to modem liberal nations was that it invoked the same values of freedom and equality. 
Against such a challenging but also uncompromising and treacherous foe, which had 
demonstrated its ambitions in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the United States would have to 
interrupt the misguided policy of appeasement of the previous administrations and assume 
its responsibility in leading and defending the free world. The threat posed by the Soviet 
Union and its sympathizers was therefore recalibrated in urgent existential terms. This 
reaffirmation of the world as a realm of enmity and of the U.S.’ role as the guardian of 
liberal values required the reassessment o f security needs.
If neoconservatives did not write or legislate on foreign assistance as such,39 they provided 
its association with security objectives with a powerful moral justification. Overall, during 
the 1980’s, foreign assistance was mainly used as a means to promote the national interest. 
In 1984, the Commission on Security and Economic Assistance, headed by deputy secretary 
of defence Frank Carlucci, concluded that ‘the instrumentalities o f foreign assistance are 
potent and essential tools that advance our interests... On balance, it is the judgment of the 
Commission that U.S. assistance programs make an indispensable contribution to achieving 
foreign policy objectives’ (Commission on Security and Economic Assistance, 1984:1). At 
this stage, the thinking behind foreign assistance had more to do with countering the enemy 
with covert military assistance than demonstrating the benefits of collective organization. 
The Economic Support Fund created in 1979, which included a portion of military and 
development expenses, received considerably more funding under Reagan than previous 
administrations (Lebovic, 1988: 121). The ESF became the most important bilateral aid 
program in the pursuit U.S. strategic and security interests. Within the total o f aid funding, 
the share o f security-oriented assistance went from 55% in 1981 to 67% in 1985, which 
accounted for an increase of 1700 million dollars (Sewell and Contee, 1985: 98). The 
paradigmatic association o f security and foreign assistance was not, however, similar to the 
one proposed by President Kennedy 20 years before. In the 1960’s, development assistance 
was used as a kind o f ‘soft weapon,’ and was an integral part o f the strategy to discourage 
communism. With Reagan, foreign assistance was less judged through the concrete 
demonstration of altruistic intentions but according to the national interest, which was 
presented as serving universally valid political and economic aims.
39 The only exception is the (Henry ‘Scoop’) Jackson-Vanick agreements on the limitation o f foreign aid 
to 300 million to the Soviet Block which asserted the generally ill-intentioned posture of the Soviets.
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From the mid-1970’s, the Third World Block at the United Nations voiced their discontent 
with the United States’ international policies. They denounced what they saw as the 
imperialistic nature o f American involvement and claimed that U.S. assistance programs 
were plainly unjust and self-serving. Some representatives also lamented what seemed like 
the progressive demise of welfare-foreign assistance programs, to which the United States 
was a major contributor. Patrick Moynihan, then ambassador at the United Nations, was one 
o f the first to adopt a more embattled stance and firmly assert the benevolent role of the 
U.S; ‘the US should stop apologizing for an imperfect democracy’ and proclaim the 
American case: ‘those nations who have put liberty ahead of equality have ended up doing 
better... than those with the reverse priority. This is so, and being so, it is something to be 
shouted at the heavens in the years now upon us. This is our case’ (quoted in Ehrman, 1995: 
83). As Moynihan remarked, there was no time to waste on either guilt, self-flagellation or 
on trying to win hearts and minds in a peaceful and quiet fashion; it was crucial that the 
superiority o f American values be recognized by its own people and carried out through a 
more visible and forceful engagement with its ideological opponents. For Moynihan and 
other neoconservatives, it was also time that the unprecedented international prosperity 
stimulated by American liberalism be recognized and that poorer countries who blamed the 
United States for their problems assume responsibility for the failure of their own socio­
economic choices. As Kirkpatrick commented, in a similar vein as her predecessor at the 
U.N., the overly critical attitude to the US’ international purpose was symptomatic of the 
‘New liberal Class’; ‘liberal idealism need not be identical with masochism, and need not be 
incompatible with the defence o f freedom and the national interest’ (Kirkpatrick, 1982:45). 
Naturally, the appreciation o f the successes o f American liberalism put into practice in 
Reagan’s foreign policy stood in firm opposition to the kind of internationalism which was 
developing at the UN forums in the 1970’s. In terms o f foreign assistance too, the more 
confident outlook on the US’ international role meant concentrating on its achievements; 
namely what it claimed to be the substantial improvements in standards of living across the 
world.
Conclusion
During the 1980’s, it was becoming apparent that the individual was becoming the central 
component o f new conceptualizations o f government. Conditions were set to allow 
entrepreneurial instincts to thrive and provide the impetus to regenerate the dynamics of 
social activity. Responsibility for one’s own welfare and economic status was impressed
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strongly through a variety o f administrative and cultural incitements as much as disciplinary 
measures. Through techniques and diagrams which took the individual as the focus of 
categorization and transformation and through the intellectual articulation o f the value of 
free enterprise and the disadvantages o f state assistance, the new conditions o f rule and 
subjectivity were laid out. The logic of the market was heralded as the highest form of 
rationality, one which had to be maintained by the state and other regulatory agencies. 
Services traditionally provided by the state were becoming delivered through private 
agencies and individual consumers were encouraged to choose among competing service 
providers. Freedom was no longer being free from want or ill-health, it now had to do with 
fulfilling one’s potential. Neoliberal texts and techniques of rule conveyed the belief that 
individuals were sufficiently knowledgeable to make enlightened choices. However, other 
forces and rationales, neoconservatism being one of the more important ones, disputed the 
ability o f individuals to regulate themselves. Remnants of state power bore down on those 
who persistently failed to espouse new standards of conduct. What’s more, the lack of 
explicit directives in neoliberal philosophy as to how one must live his or her life, and the 
apparent progression of liberalized mores in American society, made neoconservatives 
concerned about the effects o f cultural expressions on the stability o f the political order. The 
governmental landscape of the 1980s’ therefore expressed a complex combination of 
enabling and constraining rationales. On the whole, however, the penalty for not 
internalizing the new requirements for life was more severe. Many individuals were 
purposefully left at the margins of the biopolical whole.
The valuation of self-reliance was no longer left as a choice, it was both actively encouraged 
and enforced through concrete programs. Domestic welfare programs and foreign assistance 
programs reflected these demands. Foreign policy under Reagan was a mixture of self- 
interested ventures, structural adjustments in shattered national economies of the third world 
and of moral crusading against communist foes. To a large extent, the aggressive tone and 
neoliberal injunctions of US foreign ventures replicated the mixture of sovereign and 
biopolitical forms of power in the domestic realm, which alternatively imparted forceful 
sanctions and seductive suggestions upon subjects o f government. What’s more, the 
discursive objectifications justifying those impositions both appealed to the same modalities 
o f exclusion. Elements o f domestic society which put the health of the population at risk and 
foreign enemies who were deemed a threat to the security of the biopolitical whole were 
presented as wicked and immoral. Reagan’s rhetorical arsenal, although pursuing the long 
tradition of inspirational speech-making among American leaders, somehow succeeded in
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re-injecting national self-confidence and to legitimize an aggressive foreign policy by 
asserting the inherent benevolence of US actions abroad. If questions surrounding morality 
and ethics were introduced as a counterpart to neoliberal government in the 1980’s, the 
rationality o f rule that was developing in the beginning of the 1990’s actively integrated the 
ethical preoccupations of individuals to its designs.
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Chapter Six:
The 1990’s; Community and Global Governance
Introduction
This chapter will first attempt to quality the content and practices characteristic o f the 
ethical turn in American neoliberal governance throughout the 1990’s. Secondly, it will 
specify the particular combinations of power at work in the domestic and foreign policy 
domains, focusing on the ways in securitizing, disciplinary and de-centered regulatory 
agencies shape and control life in advanced liberal societies. In what follows, I argue that 
the constitution o f American subjectivity is becoming more complex as government is 
integrating an ever greater range of personal identifications, ranging from ethical 
inclinations to consumer preferences.
The co-ordination of local initiatives to prevent crime and to improve community relations 
that took place in the 1980’s was announcing a larger shift in governmental rationalities. In 
the 1990’s, ethical identifications among citizens, community leaders and local politicians 
became an important aspect of political involvement. Along with the perceived loss of 
meaning, community spirit and moral standards which had followed from three decades of 
individualism, citizens, politicians and intellectuals were involved in the remaking and 
rethinking of the premises o f neoliberal governance. The attribution of responsibility for 
social ills to the individual, which typified the neoliberal reliance on rationality and self- 
interest, was to be complemented by the recognition o f standards by which communities 
should abide and by which individual behaviour should be judged. In other words, 
responsibility was given an increasingly specific content, which went beyond insuring one’s 
own benefit to include a notion of collective well-being. In 1990’s America, the long­
standing libertarian hesitancy to intercede on matters o f personal morality, seemed to be 
receding in favour of an ever closer monitoring and control o f mores through a variety of 
self-regulating instances as well as through direct legislation. Culture was becoming an 
integral part o f governmental calculations because of its potentially detrimental or beneficial 
effects on self-sustaining governmental logics such as neoliberalism. Two of the modes of 
thought which were instrumental in recognizing the influence o f cultural mores on social 
stability, neoconservatism and communitarianism, suggested ways to understand the nature
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and content of moral responsibility which contributed to shape community-oriented 
governance.
Governmental programs of the 1990’s were essentially conveying the century old attempt to 
properly conceptualize and balance the twin exigency of social integration and productivity. 
However, the progressive reliance on specific forms of responsibility and on political 
technologies working through community affiliations was novel. Following Nikolas Rose’s 
definition, community ‘is a space of emotional relationships through which individual 
identities are constructed through their microcultures of values and meanings’ (2000:1401). 
As complex objects of representation within governmental plans, individuals are considered 
part of singular communities of taste with their own ethical and cultural identifications. 
Individuals are no longer seen as isolated, purely self-interested beings but as fully aware of 
their situation in society and capable o f posing moral judgments on the consequences of 
their own behaviour. Vowing to ‘end welfare as we know it,’ the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWOR) was signed by Clinton in 1996. Its 
provisions, clearly oriented towards encouraging family unity both because o f its intrinsic 
ethical value and its useful regulatory function, were largely carried out by private and 
community-based agencies. Importantly, the Act now officially regarded welfare assistance 
as a transitory state on the way to full employment. In other words, work became a formal 
obligation on the part of individuals receiving benefits. The proliferation of ethically-driven 
agencies was perhaps even more pronounced within the emerging networks of global 
governance. Already conveying and monitoring the financial reforms brought about by the 
regime o f conditionality, international development agencies like USAID began to add 
political requirements to their assistance. Community-oriented governance at home and 
abroad therefore integrated entrepreneurial language and ethico-political standards to 
existing concerns about responsibility, bureaucratic efficiency and economic growth.
Bush senior’s invasion of Iraq in 1990, an example of the continuing use of force in foreign 
policy in and amongst what some called a postnational constellation (Habermas, 2001 and 
Walker, 1993), presented a series of novel combinations between government and sovereign 
power. Not only did the use o f force seem to be constrained through the increased 
recognition o f binding legal and normative underpinnings, but war itself, insofar as its 
public legitimacy and its operational and technological coordination went, was beginning to 
change radically.
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1. Neoliberalism with an Ethical Twist
Following the important change in governmental paradigm in the 1980’s, governance in the 
1990’s furthered the ethos of minimal state intervention and sustained the development of 
individual responsibility. As Bill Clinton admitted in his Second Inaugural Address (1997), 
‘government is no longer the solution. We_ the American people_ we are the solution.’ 
Now firmly entrenched in most areas of government and psychic life, economic rationality 
was dictating the terms of maximum efficiency and insisting on the vital necessity o f effort 
and performance. The objectives o f economic prosperity, personal security and social 
stability now relied on the simultaneous responsibilisation and autonomisation of the 
individual. The distinctive feature o f post-Reagan governance, however, had to do with 
lending a specifically ethical content to the mobilization of individual energies. That is, 
individuals who, for example, sought to actualize themselves through increasing their 
productivity at work, could no longer see themselves as coincidental agents of collective 
prosperity, they had to be made aware that their striving toward success and prosperity 
could not be divorced from the duties citizens owed to each other. As Clinton insisted, ‘each 
and every one of us, in our own way, must assume personal responsibility— not only for 
ourselves and our families, but for our neighbors and our nation. Our greatest responsibility 
is to embrace a new spirit o f community for a new century’ (1997). The kindling o f this 
‘spirit o f community’ was meant to temper the consequences of greed and naked self- 
interest perceived to have reigned over American society during the 1980’s.
Freedom and justice were made to depend on ‘responsible citizenship,’ which, in 
contemporary terms meant ‘teaching children to read; hiring people off welfare rolls; 
coming out from behind locked doors and shuttered windows to help reclaim our streets 
from drugs and gangs and crime; taking time out of our own lives to serve others’ (Clinton, 
1997). The above tasks, vital to restore a sense o f community, civic pride and social 
harmony, were no longer the burden of a state administration with limited resources and 
public legitimacy, they were the lot o f citizens willing to recognize the need for collective 
standards of behaviour and to find constructive ways to divulge them. The recognition that 
readily formed communities and identities constituted potential means of effective 
governance gave way to a series of changes in practical political programs. As Rose 
maintains; ‘in the institution o f community, a sector is brought into existence whose vectors 
and forces can be mobilized, enrolled, deployed in novel programmes and techniques which 
encourage and harness active practices o f self-management and identity construction, of
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personal ethics and collective allegiances’ (1999: 176). During the 1990’s, a multiplicity of 
initiatives such as community policing, voluntary work, charitable efforts, local and 
international civil society projects were being carried out through a complex of non-state 
agencies which provided and promoted particular ethical identifications. Clinton’s political 
programs referred explicitly to a third sector in which renumerated and non-renumetared 
services to fellow citizens were taking place (Rose, 1999:171). The state’s role within these 
emerging networks o f solidarity and allegiances, was to act as a kind of referee and 
‘enabler,’ to incite social and self-management through the development of an inclination to 
moral responsibility. Nikolas Rose qualifies this kind of morally-charged government at a 
distance as ‘ethopower,’ a kind o f power which ‘works through the values, beliefs, and 
sentiments thought to underpin the techniques of responsible self-government and the 
management o f one’s obligations to others’ (2000: 1399).
The development o f self-governing spaces and instances, somewhere in between the 
unforgiving rule o f the marketplace and the administrative control of the state, therefore 
modified the diagram of contemporary government. This is not to say that there had been no 
previous reflection on the effects of capitalism and state intervention (or lack of) on social 
communities. Indeed, the perception that the withering of traditional bonds such as family, 
church and local community were jeopardizing social cohesiveness dates back from the 19th 
century if  not before. In effect, civil society was already the ‘correlate of a political 
technology of government’ (Burchell, 1991: 141). Outside o f their bare determination as 
economic and political subjects, individuals became increasingly governed through their 
own preferences, tastes and emotional ties. Government no longer acted upon ‘society’ as a 
thick object of scientifically calculated ebbs, flows and regularities nor through the 
dispositions of atomized individuals competing for their survival on the marketplace, but 
through readily formed communities, to which individuals chose to belong to. Far from 
operating in a vacuum of power, the extensive and complex networks of civility which were 
beginning to develop within and beyond the borders of the state were invested with 
regulatory functions in line with the paradigmatic shift toward ethical government and were 
monitored according to those intrinsic standards.
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Two of the main strands of thought which argued for the re-moralization of the public and 
political realms in contemporary America, communitarianism40 and neoconservatism, 
proposed contrasting solutions to the presumed degeneration o f the country’s moral fabric. 
If  American communitarians like Etzioni, Galston and Glendon fostered dialogue and aimed 
to find commonalities among existing moral and cultural codes, neoconservatives militated 
for the re-establishment of fixed moral standards over and above diverging points o f view. 
While the neoconservative articulation of cultural unease in stark, oppositional terms called 
for the forceful exclusion and correction of particular identities and attitudes, the 
communitarian valuation of dialogue and compromise had a more suggestive and voluntary 
character. In practice, neoconservatives invested the state with the duty to establish and 
enforce fixed moral standards. According to this duty, the state was justified in defining the 
boundaries and obligations involved in issues o f private morality such as marriage. 
Communitarians, on the other hand, called upon educational programs in schools, 
community associations and elsewhere to teach the value of marriage and to transmit the 
skills required for a lasting union, as well as for responsible fatherhood and motherhood 41
For all their differences, however, both neoconservatives and communitarians agree on a 
desirable set of qualities for the citizen; responsibility, self-restraint and uprightness are 
traits that ought to be valued in order to counterbalance the ongoing atomisation and a- 
moralization of American society. Their diagnostic of isolation, hedonism and-all around 
apathy usually revolved around the familiar scourges of drug-taking, family-breakdowns, 
suburbanization and the multiplication of specific cultural and educational backgrounds and 
preferences. However, as Rose maintains, their answer to the crisis of values is different; for
40 Communitarianism is not a unified strand of thought. There are at least two different forms of 
communitarian thinking. The first one, which could be qualified as ‘philosophical,’ commonly takes its 
starting point as a critique of liberal thinker John Rawl’s Theory o f  Justice's (1971) ontological and 
epistemological premises. Authors associated with this task are Charles Taylor (1989), Michael Sandel (1982) 
and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) and Michael Waltzer (1983). For an excellent overview of the Liberal- 
Communitarian debate, see Mulhall and Swift (1992).
The other strand of communitarianism, which is the one I am more concerned with here, is rather more policy 
oriented. Usually bemoaning the disintegration of community ties in post 1960’s America, people like Amitai 
Etzioni (1993, 1995, 2004), Robert Bellah (1985), Robert Putnam (2000), William Galston (1991) and 
Benjamin Barber (1998) have argued in favour of empowering local and intermediary institutions in order to 
re-instil a sense of civic engagement. Many of these analysts propose practical means to teach ethically sound 
and socially useful attitudes and many of them were also more or less affiliated to the Clinton administration. 
Among the various domains of social policy and cultural institutions are education, marriage, criminal justice, 
faith based initiatives, etc. For more information, see the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies’ website; 
http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/.
41 For a communitarian perspective on marriage see Whyte (Ed.) (2000)
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communitarians ‘moral order cannot rest on legal codes enforced and upheld by guardians; 
it is embodied and taught through the rituals and traditions and the everyday life of 
communities’ (2000: 1403). As Etzioni himself makes clear ‘for a society to be 
communitarian, much of the social conduct must be ‘regulated’ by reliance on the moral 
voice rather than on the law, and the scope of the law itself must be limited largely to that 
which is supported by the moral voice’ (1995: 139). What is at issue in the difference 
between the two modes of political intervention is both the source o f moral behaviour and 
the appropriate means to produce it. For neoconservatives, there are extrinsically defined 
ethical standards which must be enshrined in law. As neonconservative William Bennett, 
former Secretary o f Education under Reagan and Director o f the Office o f National Drug 
Control Policy under Bush senior affirmed, government can supply ‘through policy and 
law..., a vivid sense o f what we as a society expect of ourselves, what we hold ourselves 
responsible for, and what we ourselves answerable to’ (1995: 28). For communitarians, 
these standards must be bome out of an accord between a multiplicity of cultural, political, 
social and economic voices as well as perpetuated through ethical agencies which coax 
participants into socially beneficial behaviours.
When looking at the reforms propounded by the Personal Responsibility Act o f 1996, the 
virtual abolition of federal assistance clearly emphasized the notions o f obligation and 
responsibility over that of rights and opportunity. As Dean points out, ‘the limited sphere of 
the political (‘the state’) and the different conceptions of what is exterior to it (‘civil 
society’) interlace(d) to turn the injunction to govern through freedom into a set o f binding 
obligations potentially or actually enforceable by coercive or sovereign instruments’ (2007: 
111). The reforms of the mid-1990’s exposed welfare recipients who had proved 
untrustworthy and had faltered on the path to freedom and self-realization, to intensified 
modes o f observation and coercion. They were more or less forced, as it were, to attain self ­
management through the mandatory transfer from welfare to employment. Non-state 
agencies in charge o f administrating welfare were then effectively exercising a delegated 
form of sovereignty (Dean, 2007: 144) by managing and securing a specific object, in this 
instance the undisciplined and economically passive welfare recipient, for the benefit of the 
biopolitical whole. The other crucial component of the Act, also indicative of a disciplinary 
and authoritarian shift, had to do with the explicit valuation of heterosexual marriage as the 
foundation for a good society. Here, sovereign power acts through the legislative 
commendation o f a specific kind of morality but also through the agencies that perpetuate 
the requirements for a successful union or the disincentives associated to its collapsing. As
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one form of supreme power established models of moral responsibility over and above the 
biopolitical whole, other more specialized instances promoted these criteria and enforced 
them on individual recipients. This governmental turn presumed a more direct intervention 
on mores and a greater propensity to invest educational, civil and civic institution with 
normative functions and to enjoin them to consciously espouse their role as formative 
institutions in the fight against the degradation of values in American society.
Throughout the reforms, there remained a tension between the pact o f civility proposed by 
communitarians and the authoritative enforcement of morality o f neoconservatives. What 
can be said, however, is that the notion of choice promoted in the programs o f the past few 
decades, which was tied to the cultivation o f individual potentiality and energy, became 
increasingly sparse in the novel configuration of welfare. The obligation to work was now 
more or less entrenched over and above ideological divisions,42 and failure to do so incurred 
nothing less than the termination of welfare checks.
2. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWOR)
As with most of the previous reforms of the AFDC since the early 1960’s, the changes 
instated through the PRWOR were based on the assumption that welfare generated a state of 
helplessness, low self-esteem and dependency among recipients (Rose, 2000: 1407 and 
Cruikshank, 1999). The discursive objectification of individuals on welfare asserted the 
intrinsic value of labour, independently of the recipient’s own idea of what constituted a 
rewarding activity. Work as well as marriage, were presented as undeniable providers of 
self worth and as the essential pillars of an ordered society. They lent meaning, pride and 
identity in an otherwise confusing and egotistical social environment. In her empirical study 
of the effects of marriage on quality of life, Linda J. Waite found that it was associated to 
increased purchasing power, greater health and had a moderating effect on children’s 
propensity to either drop out o f school or commit crimes (Waite, 1998). Work and marriage 
were not only distant ideals proclaimed by nostalgic conservatives or well-meaning 
presidents; they were concrete regulatory instances which permeated the technical 
elaboration o f welfare programs and the training o f a multitude of case workers, precisely 
because of their effect on a great variety of potentially prejudicial behaviours. As Rose
42 Someone like Lawrence Mead, a well-known advocate of the state’s role in progressive social policy argues 
in his book Beyond Entitlement (1996) that in spite of the state’s duty to care for the most destitute, obligation 
to work must be at the core of any welfare reform.
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attests, ‘the technologies of welfare-to-work deploy a mixture o f re-moralizing therapies, 
pedagogies for inculcating citizenship competencies and punitive measures’ (2000:1407). 
Individuals had to integrate and apply the guidelines learnt in parenting classes, marriage 
preparation workshops and job seeking programs and their progress was routinely assessed 
by individual case workers. Such a governmental effort in the shape o f persuasive 
educational schemes, was ultimately made possible by the American public’s exasperation 
with the long-term ‘dependency’ of some elements (majoritarily Black and Latino) of the 
underclass. In the years that followed Reagan’s rhetorical assault on ‘undeserving’ 
recipients, academic and popular debate about welfare had effectively shifted toward a 
preoccupation with ‘dependency’ (Bane and Elwood, 1994: 67).
Furthering the devolutionary efforts initiated through the OBRA in the 1980’s, the PRWOR 
formally released the federal government from its responsibility to care for the poor and 
displaced it unto individual states and local authorities. In line with the ever increasing role 
of the private sector in the delivery o f welfare, the Act also appealed to the marketplace to 
provide competitive and high quality services. Having seen his plan for universal healthcare 
foiled by a republican Congress in 1994, Clinton vowed to preserve some Great Society 
programs (food stamps, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, etc.) at the cost of 
restricting eligibility (Katz, 2001: 292). However, anti-poverty strategies of the 1990’s were 
explicitly reliant on the market and set work as a condition for any sort o f reward or 
assistance. In an attempt to find a policy which would content both Congress and a portion 
of the Democratic Party, Clinton expanded the Earned Income Tax Credit, introduced in 
1975. This measure was designed to lift individuals who already worked above the poverty 
line by exempting a larger portion of their income from taxation (Clinton, 2000). In 1999, 
Clinton also announced tax cuts and other incentives to encourage private investment in 
inner city and rural areas.
Throughout the 1990's, the restrictive and punitive measures instigated during the Reagan 
era were actively sustained. The signing into law of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWOR) in 1996 once again tightened work requirements. 
Clinton’s vow to ‘end welfare as we know it’ basically meant exchanging welfare for work 
after two years for all ‘able bodied adults,’ and terminating benefits altogether after a period 
of five years on the rolls. Welfare provision was indeed completely transformed by those 
measures. Any reference to the notion of assistance as entitlement had formally disappeared 
and welfare was officially defined as a transitional and ‘temporary’ state (PRWOR, 1996:
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104-193). The work-related component o f the PRWOR, the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF), applied ever stricter performance quotas for states in the attempt 
to move recipients unto the labour market.43 The Act also required states to develop 
‘personal employability plans,’ which taught recipients about the necessary manners and 
qualities required to obtain and hold down a job. To stimulate performance, the various 
local instances in charge of welfare provision competed for monetary rewards allocated to 
those agencies that devised the best motivational programs and achieved the highest work 
placement percentages.
A number of Community Organisations, Interfaith Partnerships and community service 
institutions like AmeriCorps participated in the effort to assist, educate and restore 
underprivileged communities. Influential alliances like the Coalition o f Human Needs, 
formed in 1993 out hundreds of labour, religious and Women’s groups, laid out a series of 
principles that were presented to Congress (Nancy E. Rose, 1995: 177). In terms o f work 
placements, large organizations such as the Goodwill coalition contributed to employ and 
train thousands of recipients. The ‘third sector,’ composed of private, public and voluntary 
organizations, constituted both an outlet for governmental goals regarding welfare and 
crime control, and an alliance o f regulatory agencies that provided civic education in the 
hope o f eliminating the need for direct state intervention. Responsibility for the 
management and implementation of basic state functions was in effect diffused to 
individuals and communities. The goals o f safety and well-being, represented as commonly 
accepted goods in local and national life, required the collaboration, involvement and 
notification of each and every citizen.44 Individuals were beginning to see themselves in 
terms o f their respective ethical commitments; as proud contributors to the changing 
outlooks on specific issues in local, national and international contexts.
The other crucial component of the Personal Responsibility Act is its conceptualisation of 
marriage and family. For the first time in a text o f law, marriage was acknowledged as ‘the 
foundation of a successful society’ (PRWOR, 1996 HR 3734-6, Sec 101). Fathers and 
mothers were made responsible to manage the social risk of engendering an unruly child, 
and their ability to preserve their marriage as well as to rear children, were subject to 
increased scrutiny and regulation. Furthermore, to impress the consequences of
43 25% of recipients were to be work by 1997 and 50% by 2002.
44 For a good example on the notification o f citizens in safety related schemes see the discussion of Megan’s 
Law in Rose (1999: 174) and especially Levi (2000).
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irresponsible behaviour reflected in the high rates o f divorce and teenage out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies, measures and programs insisting on ‘male responsibility’ were enacted. The 
government allocated competitive grants for the development o f programs like ‘Fathers 
Work,’ concerned with assisting fathers ‘who owe child support and help(ing) them connect 
with their children.’ Again, the management of these programs would be ensured by ‘one 
stop career centres, community groups and faith-based organizations under contract to local 
and state workforce investment boards.’ Parents were here represented as having the 
important responsibility to prevent the perpetuation of social ills like crime, delinquency 
and teenage pregnancy by transmitting clear ethical principles to their children. If parents 
failed to assume that responsibility by, for example, deserting their family or refusing to pay 
child support, they ran the risk of having their wages reduced, their bank accounts seized 
and their tax refunds withheld (Clinton, 2000: 9).
The PRA also included a ‘program for abstinence education’ in which restraint from sexual 
activity outside of marriage was posed an as explicit norm. The plan ‘teaches that a 
mutually faithful monogamous relationship in the context o f marriage is the expected 
standard o f human sexual activity’ and that sex outside o f marriage ‘is likely to have 
harmful psychological and physical effects’ (PRWOR, 1996, HR 3734-250, sec 502). This 
representation of marriage not only entails that it is the only legitimate institution to 
accommodate sexual activity and child rearing, but also, as is made explicit elsewhere in the 
Defense o f Marriage Act (DOM A), that it can only take place between a man and a woman 
(Smith, 2001: 308). Accordingly to this conception of marriage as an essential means for 
social and moral regulation, a myriad of training programs were put in place to safeguard 
and promote it. Under George W. Bush, the Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family 
Promotion Act (2003), essentially following on from Clinton’s initiatives, proposed public 
advertising campaigns on the value of marriage and workshops on how to develop 
‘marriage’, ‘relationship’ and ‘budgeting’ skills (HR4735-1, sec. 103: 2002). The united 
two-parent heterosexual family was consistently presented as a primary example and a 
nucleus o f morality. The valuation of one particular form of family, which induces 
particular qualities and produces a certain kind of citizen (drug free, emotionally balanced, 
responsible, hard-working and principled), was not altogether new, but the fact that this 
function was explicitly recognized in law as opposed to simply suggested in rhetorical 
addresses was.
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3. The dawn of Global Governance
In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the contribution, role and agency of the state were more clearly 
delimitated and the programming of the economic and social structures of developing states 
was more direct. Similarly, the institutional measures toward ‘self-government’ which 
appeared in the governmental programs of the late 70’s early 80’s could barely conceal the 
disciplinary components of conditionality. If Structural Adjustment Programs managed by 
the IMF and the World Bank very much endured throughout the 1990’s, the consequences 
o f their zealous application in the 1980’s were widely criticized and addressed in a variety 
o f reforms. The neoliberal turn in the administration o f international economy was being 
reconsidered according to new normative covenants put forth by governments, civil society 
institutions and individuals alike. The shift to global governance was marking the 
progressive disappearance o f ‘coordinated, hierarchical structures and processes of societal 
steering’ and the emergence of ‘a network-based process o f exchange and negotiation’ 
(Salskov-Iversen, Hansen and Bislev, 2000: 184). In contrast with the transposition of 
modernizing planning or with the imposition of fiscal discipline unto recipient countries, the 
emerging compact o f development appealed to the inherent ability of state and non-state 
actors to integrate the universal norms of economic growth and good governance. As Archer 
maintains, whereas neoliberalism ‘exploded the relationship between government, the 
economy and ‘society’, the new covenant for development (aimed) to re-unite society’s 
political, economic and social dimensions’ (Archer, 1994: 8-11). In line with the 
progressive displacement of state functions toward self-regulatory spaces such as the market 
and the third sector, International Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations took 
a more active part in elaborating and implementing particular criteria for targeted countries.
Importantly, as Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann point out, ‘the ascendance of non­
state actors in shaping and carrying out global govemance-functions (was) not an instance 
o f transfer of power from the state to non-state actors... (but rather the) expression of a 
change in govemmentality by which civil society is redefined from a passive object of 
governance to be acted upon and into an entity that is both an object and a subject of 
government’ (2006:658). Indeed, the shift toward global governance does not result entirely 
from the conscious delegation of administrative capabilities from one tiers to another. 
Although states may still decide to assist or fund specific countries orNGO’s, the object and 
spectrum of international liberal governance emerge as a result o f both the intellectual 
objectification o f a field of intervention, that is, poverty, and the proposed technical
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solutions to underdevelopment. In the 1990’s, poverty became increasingly defined as a 
universal moral wrong and was represented, along with a range o f other issues such as 
global warming, family-planning and epidemics, as a threat to the well-being and security of 
the world population. Although it is still difficult to determine the degree of correspondence 
between individual consciousness and the transnational subjectifying processes of 
development discourse, something like a global biopolitical whole, as an object to preserve 
and secure, was emerging.
Ironically, the treatment of poverty did not result in an increase in development funding45 
but rather in the active consideration of all the possible causes, factors and agents involved 
in its perpetuation and its prevention. Civil societies, state administrations, private firms and 
individuals were represented as the main instances of their countries’ economic and political 
development. In line with the wide spread recognition in donor countries of neoliberal 
criteria o f efficiency and self-regulation, development schemes were beginning to work 
through the existing dispositions of the individuals and states concerned and ultimately 
served ‘to infuse self-governmental disciplinarian techniques on the recipient side’ (Sande 
Lie, 2005: 2). Often making abstraction o f structural factors like the world economy or the 
lack o f local infrastructures, development strategies tended to focus on the potential of 
individuals and states in poor countries to integrate standards o f entrepreneurship, ethical 
behaviour and organizational efficiency. Those state-administrations or those individuals 
that performed well in a variety of projects conducted through the international cooperation, 
eventually benefited from more assistance.
The economies, civil societies and political institutions o f underdeveloped countries were 
then progressively constituted into objects of observation, evaluation and intervention. 
NGO’s, International Organizations such as the World Bank as much as grass roots 
organizations, conveyed standards of efficiency and self-reliance through the circulation of 
technical competencies like budgeting, voting procedures, project auditing and community 
organization. Conditions for assistance did not only include the liberalization of national 
economies but also the compliance to environmental and good governance standards. A 
notable effect o f the widening array o f conditions for development aid was to bring 
‘increased powers of surveillance and control over sovereign states, and more invasive
45 ‘In 1996, developed countries gave the lowest share of their combined GNPs in assistance (0.27 percent) 
since comparable statistics on aid first became available in 1950, this, however, does not include private 
donations which are hard to calculate’ in Craig Burnside and David Dollar (1997).
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monitoring of liberalization through the International Financial Institutions’ (Mosse and 
Lewis 2005: 8), Throughout the 1990’s and beyond, the agencies in charge of carrying out 
the objectives of conditionality and good governance became increasingly involved in the 
daily lives of individuals in poor countries. As Merlingen attests, the projects and platforms 
of International Governmental Organizations (IGO’s) like the OECD ‘render(ed) visible the 
space brought under their governance by monitoring countries, comparing their behaviour to 
international institutional standards o f normal statehood and developing the meticulous 
knowledge through which countries (could) be corrected and controlled’ (Merlingen, 2003: 
369). In 1990’s, the amount of information about specific countries, whether it had to do 
with the performance of a particular ministry or of a local project funded by the European 
community, increased dramatically. With new and improved techniques o f data collection, 
each countries’ performance could be assessed more effectively. When particular countries 
or local communities failed to meet the targets of political and economic ‘efficiency’ that 
they were advised to internalize (Dillon and Reid, 2000: 119), disciplinary measures and 
occasionally a complete withdrawal o f assistance, were enacted. For some recipient 
countries, the withdrawal o f assistance meant nothing less than a slow descent into abject 
poverty and oppressive conditions. The new regime of recipient countries’ 
responsibilization was often enforced at the expense of its national populations. Even a wide 
ranging development initiative like the United Nations Millennium Development Goals46 
forced aid beneficiaries to demonstrate real improvements in their economic and political 
management. A failure to measure up to stringently observed performance criteria meant the 
collapse o f the compact of mutual responsibility and, in foucaultian terms, meant that some 
states and large parts of their populations were left to die.
In spite of the multiplication of regulatory agencies, there was a surprising homogeneity in 
the concerns, themes and intentions stated in the platforms of institutions ranging from 
American bilateral aid agencies to Amnesty International. Apart from mandatory structural 
adjustments to national economies, the constructs of sustainable development, good 
governance and human rights became the enforceable norms of international government. 
These norms and ideas surrounding local and national development were largely devised 
and reproduced through the interlinking o f institutions like the UNDP, regional 
development banks, the IMF, the World Bank and the Organization for Economic 
Development Assistance Committee to name but a few important ones (Boas and McNeill, 
2004: 3), with the ‘transnational alliances forged by activists and grassroots organizations’
46 55/2. United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000)
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(Ferguson and Gupta, 2002: 990). Ethically driven objectives such as ‘sustainable 
development,’ which have come to include not solely environmental and economic 
components but also social, cultural and political issues, are perpetuated through an ever 
greater array of actors who all adhere to vaguely defined projections o f democratic 
participation, local and national consultation, nation-wide educational campaigns, greater 
transparency, etc.47 Similarly, ubiquitous headings such as ‘good governance’ (UNESCAP) 
include standards o f administrative efficiency, political participation and legal integrity 
which are tirelessly reasserted in development compacts with third world countries. As 
Hardt and Negri attest, NGO’s and the ideals that drive their efforts ‘are completely 
immersed in the biopolitical context o f the constitution of Empire; they anticipate the power 
of its pacifying and productive intervention of justice’ (2000: 36). Organizations such as 
Amnesty International and Oxfam that are hoping to quell poverty and oppression through 
moral injunctions, are in effect contributing to establish universally valid criteria (such as 
Human Rights) for forceful intervention. In the complex, multitier and incomplete diagram 
of global governance, criteria of universal ethics and technical guidelines towards 
transparent, diligent and equitable governance, work to produce a single entity o f rule. 
Although Empire has yet to materialize and although forceful interventions in the name of 
human rights abuse are still few and far between, the language of universal goodness, 
economic and political liberalism which surrounded the American interventions in Iraq in 
1991 and 2003 were strikingly similar to that used by humanitarian agencies.
Much in the same way as the requirements impressed upon welfare recipients in the US, the 
enabling agencies for democracy and development solicited the active participation of 
countries, local communities and citizens in order to establish their responsibility in 
contributing to their own well-being. However, if  the language o f global governance in the 
1990’s marked the beginning of an objectification o f groupings o f citizens in third world 
countries as terrains to organize and regulate, means to evaluate compliance and the extent 
to which individual citizens in the third world were able to self-regulate were and still are 
far from extensive. The admonitions to community empowerment, political participation, 
health and environmental awareness which filled development projects often remained at
47 on the implementation o f sustainable development through Grass Roots Organizations see Fisher (1993).
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the level o f admonitions. Equally, coordination o f the various actors which propounded 
ethical, social and economic objectives was often very partial and fragmented.48
In truth, throughout the 1990’s, struggles for economic and military dominance in local, 
national and international contexts affected the lives of citizens in third world countries in a 
more direct and brutal way. State power could still curb particular initiatives towards 
democracy and development as sovereignty still reigned in international law. Equally, state 
administrations could often limit or direct specific efforts in accordance with their support 
o f political sympathizers or ethnic affiliations 49 What’s more, the progress reports compiled 
by NGO’s and IGO’s often depended on the unreliable figures and statistics of national and 
local administrations. Stuck between attempting to reform intra-govemmental agencies such 
as ministries of trade or environment and initiating governance from below by stimulating 
local empowerment, international development efforts have consistently run into difficult 
and complex situations.
While the spectre o f global governance appeared through the universalization o f ethical 
standards in the form of human rights, good governance and environmental politics and 
through the partial extension o f technical knowledge and of a performance based ethos, it 
had yet to impress itself as a set of clear and enforceable requirements in the consciousness 
of all human beings. Again, if  international aid and development initiatives relied on the 
market and on nurturing personal responsibility and ethical obligations, the extent to which 
these criteria were followed and integrated was much greater in the domestic realm.
4. USAID Reforms in the 1990*8
Although the extension of global governance, which circulated a set o f mutually-sustaining 
requirements for development in the shape of market economics and local political 
empowerment, permeated the governmental thinking that informed American foreign 
assistance in the 1990’s, reforms towards encouraging local participation progressed rather 
slowly. What’s more, since foreign aid had been in great part guided by ideological 
considerations until the end o f the 1980’s, there was a wide spread feeling among the
48 On the difficulties of coordination between various governmental instances, see Helling, Serrano and 
Warren (2005).
49 The permanence of the statist model and the obstacles to Global Civil Society are highlighted by Richard 
Falk (2005).
163
American public and its political representatives that USAID was now purposeless and 
ineffective. The US government, under the general pledge to render administration more 
efficient and cost effective in the 1990’s (Gore, 1993), vowed to drastically re-organize the 
agency according to stringent performance criteria. On the other hand, the agency was 
beginning to integrate some of the ethical standards set by multilateral development 
coalitions and to modify the conceptualization and practical implementation of its aid effort. 
Development was beginning to be constituted in and among the mutually beneficial 
regulatory ideals o f administrative efficiency, decentralization, market economics and 
liberal democracy. The governmental rationale behind the transformations of foreign 
assistance programs of the 1990’s then stood at the intersection of managerial techniques 
and ethical criteria, as well as between domestic hesitations and cosmopolitan sentiments. In 
what follows, I will give examples of how these criteria were assimilated in practical 
reforms and attempt to determine whether the re-moralization of the governmental field in 
the domestic realm was replicated, if  at all, in the governmental changes o f US aid policy.
In 1993, President Clinton launched the National Performance Review (NPR) (Gore, 1993) 
intent on streamlining state administration according to efficiency-driven managerial 
models. USAID was designated as a prime target for reform by national officials. As the 
agency’s administrator affirmed, the agency was going to serve as a ‘re-invention 
laboratory’ closely guided by the NPR’s standards (USAID, 1996: 1). Having long been 
criticized for its complicated and rigid bureaucratic structure, the agency was compelled to 
modify its general outlook as much as its cumbersome data collection, procurement and 
evaluation procedures. USAID was now ‘obliged to define programme objectives, create 
annual performance plans specifying measurable goals and publish reports showing results’ 
(Corneille and Shiffman, 2004:258). The emphasis was put on clearly articulated goals and 
simplified guidelines and procedures, all o f which had to lead to producing ‘results.’ 
USAID’s employees were subjected to new evaluation systems, which sought information 
about a specific individual’s performance by consulting his or her ‘peers, support personnel, 
supervisors and customers’ (USAID, 1996: 17). Where results or professionalism were 
lacking, disciplinary actions or dismissals took place. These disciplinary measures were of 
course applied equally, if not more so, to recipient countries who did not reach projected 
targets. These new stringent criteria transformed the agency into a competitive and highly- 
skilled environment. Along with the general reduction of US military and development 
assistance after the collapse o f the Soviet Union, drastic cutbacks to USAID’s workforce, 
which went from 11096 in 1992 to 8638 in 1996, were enacted (USAID, 1996:12). Second,
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those countries ‘who (had) proven not to present the conditions needed for fruitful 
cooperation with (USAID’s) sustainable development efforts’ were simply cut off (USAID, 
1996: 8). Between 1992 and 1996, USAID closed 25 missions. The solution of withdrawing 
eligibility for recipients who did not comply with standardized rules and obligations then 
also applied across the boundaries of domestic and foreign policy.
In line with the readily established governmental tendency towards advancing 
entrepreneurship and responsibilization, the agency also had to become more focused on its 
clients, in this case, the poor people. In the beginning of the 1990’s, the notions of 
decentralization and local empowerment in developing countries were introduced by a 
variety o f major international organizations. In 1990, the World Bank reunited several 
IGO’s and NGO’s, among which was USAID, and formed ‘participation learning groups’ 
intent on discussing how best to involve and empower the local beneficiaries of 
development projects. Following the movement of decentralization in donor countries, 
which was intimately tied to the governmental objective o f delivering services effectively 
and at a minimal cost, USAID progressively began to encourage a participatory approach in 
client countries. For example, when a study found that few local actors were getting 
involved in a decentralized water project in Nicaragua, USAID ‘trained municipal officials 
in ways to increase participation, resulting in a campaign that brought about the 
involvement of students, teachers, community members and religious leaders’ (Corneille 
and Shiffman, 2004:259). Through thorough reporting and auditing, solutions were reached 
more quickly and efficiently. What’s more, the active involvement of local communities 
entailed the development of competencies to do with planning, organizing and budgeting as 
well as the long-term establishment o f standards of participation and accountability. In the 
general spirit of opening government and of inducing the participation of American citizens, 
USAID development and investment programs were made accessible on the internet. Both 
the recipients and the purveyors o f foreign aid then had to feel involved and ‘empowered’; 
conditions and wordings were set for them to believe that the skills they were either 
transmitting or acquiring were meaningful steps towards peace, prosperity and democracy. 
By impressing the correct ethical and procedural practices, USAID could transform the poor 
into agents o f their own regulation. In spite of the increased popularity o f participatory 
methods, however, impediments such as the lack o f funding, the reluctance of central 
administrations in recipient countries to cede powers and the doubts on the part of some 
USAID officials that the poor could indeed have ‘the requisite knowledge to understand
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their own needs and to select and carry out the relevant projects,’ (Corneille and Shiffman, 
2004: 260) still remained.
With the end of the Cold War and the triumph of liberal capitalism which prompted 
Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis, standards such as market economics but also freedom, 
democracy and opportunity gained a wider acceptance in the realm of bilateral and 
multilateral development organizations. However, deprived of the impetus to support the 
cause of freedom and democracy in countries under communist threat, the American public 
and its representatives began to doubt the very necessity of foreign aid. Misgivings as to the 
agency’s legitimacy and effectiveness somewhat hampered its ability to integrate and meet 
the emerging standards of humanitarian internationalism. On the one hand, the coordination 
of US foreign assistance required an improved linkage with the expanding array of aid 
agencies and International Financial Institutions. It also had to assimilate the ‘good 
governance agenda,’50 considered as the ‘prevailing paradigm of development’ comprising 
of ‘democracy, human rights, transparency and political decentralization.’ The 1995 
statement o f the administrator presented six mutually reinforcing objectives as part of the 
new guidelines for foreign assistance; promoting sustainable development, building 
democracy, promoting peace, providing humanitarian assistance to those in need, promoting 
U.S. prosperity through trade, investment and employment and advancing diplomacy 
(USAID, 1995: 3). For the most part, these objectives corresponded to those of other 
bilateral and multilateral agencies. Sustainable development, for example, was a heading 
found in almost every large-scale regional projects initiated by the international cooperation 
and became the most important component o f American foreign assistance. On the other 
hand, one of the core objectives o f Clinton’s foreign policy program was to expand 
international markets and to use this expansion as groundwork for peace and democracy. 
Overall, save the partial coordination o f the American aid effort with international 
organizations and a limited amount o f highly conditional development projects, the 
economic aspects o f sustainable development received more attention.
Apart from the individual qualities which were nurtured through commercial dealings, the 
opening o f markets and the improvement of business practices in other parts of the world 
presented direct benefits for the US economy. Clinton’s foreign policy was largely informed 
by the promotion of what he called ‘the new fabric o f commerce’ (Clinton, 1993). Each of
50 The World Bank report on poverty in 1990 cites 3 axes for ‘good governance’ 1_ The Role of competitive 
markets, 2_ The Government’s responsibility to manage state functions 3_ The importance of private rights 
and individual initiative (civil society).
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the four points in his foreign policy strategy, entitled ‘From Containment to Enlargement’ 
(Lake, 1993), referred to the need to promote, extend and defend market economy. The 
central role of the market in international development policies has led some of the 
commentators interested in govemmentality such as Hardt and Negri, (2000, 2004) 
Lipschutz (2005, 2006) and Rupert (1995) to argue that very little remained outside the 
bounds of the regulatory and disciplinary mechanisms of the globalized economy. Clinton’s 
liberal internationalism did translate a belief in the ‘civilizing’ virtues o f the market. But 
unlike classical liberalism, the marketplace of the 1990’s was a highly controlled and 
regulated environment, and economic transactions as much as infrastructure projects were 
subject to greater scrutiny; transparency and efficiency were often posed as conditions to do 
business. The extension of the virtues of market economy required specific moral and 
technical competencies but also a political system which accommodated enterprise and 
innovation. It was therefore worthwhile to form a small number of individuals in developing 
countries to diffuse governmental norms through educational forums on human rights, 
corruption and democratic organization. Again, the resulting emergence of a civil society 
aware of common rules for economic and non-economic development constituted a field of 
intervention which regulated itself in parallel and in cooperation with state institutions. The 
essential objective of the diffuse and often contradictory sources o f power found in civil 
society came in full circle through the objective of bilateral assistance; the attainment of 
self-reliance.
By furthering global neoliberal economics, perhaps Clinton was hoping to minimize the 
potential contradictions between the national interest and universal values. Towards the end 
of the 1990’s, however, a group of neoconservatives specialized in foreign policy, 
articulated the equivalence of universal values with US national interest and criticized 
President Clinton’s cutbacks in the defence budget (PNAC). The preservation o f American 
and therefore global interests, wherever they were seriously threatened, required a high- 
level o f military preparedness. In the following decade, in light o f the terrorist attacks of 
2001, these recommendations would be implemented by the incumbent president with more 
conviction.
5. The Gulf War and International Governance
Global govemmentality’s propagation of the means to attain self-regulation and self- 
reliance without the use o f direct violence was not matched by the end of outright hostilities
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between sovereign entities and ‘ethnic’ groups. From the perspective of the deployment of 
sovereign authority in contemporary US history, the Gulf War was remarkable because it 
reasserted the president’s ability to declare war, a power which had been severely 
compromised after the American defeat in Vietnam. The Gulf War also marked new 
standards as to the discursive constitution of a consensual national response; an ABC poll 
on January 18 1991 showed that 83 % of Americans supported the war, and that 71% of 
them opposed anti war demonstrations (Summers Jr., 1992: 19). Importantly, the US’ 
military reprisal was also conducted in the name o f international law and condoned by a 
majority o f UN members. In all, the Gulf War presented a (worrying) new kind of 
entanglement between force, discursive performance and universal right.
Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, foreign policy ventures were mainly limited to arms 
treaties, diplomatic missions, covert operations and to military and economic assistance to 
its allies. After the Vietnam War, not only were the presidency’s war-making powers 
restricted by Congress (WPA, 1973) but the public was less than disposed to put American 
soldiers in harm’s way. In Saddam Hussein’s invasion o f Kuwait, George Bush was 
presented with an ideal opportunity for the US to demonstrate its military might and deter 
any eventual challengers to its newly consolidated hegemony. For this to be a successful 
undertaking, Bush and some o f his closest advisers had to propose clear goals, a precise 
estimate of the duration and o f the resources needed to achieve them and the establishment 
of an international coalition who would share some o f the financial and military costs of the 
operation (Summers Jr., 1992: 18). Along with amassing public support, the iteration of 
clear political and strategic aims suggested that the administration did not want to repeat the 
mistakes of the Vietnam War. As Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. attested, the president 
explained the US’ political objectives ‘at every opportunity.’ These were; the immediate 
withdrawal o f Iraqi troops from Kuwaiti territory, the restoration o f Kuwait’s sovereignty, 
the pursuit o f stability and security in the Gulf and the protection of American nationals 
abroad (1992: 18). On August the second 1990, president Bush declared a national 
emergency to ‘address the threat to national security and foreign policy of the United States 
posed by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq’ (Bush, 1990). Reliant on the commander in 
ch iefs authority to declare war in section II of the constitution, the president sent 230 000 
US troops to Saudi Arabia (operation Desert Shield) as a pre-emptive measure. At that 
point, some members of Congress started to question the legality o f the operation and 
vowed to prevent further presidential actions without the explicit authorization of Congress.
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But it wasn’t long before war was declared by a near unanimous congress and an 
acquiescent American public.
The production o f an assenting political body through the establishment o f the legality, 
moral legitimacy and instrumentality o f the war showed signs o f a renewal of the 
government’s capacity for leadership and responsibility. The relative ease with which the 
country accepted to go to war prompted Bush’s to affirm that the US had finally ‘kicked the 
Vietnam Syndrome.’ Beyond the traditional strategic and economic motivations o f Bush’ 
war making cabinet, however, lay a tremendous discursive effort which sought to convince 
the American public as well as the international community o f the legitimacy o f an armed 
intervention. As David Campbell attests, it was the ‘political discourse o f moral certitude 
that mobilized the coalition led by the United States’ (1993: 17). In a string of efforts to 
characterize the threat at hand, Bush proclaimed that Saddam was ‘worse than Hitler.’ 
American legislators insisted that any hesitation to confront the tide of evil conjured up by 
this crazed and irrational tyrant could prove fatal. Along with the traditional distinctions 
between good and evil, right and wrong, rational and irrational, the construction of a 
consensual national response depended on the almost unequivocal support of the US media. 
A large number o f antiwar protests were unreported and journalists had very limited access 
to the battlefields in Kuwait and Iraq.51 The American intervention in the Gulf was 
channelled, perpetuated and performed through discursive rituals which constructed a 
unified narrative o f legitimate retribution. By the same token, alternative narratives were 
practically shut down. Perhaps still riding the wave of Ronald Reagan’s patriotic 
exhortations, Americans seemed pre-disposed to validate the principles which they 
associated with their national identity both forcefully and confidently.
In Baudrillard’s view, the Gulf War was the first war to be ‘conducted legally and globally 
with a view of putting an end to war and liquidating any confrontation likely to threaten the 
hence-forward unified system o f control’ (1995: 84). By organizing and leading the 
international coalition, the US claimed its responsibility as the guardian of a unitary system 
of rule. This role could not only be developed through force but through ‘the production of 
international juridical norms’ which would perpetuate the US’ hegemonic status (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000: 180). One of the principle juridical norms invoked in the discursive 
justification of the American response was of course sovereignty. Through resolution 670,
51 There abundant literature on this question but for the best accounts see; Morrison (1992), Muller (1994) and 
Taylor (1998).
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the UN sanctioned the use of force against Iraq primarily because of its infringement of the 
territorial and political integrity o f one of its members. Sovereignty was then still being 
presented as the primary condition for a secure and ethical form of life. As David Campbell 
notes, this obstinate reassertion of sovereignty in political discourse was pursued ‘in an 
environment where it was (and is) constantly challenged, transgressed, erased, and 
reinscribed’ (Campbell, 1993: 80). The violation of sovereignty as a cause for intervention 
still appeared to carry more weight than a universal ethics based on human rights. However, 
to consolidate their case, the US also appealed to an emerging international order bounded 
by liberal democratic values which corresponded with its own plight. Bush told a joint 
session of Congress before the Gulf War that ‘the crisis in the Persian G ulf... offer(ed) a 
rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation ... and opened the way 
for the UN Security Council to operate as its founders had envisioned’ (in Mann, 2004: 
194). The intervention of an international coalition in the Gulf seemed to announce the fate 
of a global system of rules enforced by an American world police. Again, this new world 
order was being imposed not solely through force but through ‘the virtual violence of 
consensus’ (Beaudrillard, 1995: 84). Untroubled by the potential tensions between 
particularistic and universal interests, the post cold war narrative conjured up a hopeful 
rhetoric which sought to create a unified notion of humanity around the precepts of security, 
prosperity and justice. Those who flaunted those requirements ran the risk of being excluded 
and disciplined. For example, as Beaudrillard cogently expressed; one the Gulf War’s 
‘crucial stake ... (was) the reduction of Islam to the global order.’ The goal was ‘to 
domesticate it, by whatever means: modernization, even military, politisation, nationalism, 
democracy, the Rights of Man, anything at all to electrocute the resistances and the 
symbolic challenge that Islam represents for the entire West’ (1995: 85).
Despite talk o f a new world order, both Bush and Clinton were to careful not to substitute 
US national interest for universal interest in too obvious a manner. Both presidents were 
inclined to prudent coalition building and careful, especially in Clinton’s case, not to 
overextend American commitments abroad. American-led interventions were often made on 
a highly selective basis (Iraq was not the only country threatening its neighbour’s 
sovereignty) and after much deliberation (Bosnia). For the most part, US leaders in the 
1990’s were content to facilitate the extension of a market rationality unto emerging 
networks o f global governance. However, a group of neoconservative policy advisers made 
up of Wolfowitz, Cheney, Perle and Rumsfeld, to name but the most famous, were 
beginning to elaborate a more aggressive strategy to promote American interests and values
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abroad and to deter any potential challengers to the US’ rightful hegemony. As will be made 
clear in the next chapter, the foreign policy ideas expressed in documents like the Defense 
Planning Guidance in 1992 and the Project for a New American Century in 1997 came to 
prominence after the attacks of September 11.
Conclusion
In the 1990’s, it was no longer solely a matter o f ensuring one’s own material and spiritual 
benefit but to reconnect with collective endeavours and to do good in the community. After 
the fairly drastic reshuffling of individual and institutional roles in the 1980’s, governance 
was being reengineered according to the ethical identifications of individuals, some of 
which reached beyond local and national contexts. New governmental arrangements strove 
to involve citizens in government, to make them participate even further in their own 
subjection and regulation. Volunteers and non-profit organizations swelled the ranks o f self­
managed, ethically-inclined agencies of authority. Concurrently to this ethical turn, more 
aspects o f subjectivity such as personal tastes and opinions were readily included into 
governmental calculations. Knowledge about consumer’s habits, sexual preferences, 
political opinions and sub-cultural affiliations was garnered through increasingly 
sophisticated surveys and data collection techniques. The further colonization o f the 
individual soul through the mediums of advanced liberal societies was supplemented by a 
debate around the sources o f morality and the practical means to enforce it. Having both 
questioned the social and cultural consequences o f neoliberal government, communitarians 
and neoconservatives each proposed solutions to overturn the seemingly apathetic, confused 
and isolated dispositions o f the American people. A look at the AFDC’s demise in 1995- 
1996 shows that concrete welfare reforms did reflect both sets of concerns. While 
community organizations and private agencies were getting more and more involved in the 
provision of welfare, certain pieces of legislation conveyed authoritative judgements on 
moral matters. On the whole, in spite o f the ethical inroads in the delivery of particular 
social services, the large majority o f welfare recipients were compelled to work at some 
point or the other. What’s more, the now established standards o f competition and 
administrative efficiency were imposing additional requirements on both welfare recipients 
and service providers. On the foreign assistance front, USAID reforms showed that the 
stringent criteria of managerial efficiency informing aid programs were combined with a 
further displacement o f managerial and decisional responsibilities.
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The multiplication of efficiency-driven and ethically-oriented governmental agencies could 
also be observed in international relations. After the fall o f the Soviet Union, many 
countries subscribed to the protocols of advanced liberal government and individual citizens 
as much local and national institutions were integrated in a number o f monitoring and 
facilitating schemes in cooperation with international bodies. An increasing variety of 
international organizations helped to establish national objectives around good governance, 
transparency, environmental laws and local democracy. Standardized processes of political 
and economic interaction were gaining ground across the globe and outlined the beginnings 
o f a global kind of liberal govemmentality. In such a context, the precedence of state power 
seemed to be receding. In general, US foreign policy in the 1990’s mainly sought to 
facilitate the extension of standards of liberal governance. Clinton’s rhetoric, although 
expectedly laudatory o f American values, was rarely sustained by aggressive discourses or 
military enterprises. However, with Bush senior’ intervention in the Gulf in 1991, there 
were signs of a will to enforce international norms, prompting some commentators to argue 
that America was simply ensuring its position as leader of the new global liberal order. 
Expressions o f sovereign power were therefore still actual not only in the decision to go to 
war but also in the discursive categorizations that led to its legitimization. These 
manifestations were also noticeable in the objectification of drug addiction, welfare 
dependency and divorce as deviant and threatening modes o f subjectivity. In 2001, an 
unexpected event only intensified the legitimacy o f state power.
In chapter five, I argued that a combination o f neoconservative and neoliberal standards of 
rule compelled individuals to abide by stricter notions o f responsibility. This disciplinary 
turn, concomitant with the demise of the welfare state, became a lasting criterion for 
governmental operation. Throughout the 1980’s and the 1990’s, expectations o f minimal 
state assistance for all were replaced by expectations o f increased self-reliance. In this 
chapter, I maintained that a critical assessment of what was seen as an excessive concern for 
self-realization introduced ethical questions within the neoliberal rationality of government. 
The diffusion of responsibility for both productivity and ethical conduct that followed the 
downfall o f the welfare state led to the emergence of a multiplicity of self-governing 
agencies. As I will show in the next chapter, the security measures initiated in the aftermath 
o f 9/11 worked alongside and through the various agencies endowed with moral and 
administrative authority.
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Chapter 7:
Security and Government after 9/11
Introduction
So far, I have detailed the ideational and practical formulation o f the specific roles and 
responsibilities pertaining to welfare recipients and developing countries receiving 
assistance. This has enabled me to draw out some of the main constituents o f responsible 
citizenship and individual efficiency across various policy realms. Pursuing my initial 
intention to examine the various forms of power ranging from biopolitics to executive 
power and in keeping with their historical emergence and particular visibility at any given 
time, this chapter is concerned with the ways in which the security problematique 
introduced by 9/11 has integrated and perpetuated advanced liberal forms o f governance. 
The combination of power in the post 9/11 seems to lean more clearly towards the executive 
usurpation of law and a greater involvement of sovereign authorities in assessing security 
concerns. Although the thesis argues that sovereign power is actual through a great variety 
o f moments and instances in recent American history, the particular salience o f security 
practices and the ways in which they have been reconfigured in the last 8 years, is a 
development that cannot be overlooked. This chapter is then concerned with emerging 
expressions o f sovereign power in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and the ways in 
which they relate to law, government and discipline.
Up to this point, the examples of welfare and foreign assistance programs have not 
presented major problems for the application o f govemmentality; the transformations, 
continuities, intensifications or reversals identified in the basic conceptualizations and 
techniques o f governance have shown striking similarities. Looking at the way in which 
forms of governance have been alternatively dominant, criticized, supplemented, 
reformulated and replaced in the American governance o f the past 40 years, it appears that 
the increasing normalization of society has transformed political problems into management 
issues and that political alternatives have been successfully integrated almost as soon as 
they have emerged. Despite the continuing influence of neoconservatism as a governmental 
corrective and an ideal o f subjectivity, the fluctuating but steady movement o f integration 
showed in the previous chapters seems to have gone undisturbed. Although actual through 
the intentional disciplining and exclusion o f particular individuals as well as the waging of
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presidential powers in foreign policy ventures, sovereign power participates less and less in 
the formation o f complex subjectivities.
However, we could rightfully ask if the events o f 9/11 have introduced a novel element in 
the usual configuration of sovereignty, discipline and govemmentality. In this chapter, I 
contend that the executive’s suspension o f the ‘normal’ operation o f law in the form of 
exceptional security measures and extra legal spaces of detention (not seen since the Second 
World War) has marked a sharp turn as to the role and visibility of sovereign power. As I 
will show, this development announces a novel combination of governmental, disciplinary 
and sovereign power. It also suggests, as I argue here, a more restrictive definition of 
subjectivity through the control of emotional reactions and political outcomes after the 
attacks of 9/11.
In the temporal and spatial interstice between the event and its appropriation through 
revised governmental plans, there was a decision in the name o f the survival of the state and 
the values o f which it was a symbol that govemmentality could not have accounted for. This 
moment was one of the sovereign’s interpretation as to what had happened, what were the 
common values of the nation, what now constituted a threat and what kind of retributive 
action was appropriate. The constitution of the biopolitical order was no longer simply 
facilitated but dictated. Momentarily obliterating the self-perpetuating motions of 
biopolitics, sovereign power extracted itself from both law and norm to establish temporary 
and ‘exceptional’ security measures as permanent. The decision to fix security parameters 
was enabled by powerful discursive injunctions and was eventually conveyed within the 
pre-existing modalities o f government through community. This mode of security extended 
itself from a domestic to a foreign policy context. In the first place, the US government put 
in motion a series of legal changes to manage the risk of terrorism which included extended 
surveillance and decisional powers. Linking national security with regime change in Iraq, 
the administration also opted for an armed invasion, which was followed by a reconstruction 
effort mobilizing a great variety of transnational actors. In both the domestic and foreign 
policy realms, the fabrication o f coherent responses to the attacks, such as the reassertion of 
national unity and the legitimation of security measures, depended heavily on forceful 
discursive performances.
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1. Law, Security and Surveillance: the USAPATRIOT ACT
The US government’s response to the attacks on New York was swift and decisive. The 
only interpretation that stood was that the US had been the victim of an unprovoked attack 
by what were likely to be Islamic fundamentalists. It was therefore necessary to take 
exceptional steps to ensure the security of American citizens and to avenge (Walker, 2003:
64) those who had died in the two towers. At home, these measures included extending the 
power o f a variety of law agencies to apprehend individuals that they deemed suspicious. 
Usual limitations of the state’s ability to surveil and prosecute individuals were substantially 
relaxed and the legal language pertaining to suspicion and terrorism was deliberately vague 
and inclusive. Law effectively became subordinate to the imperative o f high level security 
and the normal subjectifying processes o f the citizenry were temporarily interrupted to be 
eventually reoriented according to new priorities. The reorganization o f the governmental 
map after 9/11 included the increased use of technologies o f identification to monitor and 
categorize specific individuals often on the basis of specific racial characteristics. This 
marked a shift in how the offender is conceptualized. As Hudson argues, ‘the classification 
o f suspected terrorists fits within a wider net, cast to identify offenders by risk values rather 
than addressing them as rational actors’ (Hudson, 2003:42) which can rehabilitated. Since 
the threat of terrorism was difficult if not impossible to quantify, it conferred a potentially 
limitless mandate to increase the state’s knowledge o f individual activities. The 
instrumentalist and legalistic nature o f the government’s response also implied that a 
political approach, that is a problematization of the causes and possible responses to the 
attacks, was altogether excluded. The sovereign’s hand could thus be clearly seen in the 
exclusion of particular individuals from the socio-political realm, the modification and 
suspension of law, the extension of security to an increasing array o f daily activities and, 
finally, in the choice of unitary interpretations and technical responses over political means 
throughout its dealings with terrorism. This section aims to expose some of the ways in 
which the sovereign deployed and normalized security measures on the basis on 
‘necessity.’52
After the attacks, the American executive branch then swiftly enacted measures that 
facilitated the identification and apprehension of terrorist suspects. Means of surveillance 
and identification as well as legislative changes were extended to several areas of daily life
52 As Agamben remarks, the theory of necessity ‘is a theory o f exception. It is the particular case where the 
law does not apply... It does not occur as an objective given, it clearly entails a subjective judgment, and the 
only circumstances that are necessary and objective are those that are declared so’ (Agamben, 2005:25,30).
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and government. Concretely, the immediate assessment o f the US government after 9/11 
was that security systems had failed because of a lack of communication between 
intelligence agencies and of the lack of access to information held by a great variety of 
public and private sources. New departments such as Homeland Security were then set up to 
coordinate intelligence agencies, and legislation such as the USA PATRIOT ACT was 
adopted to facilitate access to private communications, records and documents. The 
gathering of data on particular individuals also required the modernization of border control 
and surveillance technologies and the relaxation o f legal restrictions to do with investigating 
and prosecuting suspects.
The USA PATRIOT ACT mainly consists in the modernization of existing surveillance and 
security technologies in view of increasing the ability o f intelligence agencies to access 
information such as financial records, electronic communications and telephone calls. In 
parallel, new biometric and face recognition technologies, aiming to better identify 
individuals moving in and out of US borders, have also been devised and tested.53 As David 
Lyon advances, the effect o f these newly expanded surveillance technologies is less to 
‘anticipate violence than to increase the stock o f available information’ (2003: 37). It is a 
matter o f debate among security experts whether the collection of data on an increasingly 
large number o f American and foreign citizens is more effective than the improvement of 
intelligence-gathering on specific leads and suspects. Nonetheless, it can be said that the US 
government’s pursuit of security since 9/11 has largely been premised upon a kind of 
‘generalized suspicion’ as opposed to intensified intelligence work on particular cases. 
Several legislators and civil liberties groups have criticized wide-ranging governmental 
initiatives such as the Total Information Awareness (TIA) programme, which basically 
intended to have the entire American population on computer dossiers.54 These criticisms 
actually resulted in the termination of funding for several federal initiatives o f this kind, 
most o f them grouped under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 
Some experts also deplored that the categorization and discrimination programmed into the 
computerized systems of identification that are currently being used, funded and developed, 
is often conducted without oversight by human agents and can therefore lead to more 
mistakes and arbitrary classifications. Furthermore, the majority of technologies such as
53 On these improvements, particularly in the case of biometrics, see Kelly Gates’ article Identifying The 
'Faces O f Terror' (2006: 417-418).
54 On November 14,2002 the New York Times published a column by William Safire in which he claimed 
"[TIA] has been given a $200 million budget to create computer dossiers on 300 million Americans."131 
http://www.nytimes.eom/2002/l l/14/opinion/14SAFI.html)
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inkless fingerprinting devises and digital photography, which are the main instruments for 
entry systems like US VISIT, have been much more effective at identifying and intercepting 
criminals than terrorists. This means that legislation and technological advances formally 
directed at preventing terrorism are now widely used for other purposes, most notably crime 
and border control. Whilst surveillance tools have been developing steadily over the past 30 
years, their use has always been limited by strict legislative guidelines. After 9/11, subtle 
alterations in the latter’s formulation have allowed considerably more license to law 
enforcement agencies.
Initially, title III o f the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, allowed 
warrantless federal surveillance for matters concerning national security but did allow it for 
those concerning criminal activity. Following the government’s abuses during the 1960’s 
and 70’, the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act specified that wiretaps could not 
take place without a warrant if the ‘primary purpose’ o f the investigation was not proven to 
be the collection o f foreign intelligence information. However, under the same act, the 
President could still authorize warrantless wiretaps when national security was deemed 
under threat. Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT ACT amended the FISA in the following 
way; a federal investigator no longer has to demonstrate that the purpose o f surveillance is 
to obtain foreign intelligence information, it is now enough to say that the ‘significant 
purpose’ (of which a definition is not provided) of an investigation is to obtain such 
information. The risk is that both intelligence and law enforcement agents will submit and 
be granted applications for electronic surveillance of criminal as opposed to foreign 
intelligence investigations. As Lawyer Sharon H. Rackow argues, it is the language used in 
the PATRIOT ACT which is likely affect the daily lives of millions of Americans (2002: 
1680).
On the whole, it is the legislative changes around the investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist suspects that have generated the most controversy. On the basis of ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ that terrorist activity is taking place, local or federal authorities can now 
investigate and request personal data (commercial transactions, travel bills, library dossiers, 
etc) without a court order. The ACT also allows the government to confiscate the assets of 
foreign terrorist organizations, terrorists themselves and those who aid them. Section 412, 
one o f the more debated provisions o f the Act, widens the grounds for ‘deeming’ an alien 
inadmissible to or deportable from the US for terrorist activity. This means that aliens who 
are ‘believed’ to pose a serious threat to national security by the attorney general or the
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commissioner of immigration are to be detained for an undisclosed period o f time or 
deported.55 Finally, it pledges to strengthen criminal laws and increase penalties for those 
suspected of being involved in terrorist activities. Importantly, the expansion of the means 
to apprehend suspects, whether discursive or technical, rests on a new definition of 
terrorism that now includes all ‘groups that have used or threatened to use violence for 
political ends.’56 An individual who is contributing financially or in some cases vaguely 
associated with any of the campaigns or members of the above institutions is likely to be
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arrested. This broadens the scope for the identification and investigation of ‘suspicious 
activity’ and ‘suspicious individuals’ in a significant way and leaves discretionary powers 
and potential abuses in the hands o f not only federal but also law enforcement agencies. One 
o f such abuses was the targeting o f citizens and especially non-citizens o f a particular 
religious and ethnic background (Muslim and Middle Eastern). In the year following the 
attacks, as many as 2000 detentions of predominantly Muslim nationals and non-nationals 
took place, often without charges or justifications. Again, this clearly contravenes to proper 
judicial procedures (Chang, 2002: 67, 70, 77).
As Judith Butler remarks, the suspension o f standard legal procedures and the changes in 
legislative language do not in themselves constitute the exceptional circumstance, they 
rather are ‘the means by which the exceptional becomes established as a naturalized norm’ 
(2003: 67). Presumably subtle modifications to texts of law and circumventions of 
constitutional rights expose the use of law as an instrument that can be modified, directed or 
overturned on the basis of self-justified necessities and subjective judgments. Indeed, this 
rewriting o f the law effectively invests governmental bureaucrats with ‘an extraordinary 
power over life and death’ (2003: 59), by allowing them to determine how long someone 
may be detained or if he or she is to be deported or exonerated. It also validates the 
official’s subjective sense that someone ‘may’ be dangerous and the power o f this same 
official to act upon his or her suspicion.
The great majority of works analyzing the security failings before 9/11 and producing 
recommendations to improve it for the future (including the 9/11 Commission) share the
55 However, Vermont’s democratic senator Patrick Leahy was able to negotiate some restrictions and 
protections.
56 This includes a wide range of organizations that can be put on file such as pro-life lobbies, the African 
National Congress, academic dissenters, anti-globalization and anti-war protesters.
57 On this see Cole (2003: 38). See also Mutiner (2007 160-162).
178
same assumptions. First, they recognize that the Federal government’s efforts toward 
national security are for the most part correct and that technological and administrative 
efficiency are the surest means to preserve the United States from further attacks. If some of 
these reports express concerns about civil liberties and the right to privacy, they generally 
suggest that the creation of more committees, audits and oversights can help provide the 
necessary balance between liberty and security. In the same spirit, they argue that automated 
surveillance and the collection o f personal information should be monitored and decided 
upon by human beings. As one commentator noted, summing up the US government’s 
rationale in the face of the events; ‘US security depends on being smarter’ (Steinberg: 49 in 
Northouse, 2006). The discursive emphasis on a unitary interpretation to the attacks 
contributed to occlude the presentation, discussion and adoption of alternative political 
strategies, but it also laid the grounds to legitimize the executive’s reliance on both law and 
expertise (Rose and Valverde, 1998: 550). Terrorism is construed as an unavoidable, 
potentially ceaseless and unquantifiable phenomenon that requires continual legal and 
technical modifications. As Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goede argue; ‘the dilemmas of 
war on terror (are) being framed as problems of risk management or, more specifically, as 
uncertainties that can be resolved via information technologies’ (2005: 139). The very 
notion that an attack is difficult if  not impossible to predict requires that all the possible 
discrepancies and vulnerabilities within the infrastructural, technological and legal 
apparatuses relating to terrorist acts be identified and remedied. This means that an 
increasing array of daily activities have to be incorporated within a dispositif o f risk further
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developed by the war on terror. It has become apparent that everything from crime control 
to travelling, shopping and library use is being invested with increasingly sophisticated 
technologies of control, whose operation is facilitated by new legal provisions.
However, the extension of surveillance was partly enabled by individual citizens agreeing 
that security be improved and widened. It is not only a matter for the sovereign authority to 
impose and use fear as a means to govern; stricter security measures are seen as legitimate 
by genuinely fearful Americans. Accordingly, the responsibility to extend security can be 
assumed by willing individuals. The US government encouraged such initiative by, for 
example, granting 1.9 million dollars to an array o f Neighbourhood Watches across the 
country. Participants were offered training to detect suspicious individuals in their own
58 Risk management is an integral part of advanced liberal strategies of government and has been studied by 
many scholars interested in govemmentality such as Pat O’Malley (2004), Francois Ewald (1990), Jacques 
Donzelot (1977), Claudia Aradau and Reus Van Munster (2007).
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neighbourhoods (Lyon, 2003: 57). In addition, many professions relating to public security 
were created and Americans enlisted by the tens of thousands. Particular emotional states 
were being given institutional outlets and rendered productive; ‘if  Americans are busy 
helping to guard our waters resources, dams, borders, airports, and other vital public 
resources and spaces, they will transform their nagging anxieties into socially productive 
activities’ (Etzioni, 2003: Xvi). Along with many other public officials, the famed 
Communitarian writer Emitai Etzioni saw in these manifestations the expression o f a 
newfound civic responsibility. However, the public-mindedness and civic duty that Etzioni 
is talking about has more to do with assuaging fear through security-oriented tasks than with 
participating in a political dialogue as to the content and limits o f security measures that 
affect each individual citizen.
The re-authorization o f the PATRIOT ACT in 2005 has extended surveillance powers to 
domains other than foreign intelligence such as smuggling, drug trafficking and crime. This 
suggests that a large portion of the legislative and technological changes instated after 9/11 
have been normalized and will endure. The increasing use and development o f sophisticated 
diagrams and technologies to ordain and tame future insecurities is an indication that 
contemporary governments rely primarily on technical means to resolve problems such as 
crime and terrorism. So far, the governmental response to 9/11 has demonstrated that the 
improvement of data-collection methods is a solution that is largely preferred to a socio­
political understanding and management of violence. Clearly, the constitution of a secure 
and unitary interpretation was essential to the US’ government’s rationale, which can be 
formulated as the undisputable necessity to ‘defeat’ terror. Technical solutions are evidently 
more effective when there are few doubts about the legitimacy of their purpose. As former 
Attorney General John Ashcroft once said to senator Patrick Leahy, with rather Schmittian 
accents; ‘talk won’t stop terrorism.’ This way of understanding and practicing security 
intentionally precludes both the political nature the US’ relationship with the rest o f the 
world and a discussion on the bounds of legitimate governmental action at home. This is not 
to say that critical arguments have not been presented by academics, legislators themselves 
or private citizens or that provisions limiting the power o f the executive to collect 
information have not been obtained, but to insist that technical solutions and unitary 
interpretations have been overwhelmingly applied to matters such as security, which have 
difficult but vitally important political implications.
180
What is most striking about post 9/11 governance has been the surprising ability of the 
central state, in a time where government is said to operate from a respectful distance to 
momentarily regroup diverse centres o f authority and information. This capacity for rapid 
mobilization, organization and decision makes a strong case for the permanence of state 
power after the much touted globalization thesis of the 1990’s.
2. Governance through community after 9/11
As we have seen in chapter six, the 1990’s saw the emergence o f a new form of governance. 
This governmental reason posited the individual as morally responsible and self-interested. 
Through a variety o f inducements produced and reproduced by cultural and political agents, 
he or she was endowed with a capacity for self-discipline and to appraise the risks and 
benefits involved in social life. This form of subjectivity was linked to the general critique 
of an overzealous application o f neoliberal political philosophy through the 1980’s. 
Manifestations o f self-interested individualism generated cultural and administrative 
problems which were put through the critical lens of novel and reflexive governmental 
standards. The latter standards combined the neoliberal distrust for the state after the 
apparent failure of the welfare model with a renewed concern for excessive individualism 
and widening inequalities. As we have seen, this was translated in the revival of ethical 
associations like the family, of civic involvement in issue based organizations and more 
generally, o f involvement in activities not directly related to the state or the private sector. 
These ethical associations were identified as units that can govern themselves and generate 
socially productive behaviour. Their work is done in parallel and more often than not, in 
collaboration with the state. In the aftermath of 9/11, there was a desire among Americans 
to know more about politics and government, to get more involved in community networks 
and public service careers and to strengthen emotional bonds with friends, families and 
lovers. Although it has done so only in a limited way, the US government channelled this 
newfound energy by providing more opportunities for individuals wanting to participate in 
ethical community schemes. This section aims to show the extent to which emotional 
reactions to 9/11 were integrated in political discourse and contemporary forms of 
governance.
Clearly, the events of 9/11 provoked a surge in demonstrations of solidarity, both at the 
emotional and institutional levels. The importance of relationships (love, friendship and 
family life) was underlined in many accounts of how the tragedy was experienced. As Joan
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Ford, responding to an online NBC survey, says; ‘having children brings you back to the 
basics, back to the essence of life, back to what’s really important_ just as September 11 
did_ but more than anything, children give you hope, which is something we all desperately 
need after 9/11 ’ (MSNBC.com, 2007). Another respondent, Martha Ott Jennings, said this; 
‘the events made me launch into an ‘email and call everyone you care about’ mode just to 
say I cared and to make sure all were alright. I also emailed my high school sweetheart, 
whom I had not seen or spoken to in over 30 years. That one email precipitated a 4.5 year 
unbelievably romantic and tumultuous affair with him. We both felt so vulnerable after 
9/11, and like so many people, felt that life was too short to not act upon such strong 
feelings’ (MSNBC.com, 2007). O f course, the media played a crucial role in constituting 
collective grief by diffusing either the personal accounts of the friends and families of the 
victims or of how the tragedy was experienced by individuals across the country. Faced 
with the fragility of life, ordinary Americans seemed to be making bold choices and to be 
returning to what really mattered; love, family and friendship. The myriad o f individual 
stories brought into the public realm contributed to a unified narrative of grief. Highly 
subjective experiences can be here recuperated in official discourse and made politically 
productive. George W. Bush’s urged his fellow Americans to ‘love a neighbor, mentor a 
child, go see shut-ins. Tell somebody you love them on a daily basis’ (Americorps website). 
The government emotionally identified with the people and proposed means to express its 
inclinations in a way that would be profitable for the ensemble of society.
Analysts (Putnam 2002, Skocpol 2002, John and Mary Kirlin 2002) surveying the history of 
civic engagement in the US found that if Americans were feeling more compassionate, 
responsible and emotionally responsive after the attacks, popular participation in 
community organizations and social clubs did not increase substantially. On the one hand, 
this new attitude translated a heightened interest in politics and government and a desire to 
volunteer in local and federal initiatives. On the other, as Putnam and Skocpol note, the 
American people’s favourable attitude towards the government and greater will to get 
involved in public affairs did not actually result in a proportional involvement in local and 
federal initiatives. What’s more, the visible increases in forms of civic behaviour such as 
contributing to charities, donating blood and volunteering were concentrated on relief 
operations for 9/11 victims and their families. More than 70% percent o f Americans were 
said to have given some of their time or money to the cause. Yet, such demonstrations were 
seen by many legislators as an opportunity to extend civic inclinations to other matters. In 
the 2002 state of the Union address, a speech usually concerned with bread and butter
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issues, President Bush highlighted the possibilities involved in the revival of community 
spirit and encouraged the extension of compassion and responsibility to other domains of 
domestic life; ‘September the 11th brought out the best in America, and the best in 
Congress... Now Americans deserve to have this same spirit directed toward addressing 
problems here at home’ (Bush, January 29,2002: 3). Republican senator John McCain also 
noted that the times were ripe to provide institutional outlets to convey this renewed sense 
of national purpose. As McCain says; ‘public service is a virtue. This is the right moment to 
issue a new call to service and give a new generation a way to claim the rewards and 
responsibilities o f active citizenship’ (in Etzioni, 2003: 136).
Federal initiatives such as the Freedom Corps, created in 2002 by President Bush, generated 
new organizational channels for ‘the countless acts of service, sacrifice, and generosity that 
followed September 11th.’ The USAFC’s states that its mission is to create ‘a culture of 
service, citizenship, and responsibility in America.’ The program essentially aims to provide 
more opportunities to volunteer and to increase collaboration between governmental 
agencies and non-profit organizations (Freedom Corps, 2002). On July 3rd 2003, President 
Bush signed the Strengthen AmeriCorps Program Act, (A program which was created by 
Bill Clinton in 1994) which nearly doubled the number of volunteers and administrators in 
the organization. AmeriCorps’ objective is to ‘provide grants to public and nonprofit 
organizations that sponsor service programs around the country, including hundreds of 
faith-based and community organizations, higher education institutions, and public 
agencies. Grants assist these groups in recruiting, training and placing AmeriCorps 
members to meet critical community needs in education, public safety, health, and the 
environment’ (AmeriCorps, 2003). Where the federal government cannot adequately 
support individual citizens and local communities, it can nonetheless encourage local 
participation and self-governance by allocating dynamic volunteers to strategically chosen 
organizations. AmeriCorps volunteers do everything from ‘tutoring and mentoring youth’ to 
‘assisting crime victims, building homes, and restoring parks’ and are expected to motivate 
and train other volunteers and community workers. However, if  initiatives like AmeriCorps 
and Freedom Corps appear to convey the leanings o f civic-minded individuals, the space in 
which such a spirit can be expressed is often strictly regimented. Even if  it does so from a 
distance, the state has a powerful influence on the content of voluntary work and the 
behaviour of its convenors, not least because it chooses to allocate funding to the more 
competitive programs. The increasing array of delocalised centres o f authority which carry 
out governmental tasks, from large corporations to individuals themselves, are all aware, or
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made aware, o f their own responsibilities through strict directives and performance 
standards.
Ultimately, 9/11 presented the US government with the potentiality of increased civic 
involvement, but the latter’s effort to re-invigorate existing civil society channels was not as 
extensive as some might have expected. In fact, most of the president’s public addresses 
rather encouraged Americans to shop, travel, and go about their daily lives as normally as 
possible rather than to get directly involved in public affairs. Following the disastrous 
intervention in Iraq and the increasingly distant memory of 9/11, polls taken in 2005 and 
2006 show that the patriotic fever and the surge of involvement in community schemes have 
died down (CNN, 2007). The kind of civic engagement that has taken place in the aftermath 
o f 9/11 has more to do with a proliferation of exchanges between highly professional agents 
and agencies than between individuals deciding to form their own clubs, discussion groups 
or neighbourhood associations (Skocpol, 2002). In general, participation in ethical projects 
is likely to involve joining a non-governmental organization that must be at once 
recognized, accredited and coordinated by one or more state agencies. It is arguable whether 
the state would actually want to see the development of a genuine civic culture, which 
would not necessarily be conducive to prevalent state and governmental requirements.
Most o f the above examples show that the main paradigms of advanced liberalism and 
governance through community go rather undisturbed after the events o f 9/11. On the 
whole, emotional reactions and changes in popular dispositions have been successfully 
identified and integrated to existing apparatuses o f power. It once again appears that in 
advanced liberal societies, government is flexible enough and disposes o f sufficient means 
and information to get into the citizens’ ‘soul’ (Rose, 1989), thereby facilitating the 
integration o f a wide array of reactions. Security measures and governmental strategies 
recuperating the individual proclivities for safety and compassion were also made possible 
by the discursive production of a unified narrative.
3. Discourse after 9/11
Discourse played an essential part in constituting both the emotional and political 
interpretations that led to enacting exceptional security measures at home and military 
actions abroad. In the immediate aftermath o f the catastrophe, there was a basic need to 
reaffirm the unity of the United States around the principles it espoused and around the grief
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and anger caused by the attacks. In order to be politically effective, the otherwise 
ambiguous and open-ended constructs of nationhood and freedom, whose integrity was said 
to be under threat, had be circumscribed and ‘decontested’ (Freeden, 1996). In the political 
discourse that followed 9/11, however, freedom and nationhood were rarely given 
substantive definitions, their effectiveness and coherence rather came from being endlessly 
reasserted in public mediums and from being put in contrast with what they are not. The 
diffusion o f dominant narratives was ensured through the political elite’s interpretations and 
existing cultural dispositions (Croft, 2006:9). The latter subjects were constituted by those 
narratives by actively integrating and perpetuating them. The ‘war on terror’ was more than 
a series of legislative changes and military actions; it was and still is a sphere of meaning in 
which retributive actions and exceptional security measures are constructed as legitimate by 
the subjects who devise and assent to them. Strategically, the ‘war on terror’ required the 
discursive construction and re-affirmation of the American population’s existence, the 
purpose and values that unified it, and the identification of the entity that was threatening it. 
The American national identity was endowed with particular character traits such as 
‘freedom-loving,’ ‘innocent’ and ‘peace-loving’ determined in their opposition to the traits 
of an enemy whom is ‘freedom-hating’ and ‘murderous.’ Through repetition and 
differentiation, the positive attributes o f that identity were extended through an intense 
validation of America’s own political and moral creed (Jackson, 2005). The enduring 
readiness o f the United States to protect itself and extend its articles of faith abroad has also 
necessitated a discursively enhanced awareness o f danger. As has been duly emphasized by 
poststructural International Relations scholars, threat is the single most important catalyst in 
the formation o f national identities. However, this readiness has also been fed by the 
constitution of an enduring feeling of grief and offence. The perpetuation o f the ‘war on 
terror’ has been relying heavily on the cultivation o f memory, o f the constant re-enactment 
of the atrocities and of the ensuing grief in the political present.
The intensity of mourning after 9/11, at once private, national and international, translated a 
particular estimation of life and of the ‘human,’ The lives of the victims and of the 
professionals involved in rescue operations were reconstituted through extensive individual 
profiling in the media, which detailed their hobbies, occupations, the names o f their family 
members, their wedding and graduation photos, etc.59 The pain and the grief caused by the 
attacks were not only related to the fact that ‘freedom’ and a ‘way of life’ had been
59 An example of portraits o f the victims can be found in the NY times’ online Portrait o f Grief. 
(http://www.nytimes.com/pages/national/portraits/index.html)
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attacked; it had also to do with the killing of innocent men and women with whom ‘we’ 
could easily identity. By being re-told and exposed through film, newspapers and television, 
lives and actions connected to 9/11 were given content and value. But as Butler warns, ‘we 
have to ask the conditions under which a grievable life is established and maintained, and 
through what logic of exclusion, what practice of effacement and denominalization’ (2004: 
38). Civilians who are losing their lives, showing heroism or enduring loss in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Palestine are not individualized, mourned and remembered in the same 
way as those who died or participated in rescue operations in the twin towers.
After 9/11, the sovereign requirements for national cohesion and security mobilized existing 
discursive resources with great effectiveness and intensity. Since my present purpose is to 
outline the interlinking operations of discourse and rationalities o f government rather than to 
provide a detailed study o f official discourse after 9/11,601 will limit myself to a mention of 
the main discursive spheres utilized and processed by governmental strategies. The first of 
these necessary discursive constructions is the appeal to national unity. In the face of 
despair and fear, the United States had to come together. Signs that read ‘we came over in 
different ships, but we’re in the same boat now,’ (in Silberstein, 2002:112) were put up on 
billboards across the country. America became a unified subject by engulfing all the 
struggles and alternative histories o f its various constituting ‘nations.’ People of all faiths 
and ethnic backgrounds were reunited in the same grief and shock. Second, an interpretation 
on the cause of the attacks had to be immediately provided; president Bush asserted that 
‘America was targeted for attack because it was the brightest beacon for freedom and 
opportunity... in the world’ (Bush, 2001). Bush depicts the United States as the most 
successful example of democratic capitalism and attests that it was attacked by an enemy 
whom is both jealous and resentful o f its success. This characterization further emphasizes 
the irrational and unjustified nature of the offence. Third, references to past historical events 
and demonstrations of leadership were reiterated in order to generate discursive continuities 
(Jabri, 1996) contributing to normalize the executive’s appropriation o f responsibility in 
cases o f emergency and to reassert nation’s courage, determination and unity in the face of 
danger. President Bush echoed the voice o f other American leaders in times war and strife; 
‘today we feel what Franklin Roosevelt called the warm courage o f national unity’ (Bush,
2001). Throughout the President’s addresses to the nation in the months that followed 9/11, 
there were also numerous references to the Cold War, Pearl Harbor and American
60 This has been done in much greater detail elsewhere see for example Silberstein (2002), Jackson (2005) and 
Croft (2006).
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involvement in the two great wars in order to recreate the resilience o f the United States in 
the face o f ruthless and amoral enemies. Fourth, the enemy is invariably represented as 
irrational and ‘evil’ because of its senseless hatred of freedom, peace and democracy. It is 
therefore not possible to engage politically with the terrorists as ‘they’ do not share ‘our’ 
normative and procedural frameworks. The only means to defeat those who operate outside 
of conventional frameworks is through extra legal and violent means. Fifth and last is the 
need to re-inscribe dominant narratives through discursive repetition as well as to discipline 
and circumscribe alternative interpretations, political strategies and narratives. Talking 
about the war in Afghanistan with Art Fleisher, former White House Press Secretary, an 
American television show host hinted that it was “us” (Americans) who were the 
‘cowards...staying in the airplane (when missiles) hit the building,’ to which Fleisher 
replied; ‘Americans should watch what they say, this is not a time for remarks like that’ 
(quoted in Chang, 2002: 93). Academic freedom was also restricted and watchdogs such as 
the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) (founded in 1995 by Dick Cheney’s 
wife Lynn), which supervise and guide higher education programs, produced a list of 
individuals that allegedly ‘blamed America first’ (Silberstein, 2002: 18, 127) in their 
lectures or publications. Accordingly to strategic objectives, the ‘war on terror’ also 
required alterations to political denominations and conventional understandings; importantly 
for the whole enterprise, what was effectively the pursuit o f a few individuals responsible 
for plotting and carrying out acts of terrorism was transformed into a ‘war,’ thereby 
increasing the need for exceptional security measures, military and technological resources 
and popular commitment. Admittedly, the above examples are all taken from the year that 
followed the attacks. Since the troublesome invasion of Iraq in particular, patriotic displays 
and calls to condemn and censor dissenting voices have become less forceful.
Even through the few examples stated above, it is easy to conceive o f a great variety of 
binary characterizations reproducing delimitated identities and interpretations. Ultimately, 
the latter discursive processes all provide the groundwork for what is ‘deemed’ necessary 
for the safety and well being of the American people. The sovereign’s definition of 
meaning, language and action after the terrorist attacks, itself chosen out o f a variety of 
other possible narratives inherent to America’s own cultural and political tradition (Jackson, 
2005), relies on discursive repetitions and differentiations and is intimately linked with 
basic modes of social, economic and cultural subjectivities aligned on governmental 
reasoning.
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4. American Foreign Policy after 9/11 and the Iraq War
After 9/11, the extension of neoliberal economics and of standards of ethical and effective 
governance characteristic of US foreign policy in the 1990’s was momentarily re-appraised. 
Without interrupting efforts towards making subjects of development more responsible and 
autonomous, more emphasis was put on strategies which would prevent further attempts on 
the security o f US citizens. In some sense, as Michael Dillon maintains, the war on terror 
launched and perpetuated by the United States only intensified the mechanisms of security 
that were already investing biopolitical life (Dillon, 2003: 3). However, the designation of 
the terrorist threat as subject to ‘a context of scientific uncertainty on the one hand and the 
possibility o f serious and irreversible damage on the other,’ to borrow from Francois Ewald 
(2002: 282), implied that the sovereign had considerable license to determine the extent to 
which the population should to be shielded from virtual, unquantifiable threats. Faced with 
imperfect expert evidence about risks to the population, sovereign authorities may well 
decide that any kind of risk is unacceptable, thereby warranting a greater degree o f control 
upon biopolitical fluxes. Here again, the ‘necessity’ of absolute security, embedded as it is 
in subjective expectations, presents itself as an inexorable logic that implicitly excludes 
political debate. After 9/11, the balance between government through freedom and 
government through security seemed to tip in favour of the latter. In the state o f exception 
which has been unfolding in the aftermath of the attacks, the usual means deployed to 
secure biopolitical processes, which rely on calculable risks, are no longer sufficient. The 
sovereign therefore claims responsibility to determine the extent of the threat and the 
strategies to prevent it. It appears that the Bush administration made the most of this 
opening by implementing technologies premised on generalized suspicion at home and by 
giving a forceful impetus to the ‘necessity’ of extending liberal democratic modes of 
government to a selection of rogue states. Some of Bush junior’s close foreign policy 
advisers argued that the projection of the American model abroad was one of the surest 
means to prevent the emergence of terrorism. Turned into a security issue, the extension of 
good governance could be seen as necessary and as legitimating the use of force.
This section will attempt to show how the decisions pertaining to national security have 
been integrated within the existing governmental make-up o f US foreign relations. In the 
first instance, I will look at the ideas which have fed into the re-assertion o f American 
values and the promotion of its institutions as a universally valid pre-emptive strategy. I 
argue that the foreign policy outlook of a younger generation o f neoconservatives like
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William Kristol, Robert Kagan, and others closer to the presidential office like Cheney and 
Rumsfeld, did have an influence on President Bush’s more muscular foreign policy, at least 
in its initial phases. Secondly, through looking at some of USAID’s reports and documents, 
I will try and determine how the war on terror was integrated into pre-existing projections of 
American govemmentality. The invasion of Iraq and the ensuing circulation of neoliberal 
rationales through the reconstruction effort serve as example o f the novel combinations 
between sovereign and biopolitical power.
4.1 Second Generation Neoconservatives and US Foreign Policy
By the late 1990’s, it was becoming apparent that a new generation of neoconservatives was 
replacing the old guard, made up o f people like Irving Kristol, Norman Podhorezt and 
Daniel Bell (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 99). In the wake o f the Soviet Union’s collapse, the 
original neoconservatives were suddenly deprived of their most feared and loathed enemy. 
Many o f them argued that the United States no longer had a reason to cast its military power 
abroad. Throughout the 1990’s, however, a group of dedicated officials and intellectuals 
began to devise a more unapologetic kind of internationalism. In the midst o f what they saw 
as the tepid consensus o f post cold war American foreign policy, William Kristol and 
Robert Kagan aired their views on what a conservative foreign policy should look like. 
They essentially argued that American hegemony was a good in itself, and one which had to 
be sustained through strong political leadership and increased military spending. Along with 
several others, they weaved a powerful institutional network, which included the PNAC and 
the American Enterprise Institute, in an attempt to convert Washington officials to their 
ideas. Neoconservatives essentially aimed to reignite political leaderships’ ability to 
command an appreciation among American citizens that ‘they have never had it so good’ 
(Kristol and Kagan, 1996: 22). Americans had to be reminded o f the inherent benevolence 
o f the value system which made their lives what they were and neoconservatives hoped that 
this recognition would translate into its active appreciation, promotion and defence. As 
Kristol an Kagan asserted, adding a complement to their peers’ gloomy diagnostic of 
contemporary American culture, ‘the remoralization o f American at home ultimately 
require(d) the remoralization o f American foreign policy’ (1996: 31).
Second generation neoconservatives then regarded ‘freedom’ as fundamentally undervalued 
by its main proponents and threatened by those countries who disregarded it. However, in 
order to be politically and morally effective, the definition of freedom could not confused
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with mere rights, nor could it be contaminated by ambiguity. For the sake of clarity, it 
should neither be given a specific content nor defined through political debate. In line with a 
kind o f Straussian noble lie, leaders who stood for what was right had to ‘defend verities so 
long accepted that they are no longer fully understood,’ they had to ‘routinely explain why 
certain ideas are right or wrong, and why the distinctions matter’ (Kristol in Dorrien, 2004: 
132). Political authorities were responsible to define the terms of political discourse. 
Beyond their technical and legalistic designations, freedom and democracy were 
unassailable metaphysical goods. Importantly, such a discursive strategy could provide the 
sovereign with powerful means to legitimize its own existence and its strategic choices 
without actually having to refer to the legal codification that usually bounds its operation. 
The role o f political leaders was then to render the importance o f freedom as a good which 
inspired selfless devotion and to educate ‘the citizenry to the responsibilities o f global 
hegemony’ (Kristol and Kagan, 1996: 26). In what seemed like an appreciative nod to pre­
modem martial republicanism, Kagan and Kristol also suggested expanding forms of 
‘reserve service’ to give Americans ‘an appreciation of military virtues’ as there ‘was no 
more profound responsibility than the defence of the nation and its principles’ (1996: 27). 
As an ideational and governmental force, this renewed, outward-looking neoconservatism 
invested political authority with the mission to inspire moral clarity and to produce a 
specific kind of citizen, who would be both appreciative o f moral principles and willing to 
defend them.
In the latter part of the 1990’s, neoconservatives already benefited from substantial financial 
backing and had put together an extensive institutional network. Conservative thinktanks 
like the Heritage foundation, the Hudson Institute, the American Enterprise Institutions, the 
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, the Center for Security Policy provided 
platforms for an exchange of views between various conservative factions on both domestic 
and foreign policy issues (Steinfels, 1979: 29). Reasonably influential in political circles, 
neoconservative intellectuals ‘spoke at congressional hearings, took an active role in the 
mainstream media discourse, sent open letters to the White House, published articles 
regularly in the major newspapers, and produced a stream of books’ (Halper and Clarke, 
2004:103). Resulting from Kagan and Kristol’s initiative, the Project for the New American 
Century (1997), signed by many intellectuals, military personnel and government officials 
with neoconservative sympathies, was put together. It main recommendations stressed the 
need to increase defence spending, restrain regimes hostile to American interests and values, 
promote political and economic freedom abroad and extend an international order friendly
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to the security and prosperity o f the United States. One o f project’s reports, Building 
America ’s Defenses (2000) manifested an acute anxiety about an American loss of military 
pre-eminence, attributed to President Clinton’s general ‘defense neglect’ (PNAC, 2000:4). 
Countries like Iraq, North Korea, Iran and even China had to be actively deterred from 
mounting a challenge to American power. As neoconservatives saw it, one of the ways to 
prevent such ambitions was to provide the respective civil societies of these countries with 
‘democratic freedoms and individual political rights’ (PNAC, 2000: 4). American foreign 
policy should then endeavour to bring about regime change in these zones o f tyranny. A 
universal order o f sameness, united in the practice o f liberal democratic values, would 
supposedly command the peaceful cooperation of all nations.
In the few months that followed the attacks, George W. Bush’s foreign policy initiatives 
showed distinctive neoconservative influences. The pre-fabricated moral certainty purported 
by neoconservatives seemed suited to the impatient and angry mood of the nation. The 
president presented a clear rationale for the projection o f American force abroad, often 
couched in aggressive, Manichean terms. A true commitment to defend national values had 
to be met by the means to defend them. In late 2001, the President called for a 48 billion 
increase in military spending, making national security his number one priority (Bush,
2002). However, arms were not the only means to repel terrorism. Bush expressed the 
conviction that ‘the advance of freedom (was) the surest strategy to undermine the appeal of 
terror in the world’ (Bush, 2002). The administration then deployed an all-embracing logic 
which confounded pre-emptive militarism with value-laden expansionism. In the face o f an 
unquantifiable threat not only to the United States, but to all who stood for goodness in this 
world, this logic was potentially boundless and government through security would likely 
become the norm for the foreseeable future. Because it was unknown, the terrorist threat 
was all the greater. As mentioned in the National Security Strategy of September 2002, ‘the 
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction_ and the more compelling the case for 
taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and 
place o f the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the 
United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively’ (NSS: 15).
In the midst of a threat greatly accentuated by political leaders, fear of terrorism firmly set 
in. Independently of the ‘real’ motivations behind the American invasion o f Iraq, which 
would typically cover a range o f economic to strategic interests, the course of action 
adopted by the administration was made possible through the great violence exercised on
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political discourse. The US invasion was underwritten by a stupendous discursive effort 
which, at least for a time, made extremely dubious claims and connections seem reasonable. 
Alternative interpretations of the administration’s official justifications to attack Iraq were 
all but forbidden and the American media succumbed to a high patriotic fever. Along with 
establishing the necessity to preserve the existential attributes of freedom and democracy at 
all cost, fear once again ‘provided the necessary glue to meld otherwise uncorroborated 
statements, assumptions, predictions, and ideas in the case o f war. Official discourse turned 
the assessment o f a hypothetical danger into the absolute proof o f real danger’ (Halper and 
Clarke, 2004: 232). Through all sorts o f other incentives such as the color coded scale of 
threat (yellow, orange, red), fear was produced and perpetuated. As Zizek comments ‘we 
should therefore interpret the different levels o f the Alert Code (red, orange) as a strategy to 
control the necessary level of excitation, and it is precisely through such a permanent state 
o f emergency, in which we are interpellated to participate through our readiness, that power 
asserts its hold over us’ (Zizek 2003:98-99). The political use of these discursive strategies 
was substantial, as it enabled the adoption of technical and legal provisions deemed 
necessary for the greater control of people and goods inside and outside of the US. But 
perhaps the boldest and potentially most consequential discursive coup was the 
establishment of an equivalence between national and international interest. Through it, the 
United States can not only be absolved of any wrongdoing in its self-interested foreign 
ventures, it represents itself created as a monolithic entity which confuses its national 
identity for abstract principles like freedom. Any imperfections that may arise from a 
political or even plainly realistic assessment o f the United States’ cultural and economic 
differentiations are therefore pushed out by insistent discursive machinations, which many 
Americans come reproduce in their own notion o f identity and politics.
4.2 American Govemmentality in Iraq
Once political authorities had substituted the uncertainty o f the terrorist threat with the 
necessity o f ousting Saddam Hussein, the mission to democratize Iraq begun. The safety of 
American nationals was made to depend on transforming the mindset and institutional 
make-up o f Iraq. Here, the investing o f a specific space and population with an advanced 
liberal framework was not intrinsic to the circulation o f standards of global governance 
through NGO’s, trade and other vectors, it was the product of a conscious decision by the 
United States government, which was enabled by particular intellectual and discursive 
forces. The decision to go to war was part o f a wider pre-emptive logic, which aimed to
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instate a particular kind of government in the interest o f the moral good and national 
security. War therefore produces biopower in that its final purpose is to regulate and control 
rather than react and repel. As Hardt and Negri attest; ‘whereas “defense” involves a 
protective barrier against external threats, “security” justifies a constant martial activity 
equally in the homeland and abroad’ (2004: 21). Government through security is then a 
creative task which extends itself into a limitless future. The use of force to bring about 
regime change is seen as legitimate so long as it is successful in producing a certain kind of 
domestic order in line with the self-evident principles espoused by the American 
administration. As Hardt and Negri sustain, the American venture o f ‘nation building’ in 
Iraq has less to do with assisting internal forces in their quest for self determination than 
with imposing external administrative, political and economic models (2004:23). In the end 
though, the project of universal democratization, concocted by neoconservatives and 
partially adopted by the Bush administration, required a territorial anchor to come into 
effect. Sovereign power therefore designates a space upon which to introduce specific 
governmental plans, but it is also actual in the daily enforcement of these extraneous 
practices. Initiatives coordinated by the US army and by local police and military forces aim 
to secure private, public and non-governmental agencies, which go about the business of 
diffusing the means and standards for self-government, efficiency and transparency.
Up to 9/11, the rationality behind the allocation of foreign aid involved an increasing array 
o f economic and political requirements, which ultimately aimed at making recipient 
countries self-managing. After 9/11, development is formally included in the president’s 
National Security Strategy (2002) as the third pillar o f national security after defense and 
diplomacy. Development, good governance, economic growth and humanitarian assistance 
are then no longer solely morally commendable objectives fostered by the free market and 
issue based organizations, they have become crucial assets to the security o f the United 
States. Again, the association of political and economic endeavours with security provides a 
powerful justification for promoting the liberal democratic model abroad. Equally, the 
association of aid with the pre-emptive strategy of global democratization provides it with 
more legitimacy. In line with the Millennium goals for development, US foreign assistance 
was set to rise from 10 billion in 2002 to 15 billion in 2006. As the administrator of US AID 
attested in a 2002 document entitled Foreign Aid in the National Interest; Promoting 
freedom, Security and Opportunity, ‘U.S. assistance can do much to shape the 21st century’ 
(USAID, 2002).
193
The implementation of security measures at home amounts to restricting usual freedoms. 
However, the extension of freedom abroad is itself a security measure. This represents a 
dual state of exception, which forfeits the normal legal and governmental operations of 
national and international neoliberal forms o f governance. These developments seem to 
confirm the historical shift towards a more restrictive kind of politics in the United States of 
which neoconservatism is an indication. The outward projection of particular governmental 
forms and its linkage with security has, as Mark Duffield (2005) argues, has a lot in 
common with colonialism. In a show of military and political force, US policy makers 
designated Iraq as a threat to national security, thereby marking a territorial space and a 
population to transform according to its own technical and intellectual benchmarks. In 
coordination with the Iraqi government and the international community, the President’s 
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, released in 2005, laid out the three main ‘tracks’ to 
victory; the security track, which ‘emphasizes the capacity o f Iraqis to secure themselves,’ 
the ‘economic track,’ which will help ‘the Iraqi government set the foundation for a sound 
and self-sustaining economy with the capacity to deliver essential services,’ and finally the 
‘political track’ which ‘works to forge a broadly supported national compact for democratic 
governance’ (USAID, 2006). The three tracks all insist on achieving self-sustaining 
administrative structures. In contrast with the foreign aid strategies that strove to make some 
states and local communities self-regulating in the 1980’s and 1990’s, the attainment of self­
sustenance is here subject to the direct and forceful intervention of American troops and 
political operatives. Iraqi self-sustenance is all the more important as it is linked to the 
security o f the American state as well as its military and its political credibility.
USAID’s effort in Iraq is substantial. In 2003, the portfolio for the transition to a ‘stable, 
democratic, and prosperous’ Iraq was estimated at 5.2 billion. The ambition of the agency’s 
assistance program is first to defeat the insurgency by changing the mindset o f frustrated 
young Iraqis, employing local people in infrastructural projects and by developing a 
participatory civil society as well as educational campaigns about human rights. Second, 
USAID is committed to providing expertise in the drafting o f a national constitution which 
would include the representation of women and of the main ethnic groups. At the request of 
local electoral commissions partly set up by USAID, the UN was also called in to supervise 
the 2005 elections (USAID, 2005:10). The concerted effort of American bilateral assistance 
and international organizations then amounts to transforming, although one could also say 
‘creating,’ an entire political structure by establishing working central and decentralized 
authorities. Thirdly, the American administration intends to create a functioning market
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economy in Iraq. To do so, it seeks to privatize many state-owned enterprises, open up the 
Iraqi market to international investment and instate the appropriate business skills and 
regulations to generate a thriving private sector (USAID, 2005: 20). Most of the plans 
concerning the transition to a market economy insist on engaging Iraqis in the process. 
However, Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority from May 2003 to 
June 2004, set very favorable conditions for foreign firms and foreign workers. Executive 
order 39 on foreign investment stipulates that 100% of businesses in sectors except oil, 
mineral extraction, banks and insurance companies must be under foreign ownership. It also 
issues ownership licenses for up to 40 years and allows firms to repatriate all their profits 
(Juhasz, 2004: 3,5). As a laboratory for the fabrication of a pacified political space, where 
market capitalism and democracy reinforce each other in the pursuit o f constant betterment, 
Iraq is subject to the imposition of an extraneous ideal. Even as they take account of cultural 
sensitivities, the spirit of these reforms effectively requires Iraqis to embrace an alien 
subjectivity in order to function adequately within the new rules o f life in their country.
Just as it would rather dismiss suggestions of lasting democratic and economic imbalances 
inside the US, the administration, USAID included, is notably averse to criticism of the 
reconstruction effort. As Journalist Bob Woodward (2006) attests, White House 
representatives like former secretary o f state Donald Rumsfeld persistently denied the 
failure o f plans for Iraq. In fact, despite the sustained optimism of the White House with 
regards to progress in Iraq, even at the height of violence in 2006, the reconstruction effort 
was punctuated by several irregularities. A congressional investigation into Halliburton’s 
Billing system found that the company had been consistently overcharging for its services 
(Chatterjee, 2004: 56-57). USAID’s main contractor, San Francisco based Bechtel, second 
only to Halliburton in total awards, was criticized for botching the repair o f many schools 
(Chatteijee, 2004: 74-80). Another example is the coalition’s allocation o f a 4.8 million 
contract to Stevedoring Services of America (SSA), a notoriously anti-union corporation, 
over capable Iraqi administrators to manage Umm Qasr seaport (Juhasz, 2004: 5). In a 
similar vein, European contractors who had dealt with the Iraqi government in the past were 
barred from obtaining contracts, thereby preventing local engineers from getting the 
necessary parts and expertise. The projected involvement o f individual, local and 
international partners for the reconstruction of Iraq has therefore been hampered by the 
prioritization of American interests. As yet, the objective of making Iraq into a pacified, 
self-governing space, has relied less on encouraging the individual propensities towards 
self-government from a distance, than with imposing rigid archetypes of freedom,
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entrepreneurship and political representation. As Mitchell Dean argues, in reference to the 
authoritarian elements o f advanced liberalism which bear down on the poor both 
domestically and beyond national borders; ‘governing through freedom... does not 
necessarily means that individuals should be governed as if  they were already capable of 
such autonomy’ (Dean, 2007:119). In spite of the governmental developments conveyed by 
the multiplication o f regulatory and decisional instances on Iraqi soil, the orchestration of 
the reconstruction effort remains under the control of a few major political, security and 
economic actors. As we have seen above, the US’ democratizing mission seems to have 
more to do with transposing extraneous states of mind and structures than with encouraging 
the ability of foreign subjects to respond to criteria of good governance and efficiency. 
Again, this enjoins us to further qualify the existence of a global kind of govemmentality, 
which would suppose the obsolescence of economic and political power.
Conclusion
The visible resurgence o f sovereign power through the normalization of exceptional security 
measures, as expressed in the suspension of law and in the enactment of pervasive 
surveillance systems, seemed to introduce a rupture in the modes of power that have 
currency in a ‘normalized’ society. Sovereign power is in many ways necessary to the 
operation o f biopower as it provides the initial motivation behind the disposition of things 
and the means to protect and manage people. Through an initial assessment o f security 
needs, the sovereign may govemmentalize, that is to say render normal, a set of exceptional 
security measures. To do this in modem liberal democracies, the population’s own 
expectations of and desire for health and security must, to some extent, be met. This is 
where discursive injunctions as to the nature o f the threat and the means required to defuse 
it were put to good use by a variety of authoritative voices. Once certain interpretations 
were chosen and legitimated, responses to 9/11 showed a preference for executive style 
politics, narrowly understood ideas of moral obligation, widespread suspicion and 
instrumental solutions over political problematizations. In some way, these choices were 
announced by the conservative and neoconservative turn in the recent governmental history 
of the United States. However, the hand of neoconservative ideas in particular can be seen 
much more clearly in the foreign policy choices that have followed the attacks.
In the aftermath o f the attacks, a series of effective discursive injunctions strove to bind 
political discourse on both the domestic and foreign policy fronts. The identity of the
196
attackers, their reason to do so and the retaliatory strategy needed to repair the offense were 
widely agreed upon. Concretely, the US’ general response required circumventing freedoms 
at home at the same time as extending those same freedoms abroad in a bid to pre-empt the 
very temptation o f terror. Since the means, locations or intentions of the terrorists were 
difficult to assess or predict, the risk of a permanent state o f exception which is forsaking 
usual legal protections at home and motivating the expansion o f American govemmentality 
abroad, still haunts America’s future.
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Conclusion
The thesis’ main objective was to evaluate the critical potential o f govemmentality by 
looking at the practices, calculations, techniques and ideas within the political rationalities 
of the last 40 years in the United States. In the hope o f unveiling the unseen requirements 
for adapted and successful forms of subjectivity in the American context, it was first 
necessary to interrogate and qualify govemmentality’s theoretical premises. While a lot of 
those who have used Foucault in various social sciences have done so sparingly or for very 
precise purposes, I tried to look at the totality of his work in order to contextualize and 
strengthen his studies on government. While the right to kill, to neglect or to oppress 
remained effectual within the American polity, notions such as territorial integrity and 
centralized political authority remained vital in any understanding of International 
Relations. The retrieval o f Foucault’s thoughts on sovereignty, but also on discipline and 
discourse, helped to further qualify some of the governmental strategies that applied to both 
the domestic and foreign policy realms.
We have seen that Foucault has had considerable influence on a variety o f poststructural 
strands in International Relations. However, the extension o f govemmentality to 
International Relations in particular, although promising, cannot be applied with the same 
efficacy as it is to national contexts throughout the Western world. The degree to which 
cultural, institutional and discursive channels relay neoliberal rationalities of rule changes 
drastically from one state to the other. The development of global govemmentality signifies 
that narrowly defined spaces of subjectification, which include the cultural and institutional 
transmission of particular dispositions like democratic consciousness, honesty and personal 
motivation, are emerging across a great variety o f contexts. However, individuals in various 
geographical and cultural contexts do not perceive norms of neoliberal governance in the 
same way, which means that they may not integrate them evenly. In the thesis, I limited my 
enquiry to the development and projection of American conceptions of rule. Considering the 
political, economic and cultural influence of the US in the world, however, it can be said 
that the technical and intellectual models observed in international governance have been 
largely inspired by American ones. One of the thesis’ main findings was that the general 
critiques which guided reforms and governmental experiments in both realms appeared to 
be very similar, as was shown through the examination of secondary sources and policy 
papers in both areas. This discovery refutes the claim of traditional International Relations 
that domestic and foreign policy are governed by different conditions and exigencies.
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Admittedly, the analysis of foreign assistance constitutes only one aspect of the larger field 
o f foreign policy but it does give a good indication of the bureaucratic, geopolitical and 
governmental strategies conveyed through the foreign policy apparatus.
Whilst traditional historical scholarship seeks to include all the ‘key’ political, social, 
economic and cultural events in order to construct an intelligible narrative, a foucaultian 
take on history writing will usually mean looking at very precise policy domains. In the 
thesis, I traced the history of governmental shifts by looking at specific practices on welfare 
and foreign assistance. The application of foucaultian analytics to the AFDC and US-AID as 
much as the parallel I’m establishing between domestic and international govemmentality 
constitute a novel contribution to the existing research on rationalities o f government.
While a foucaultian approach cannot be confused with traditional historical scholarship, nor 
is it a kind o f historiography or study o f ideology. What Foucault brings to the fore is an 
identification of the conditions of both subjection and objectification that does not refer to 
the usual analytical anchors of individual rationality or structural determinism. With 
Foucault, I contend that a theorization o f the main rationalities o f government, which 
constitute the greater part o f who we are, what we are doing and expected to do as 
individuals, depends on looking at their internal rules o f formation, which are characterized 
by a variety of struggles, combinations and discontinuities.
The historical make up o f American govemmentality presented several particularities. The 
emphasis on individual liberty as the cornerstone o f the republican ideal was willfully 
counterbalanced by the specification o f moral responsibilities tied to the appurtenance to the 
political community. Various manifestations of these currents battled out throughout 
American history. Neoconservatism and communitarianism can be interpreted as 
contemporary instantiations of debates around the definition o f freedom and responsibility 
in a staunchly liberal nation. As non liberal rationalities of government, they combined with 
existing governmental arrangements to create a series of requirements for appropriate kinds 
o f cultural subjectivity.
Modernization, with its belief in progress, rational planning and political democracy, 
established itself as the principal mentality o f rule in the 1960’s. Carried through by a great 
many experts on social policy, Kennedy and Johnson’s plans sought to purge American 
society o f poverty and prejudice. This concerted governmental project implied the
199
objectification of poverty as a ‘condition o f need, helplessness and hopelessness’ 
(Cruikshank, 1999: 73). The poor then needed to become empowered, that is, to integrate a 
range o f personal qualities which would enable their incorporation into the labour market 
and the political sphere. However, even if self-help was the primary normative and 
governmental target of the age, the state assumed most of the responsibility for facilitating 
the process. The peculiar combination of welfare modalities, which in the American context 
meant a state-sponsored effort to create the conditions for ‘opportunity,’ and neoliberal 
ones, which referred to the individual’s capacity for rational choice, constituted the realm of 
intelligibility o f the governmental reasoning in the 1960’s. Modernization was applied with 
even more enthusiasm to foreign policy. Poor countries were constructed and evaluated 
according to a fixed scale of development. The US administration believed that it was both a 
moral and strategic duty to bring underdeveloped countries up to standard. The US then 
concentrated its development efforts on countries tempted to collectivize their national 
economies and potentially move within the Soviet sphere o f influence. By demonstrating 
the concrete benefits of American style welfare capitalism, the underdeveloped world 
subscribe with what US administrators saw as the foremost model of development. As we 
have seen, the exercise o f American military power in Vietnam was supplemented by the 
transfer o f a particular kind of govemmentality in designated parts o f the country.
The self-perpetuating logic of modernization, which according to its proponents would 
bring about material and political improvements to people across the globe, began to falter 
towards the end of the 1960’s. The expectations generated by Great Society ideals could no 
longer be met by the state. While the emphasis on individual responsibility was already in 
motion throughout governmental schemes of the 1960’s, revised notions o f effective and 
fair governance proclaimed the individual as the main source of collective development. In 
a context o f diminishing abundance, dispositions such as hard work, self-sufficiency and 
self-realization became increasingly valued. Welfare and foreign assistance reforms in the 
1970’s then conveyed a shift from a preoccupation for universal entitlements to the 
manipulation of individual incentives. Domestically, more and more requirements were 
attached to welfare payments and disciplinary sanctions awaited recipients who did not 
comply. Just as with the domestic welfare system, the US’ main development agency, AID, 
was reformed according to criteria o f efficiency and many o f the responsibilities for 
development were devolved to recipient countries.
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The strategy of nurturing individual energies in order to lessen dependency and increase 
economic output was given its full articulation by some o f the influential exponents of 
neoliberal philosophy such as Murray, Friedman and Gilder. The 1980’s saw the validation 
of a market rationality across many domains of social life. However, some of the cultural 
manifestations that began in the 1960’s were said to impede upon the realization of a 
prosperous and orderly society. Having reacted to those forces from the very beginning, 
neoconservatives aimed to supplement the neoliberal reliance on the work of a cost and 
benefit rationale with a more assertive role for the state in transmitting and enforcing 
desirable moral qualities. In keeping with the above recommendations, the Reagan 
administration strove to provide a favourable context for the expression of individual 
energies, particularly in the marketplace, and to promote, at least rhetorically, a measure of 
self-restraint, patriotism and family unity. Throughout the governmental schemes o f the 
1980’s, the assumption was that welfare subjects and recipient countries were able to 
regulate their own conduct without any other assistance than the prospect o f severe 
sanctions on the one side, and the widely diffused image of a successful, stable and virtuous 
existence on the other. Throughout Reagan’s tenure, the state then expressed its violence 
through ever stricter controls on welfare eligibility but also through the discursive 
intensification of the supposed threats posed by internal and external enemies. This 
disciplinary turn, which had at its core the institutional stimulation and enforcement of 
individual responsibility, was to become a lasting foundation for the governmental 
rationalities that followed. In the foreign policy realm, Reagan asserted the inherent 
goodness o f American endeavours and contrasted them with the malevolence o f Soviet 
deeds. The insistent constitution of enmity as a means to deploy power upon internal and 
external enemies was also periodically called upon in the following decades.
In the 1990’s, the expressions o f an undiluted neoliberal rationality o f government 
generated doubts as to the ability o f a market based logic to involve and empower local, 
regional and national communities. Many commentators saw that the excessive emphasis on 
the liberation of the individual’s creative energies had in fact accelerated the disintegration 
o f traditional community networks and family life. Although individual responsibility and 
market deregulation had become established pillars of government, other individual 
longings for selfless involvement in ethical initiatives began to enter governmental 
calculations. In the multilayered and complex governmental image of contemporary 
subjectivity, individuals were endowed not only with the capacity to choose among a variety 
o f services provided by private agents who competed for their custom, but also associated
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with a variety of cultural tastes and ethical identifications. As a result o f the moralization of 
the governmental sphere, development was progressively taken up by organizations with 
specific political, economic and humanitarian aims. However, the introduction of this 
ethical questioning was subject to a variety of competing claims. Among the more 
consequential interpretations of the ethical were advanced by communitarian and 
neoconservative commentators. While communitarians usually favoured popular 
consultation to work through contemporary challenges in multicultural societies, 
neoconservatives continued to promote fixed standards of moral behaviour. As we saw with 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act o f 1996, the legal 
validation of heterosexual marriage and abstinence went alongside the provision of 
community-based assistance. Overall, governance in the 1990’s carried through the general 
demand for administrative efficiency and integrated the ethical identifications of individual 
citizens. However, as opposed to formulating a radical critique of neoliberalism, 
government through community actually furthered the establishment o f effective 
management as the most meaningful and consequential political criteria.
Although the greater license to punish and exclude in the 1980’s denoted the subtle 
manoeuvres of sovereign power and confirmed the authoritarian features of advanced 
liberalism (Dean; 2007), it is really after the attacks of 9/11 that sovereign power extended 
itself more completely alongside the usual operations of govemmentality. I argue that, to an 
extent, the disciplinary turn initiated in the 1980’s as well as the incremental restrictions on 
the meaning of the main terms of political discourse, prepared the ground for the discursive 
and political responses to 9/11. The resurgence o f sovereign power was actual through the 
normalization of exceptional security measures. The estimations of threat issued by a series 
of discursive authorities came to constitute the necessity to pre-empt insecurity through 
increased surveillance at home and regime change abroad. In both realms, the logic of 
securitizing strategies was presented as unequivocal. As a culmination of the movement 
towards the closure o f political potentialities and of the progressive stultification of relations 
of power, I argue that post 9/11 politics confirm worrying trends in recent American 
govemmentality.
In chapters one and two, I attempted to specify the content and role o f both governmental 
and sovereign power. While govemmentality appeared to present relatively straightforward 
analytical claims and empirical applications, the investigation of sovereign power, as 
conceived by Foucault, introduced some difficulties. So far, few theorists have attempted to
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work through this problematic conjunction. Mitchell Dean’s Governing Societies (2007), to 
which I have referred throughout the thesis, offers one of the more serious attempts to 
problematize and integrate sovereign power to the govemmentality framework from a 
sociological perspective. In his book, Dean highlights the authoritarian features through 
which an advanced liberal rationality o f rule has maintained and perpetuated itself. Judith 
Butler’s Precarious Life (2003) explores the ways in which the recent war on terror has 
rejuvenated the state’s ability to ‘extend its own domain, its own necessity, and the means 
by which its self-justification’ (2003: 55). Butler’s account o f the suspension of law after 
9/11 and o f the consequent extension of decisional powers to unelected government officials 
is close to my own understanding o f sovereign power, which I associate with the 
permanence of decisionism and intentionality in an amongst the general governmental 
preoccupation with generating and maintaining freedom.
In International Relations scholarship, several commentators have also attempted to 
reinscribe sovereign power within the globalization of liberal govemmentality. Jabri’s War 
and the Transformation o f  Global Politics points to late modem wars as multifaceted power 
containers which do not only suggest ‘a sovereign capacity to kill, but the power to 
discipline and to regulate social life’ (2007a: 61). In the context of contemporary wars, of 
which Iraq is a prime example, the modification of local structures and behaviours through 
extensive regulatory designs has become intimately linked with the physical violence 
wrought on designated populations. Importantly, the extension of liberal peace is now 
conducted in the name of humanity and relies on the discursive categorization of those who 
oppose the perpetuation o f the cosmopolitan project as ‘monstrous’ or ‘inhuman’ (2007a:
65). As Jabri points out; ‘crucial to present day modes of colonization and their display of 
sovereign power is that such display combines with legitimizing discourses that constitute 
the recipient, or target, populations as subjects of humanitarian concern’ (2007a: 151). 
Expressions of sovereign power are then accompanied by discursive objectifications that 
lend legitimacy to the destruction or modification of populations constructed as threatening 
or unethical. Jabri’s emphasis on the necessity to integrate sovereign power to a 
governmental analysis and on the role of discourse in constituting objects o f governmental 
intervention or in legitimizing humanitarian interventions, is close to my own interpretation 
o f the intimate link between discourse, sovereign power and government.
In the Politics o f  Insecurity (2007), Jef Huysmans examines the question from the 
perspective o f migration and asylum in the European Union. He does so by drawing the
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differences and possible overlaps between a ‘juridical-territorial rendering’ of the European 
Union with its inbuilt definition of legal and illegal movement, and a ‘biopolitical 
technique’ which monitors the European population and identifies the elements that are 
potentially prejudicial to its overall health and prosperity (Huysmans, 2007:103-104). In his 
analysis, Huysmans combines the linguistic and existential constitution o f objects of 
insecurity with the technocratic rendering of security issues that concern the European 
Union as a territorial and ‘cultural’ entity. Aside from looking at the discursive and 
institutional productions o f fear, Huysmans lends attention to the ‘development o f and 
application of technological devices, such as European visa and databases, professional 
knowledge and skills, and technocratic routines’ (2007: 86) involved in the generation and 
management o f both freedom and security. Both Huysmans and Jabri’s work go some way 
into extending and reinforcing the govemmentality framework in International Relations by 
integrating sovereign power, discursive categorizations and institutional practices to their 
analyses. Where my analysis differs slightly is in the inclusion of ideological constructions 
as important discursive resources that feed into the constitution o f subjectivity as well as in 
the attribution of a role to agencies of authority in determining threats and measures to 
prevent them.
Although some headway has been made, more theoretical and empirical work is needed to 
explore the subtleties of juridical power. As hinted in chapter two, sovereignty is not solely 
a means to express commands, it may also be ‘a form of joint undertaking in pursuit o f a 
common substantive objective’ (Loughlin, 2003:16). The aspects of sovereignty associated 
with regulatory and normalizing mechanisms imply that some of the political and cultural 
experiments that have taken place outside of the conventional political channels have 
eventually been integrated into law. As I see it, further analysis of sovereign power’s 
relationship to law, political theory and ideology would alleviate its frequent associations 
with purely prohibitive features.
In the thesis, I have suggested that the now famous foucaultian formula, that is the 
persistence of a power to kill and let live alongside a power to govern, discipline and 
regulate, should be reinforced by the identification and examination of the sources of 
authority that are applying their knowledge and expertise to determine the nature of a threat 
to the security o f the biopolitical order and to take the measures that they deem necessary to 
pre-empt it. Having said that, the thesis does not claim to have fully elucidated the complex 
conjunction between the two either at the national or the international level. My objective
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was to propose a workable theoretical interpretation of sovereign power within a 
governmental framework and connect it to empirical manifestations in contemporary 
American history. I have also suggested, moving away from Foucault and govemmentality, 
that the ideological features of rationalities of government like neoliberalism and 
neoconservatism were important elements in the constitution of governmental strategies at 
any given time. The elaboration and choice o f particular policies do not solely derive from 
the internal constitution of govemmentality, they are partly a function of the ideologues and 
policy makers whom either criticize previous rationalities of government or facilitate the 
extension of particular governmental strategies. One of the main ambitions of the thesis was 
to balance the investigation of policy papers and secondary sources with a variety of 
theoretical claims about govemmentality. Incidentally, this hesitation between archival 
work and a number o f tentative theoretical claims constitute some of the limitations of the 
project. On the one hand, the thesis could have benefited from a more extensive consultation 
o f primary sources and greater access to US government archives, particularly before the 
1990’s. Perhaps it could also have examined a wider range o f practices in areas such as 
security, health care or philanthropy in order to further highlight the circulation of 
governmental standards across policy realms. On the other hand, were it not for the 
temptation to anchor my analytical claims empirically, the thesis could well have turned out 
into a theoretical exploration of the possible combinations, pitfalls or possibilities involved 
in the conflation of sovereign power and government. Also, since I was more interested in 
outlining how the operation of specific practices, in the form of either ingenious suggestions 
or outright impositions, generated various conceptualizations of personhood in 
contemporary America, I did not address the question o f the possibility o f transgressing the 
rules and incitements that pointed to particular kinds o f subjectivity. The full articulation of 
an ethics o f resistance inspired by foucaultian premises would be the subject of another 
project. However, in a partial response to Foucault’s critics about the inescapability of 
power and in a bid to highlight the strengths of his philosophical position, I suggest a 
preliminary account of Foucault’s reflexions on freedom, resistance and ethics.
Clearly, Foucault was more concerned with how basic distinctions between normal and 
abnormal, guilt and innocence come about than how particular ills may be remedied through 
political intervention. However, towards the end o f his life, in a series o f texts and 
interviews grouped under the heading Ethics and Subjectivity {1984), Foucault specified his 
position on the conditions of political change;
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‘since the 19th century, great political institutions and great political parties have 
confiscated the process of political creation; that is, they have tried to give political 
creation the form of apolitical program in order to take over power. I think what 
happened in the sixties and early seventies is something to be preserved. One of the 
things that I think should be preserved, however, is the fact that there has been 
political innovation, political creation, and political experimentation outside the great 
political parties, and outside the normal or ordinary program. It’s a fact that people 
everyday lives have changed from the early sixties to now.. It has changed the attitude 
of people who do not belong to these movements’ (Foucault, 1997: 172-173).
On the one hand, Foucault argues for innovative political experiments developing out o f the 
subject’s refusal of present institutional and cultural modes and on the other, he seems to 
favour the legal integration of the claims that derive from those refusals. Even though he 
hesitates to see the emancipation of marginal social elements throughout the 1960’s and 
1970’s in juridical terms, he explicitly prefers those ‘partial transformations in certain 
cultural domains ... to the programs for a new man that the worst political systems have 
repeated throughout the 20th century’ (1997: 316). What preoccupies him is not so much the 
ongoing struggles expressed in the political arena than the a-historical visions of Man from 
which many of them develop. Cultural projects of humanistic inspiration, with definite ideas 
about appropriate modes o f individual morality and political participation, foreclose 
aesthetic but also political experimentation. Recent history in the West from the 1960’s to 
our day illustrates that cultural experiments on the self outside o f conventional institutional 
channels, have had considerable influence on a series and important legal and political 
changes. However, such aesthetic and political expressions are almost always, if sometimes 
only partially, recuperated in law. A permanent awareness of the actuality o f these ongoing 
assimilations is required if there is any hope of fashioning new forms of subjectifivity. 
Resistance, Foucault maintains, can and should only develop out of the ‘contemporary 
limits o f the necessary that is, toward what is or is no longer indispensable for the 
constitution o f ourselves as autonomous subjects’ (1997: 313). Any notion o f resistance 
begins with the individual subject’s encounter with power in its specific and immediate 
forms. However, this encounter only becomes ethical when the subject reflects upon and 
analyses the limits of his or her own constitution within current assemblages of power.
Foucault sees ethics as a constant process of self-creation, a conscientious evaluation of the 
self and of its location and definition within conventional social interaction. The perpetual 
awareness and possible transgression of what constitutes us is also what informs the modem 
idea o f critique. Following one of Kant’s lesser known essays What is Enlightenment?,
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Foucault describes Enlightenment as a critical ethos. He argues that Enlightenment no 
longer has to do with ‘the search for formal structures with universal value’ but rather with 
‘a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to 
recognize ourselves as subjects o f what we are doing, thinking, saying’ (1997: 315). The 
conscious articulation o f ourselves and the appreciation o f the limits of our understanding is 
a typically modem, enlightened attitude. Referring to Baudelaire’s aestheticized figure of 
the dandy, Foucault depicts modernity as an attitude to the present and an acceptation o f its 
contingency, which may be transfigured and transgressed in an imaginary and poetic 
extension of itself. The ethical subject of modernity fashions itself as a work o f art, as an 
object in perpetual becoming which surfaces out of an agonistic encounter with the real. The 
possibility of resistance therefore emerges from the simultaneous assimilation and 
transgression of the current norms that define individuality. However, the question remains 
to determine if  this ethos o f aesthetic and political criticism can be transformed into some 
kind o f normative appraisal o f particular social, cultural and historical developments.
Although it would often appear that Foucault allocates more importance to aesthetic forms 
of refusal and experimentation, his last texts contain signs what I would call a minimalist 
normativity. While he insists that subjects must play the games o f truth deployed within 
modem govemmentality, nowhere does he deny the importance of being aware of the 
peculiar games of truth played out in the realms of law and politics. To be sure, Foucault 
does not provide a positive appreciation o f the liberal state, but he nonetheless hints at the 
liberal art o f government’s flexibility and at its uncanny ability to accommodate different 
political claims. Foucault therefore remains at the limit o f the moral promise of the 
enlightenment, o f which liberalism is an embodiment, by refusing to give in to a 
reformulation and pursuit o f its universal ideals. By adopting an ethos of absolute caution, 
against the crystallization o f power relations, he settles for less domination as a principle of 
minimal ethics in the political realm. As Simon puts it ‘a regime is judged unfavourably as 
dominative because it minimizes the possibilities for strategic reversal and thereby confines 
practices of liberty’ (Simons, 1995: 86). Essentially, Foucault insists on the contingency of 
the political, and seems to suggest that is it less dangerous to pursue changes in the 
disposition o f political power according to the requirements of the present situation than to 
subsume it through the externally generated ethical rules.
To bring Foucault’s claim a little further, I would suggest that an ethos o f perpetual 
awareness, even if it is bound by juridical objectifications, must also apply to a distinctly
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political realm in order to avoid a complete withdrawal o f critical theory unto aesthetics. 
Despite the hindrance o f political creativity by big-party politics, it is equally important that 
local forms of resistance generate actual political grievances and that individuals be 
acquainted with the rules of parliamentarian democracy. Technologies o f government are 
themselves found in between power relations, understood here as ‘strategic games between 
liberties,’ and states o f domination, understood as a capacity to have others act according to 
our will (Foucault, 1997: 299). If the cultural and psychological requirements for success 
and happiness have to do with a strategic game between liberties, states o f domination are 
more akin to an executive decision to suspend law. Both o f these realms open up 
possibilities of resistance. Manifestations of state power may then create the conditions for 
resistance and public scrutiny (Jabri, 2007b). When manipulated and called upon by 
sovereign authority in a somewhat arbitrary fashion, security measures, which aim to 
preserve life and liberty through technical means, can become politicised, resisted and 
changed.
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